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ABSTRACT 
S. T. Coleridge's religious thought may be compared with 
the 1 Prison 1 etchings of Piranesi, where the limitations of 
finite being constantly aspire towards the infinite. His 
poetic art and literary criticism embrace the Romantic 
fascination with the fragmentary ruin which intimates a 
greater and unseen whole, the infinite glimpsed through the 
finite. Coleridge occupies a representative place in 
European and English Romantic thought on poetry, religion, 
and the role of the artist . 
. His religious thinking maintains an overall unity 
through his life. Hartley's necessitarianism is linked with 
later concerns insofar as one of Coleridge's constant themes 
is of human sin and the need for redemption. The earliest 
prose writings attend to the nature of the imagination. In 
Coleridge's reading of Boehme and Giordano Bruno and in 'The 
Eolian Harp' (1795) is discovered a consideration of the law 
of Polarity, which was to develop into the Trinitarian 
musings of the late notebooks. Polar Logic underlies his 
major poetry, philosophical and theological thinking. 
The great poems) 'Kubla Khan', 'The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner', and the 'Dejection' Ode are a necessary prelude to 
the prose writings of the. middle period of his life. Self-
reflection upon the processes of creating poetry and art, 
particularly in the Biographia Literaria, is an important 
development in Coleridge's sense of the relation of the 
finite to the infinite through the inspiration of the poet. 
Attention to the nature of inspiration, imagination and irony 
in creative writing leads directly to his later discussions 
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of man's need of a divine redeemer and the nature of divine 
revelation. 
The later poetry continues these themes. 'Limbo' and 
1 Ne Plus Ultra' are fine poems of self-reflection in which 
spiritual growth is part and parcel of poetic development, 
each balancing the other. The final section of this study 
considers Coleridge's later prose, linking his reflections 
upon poetry with an epistemology which he learnt principally 
from Kant and Fichte in a discussion of revelation and 
radical evil. In conclusion, his religious position is 
summed up through the late, and still unpublished, notebooks, 
and the fragmentary remains of the long-projected Opus 
Maximum. 
The issues discussed in Coleridge's work are linked with 
a more recent debate on the nature of inspiration, poetic and 
divine which arises out of Austin Farrer's Bampton Lectures, 
The Glass of Vision (1948). 
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PREFACE 
I am grateful for the help which I have received in 
preparing this study from the Durham University Library; the 
British Library, Department of Manuscripts; the Bodleian 
Library, Oxford; the English Faculty Library, Oxford; and the 
Devon Record Office. To Hatfield College I am obliged for 
the research fellowship which enabled me to undertake the 
work in the first place, and for continuous help during the 
years of its development. I am indebted also to the Cleaver 
Trustees for their generous support. Jvly wife and I owe to 
Lord and Lady Coleridge the memory of a delightful visit to 
their house in Ottery St. Mary, where the hospitality was 
matched by their patience in answering questions about STC. 
Part of the material of chapter 4 is to be published as 
'The Two Worlds of Coleridge's "Rime of the Ancient Mariner" 1 
in J. R. Watson (ed.), English Romanticism (Edinburgh, 1983); 
material from chapter 6, as 'S. T. Coleridge: the Poet as 
Theologian. Two Late Poems' in The Modern Churchman (1983); 
and material from chapter 7, as 'Philosophy and Revealed 
Religi0n: S. T. Coleridge - the Later Years' in The Durham 
University Journal (December, 1983). 
My thanks are due to the many individuals who have 
assisted me by letter or in conversation, and particularly to 
Dr. John Coulson, Dr. F. W. Dillistone, Dr. Stephen Prickett 
and Dr. Geoffrey Rowell. Dr. David Whewell of the Department 
of Philosophy, Durham University, patiently helped me with my 
reading of Kant. James Green, of the Division of Religion 
and Philosophy, Sunderland Polytechnic, enabled me to refer 
to information on material in current research in Britain 
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stored in the Polytechnic computer. Mr. Jack PriestJey of 
the School of Education, Exeter University, introduced me to 
Lord and Lady Coleridge. Mr D. B. Sinclair photographed the 
print of the young S. T. Coleridge. Mrs Jane Bonner helped 
me with the German translations, which, with translations 
from French, are my own unless otherwise acknowledged in the 
footnotes. I am grateful to Mrs. Frances Durkin for 
undertaking the laborious task of typing the final text. 
Most of all, however, whatever I have achieved is due to the 
energy and enthusiasm of Dr. Ann Loades of the Department of 
Theology, Durham University - a fine scholar, a wise 
teacher, and a good friend. 
Finally, with love and gratitude for their unfailing 
support, I dedicate this study to my mother and father. 
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Revealed truth does not lie in propositions or sentences or 
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interwoven by inspired imagination 
Charles C. Hefling, Jacob's Ladder 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Many years ago, when. I was looking over Piranesi's 
Antiquities of Rome, Mr. Coleridge, who was standing by, 
described to me a set of plates by that artist, called 
his Dreams, and which record the scenery of his own 
visions during the delirium of a fever. Some of them 
(I describe only from memory of Mr. Coleridge's account) 
represented vastGothic halls: on. the floor of which 
stood all sorts of engines and machinery, wheels, cables, 
pulleys, levers, catapults, &c. &c. expressive of 
enormous power put forth and resistance overcome. 
Creeping along the sides of the walls, you perceived a 
staircase; and upon it, groping his way upwards, was 
Piranesi himself: follow the stairs a little further, 
and you perceive it come to a sudden abrupt termination, 
without any balustrade, and allowing no step onwards to 
him who had reached the extremity, except into the 
depths below. Whatever is to become of poor Piranesi, 
you suppose, at least, that his labours must in some way 
terminate here. But raise your. eyes, and behold a 
second flight of. stairs still higher: on which again 
Piranesi is perceived, by this time standing on the very 
brink of the abyss. Again elevate.your eye, and a still 
more aerial flight of stairs is beheld: and again is 
poor Piranesi busy on his aspiring labours: and so on, 
until the unfinished stairs and. Piranesi both are lost 
in the upper gloom of the hall. With the same power of 
endless growth and1 self-reproduction did my architecture proceed in dreams. 
A search through Coleridge's writings, in published form 
and in the still unpublished British Library notebooks, has 
yielded only one reference to the work of the Venetian 
architect and engraver Giovanni Battista Piranesi (1720-78). 
In a letter of 3 November 1814 to the poet John Kenyon, 
Coleridge describes Jeremy Taylor's 'Letter on original sin' 
as, in one sense, a 'Countenance that looks towards his 
Followers- ... all weather-eatenp dim, noseless, a Ghost in 
Marble - such as you may have seen represented in many of 
Piranesi 1 s astounding Engravings from Rome & the Campus 
Martius 1 • 2 Taylor on Original Sin is discussed at great 
length in Aids to Reflection (1825). Piranesi's etchings of 
anciant and modern Rome and the Carceri d 1 Invenzione (begun 
c.l745, reworked 1761), or The Prisons, became known in 
~ 
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England through the admiration of English art connoisseurs on 
the Grand Tour. His exaggerated.visions o~ grandeur were 
carried into.English romanticism by their recognition in the 
J. i•i. W. Turner 
(1775-1851) and Horace Walpole (1717-97), who, in 1771, wrote 
of 1 the sublime dream of Piranesi ... he has imagined scenes 
that would startle. geometry, and exhaust the Indies to 
realize' . 3 Piranesi 1 s Prisons, called by De Quincey his 
Dreams, have frequently been compared with Edmund Burke's 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of.our Ideas of the 
Sublime and the Beautiful (1757) as analyses of the effect of 
'infinity and things multiplied wLthout end', and of the 
relationship between the finite and the infinite.4 
Coleridge, in his turn, was affected by these 
extraordinary etchings, expressions of a deep spiritual 
conflict which, in many ways, matches his own. Philip Hofer 
describes how Piranesi 1 s 
... etched lines dance and soar, stimulating the 
beholder's imagination at the same time that they fill 
him with wonder, a deep sadness and a sense of mystery. 
Where do these immense vaults actually end? To what 
further fastnesses do the innumerable staircases and 
balconies lead? What tortures are suggested by the 
projecting beams, whe~ls, ropes, chains and less clearly 
defined means of punishment? Wh.o are those wretched 
beings one occasionally glimpses chained and fastened 
to the great rings in the walls! By whose authority 
were they put there, and for what cause? For all 
Piranesi 1 s barely outlined5and emaciated, ragged figure subjects defy analyBis ... 
If De Quincey 1 s report is. to be trusted, Coleridge seems to 
have placed Piranesi within the prison, and identified 
himself with Piranesi. The great pieces of machinery express 
power exercised against power .in a series of counterbalances, 
tensioned like the poles of.a vast magnet. He himself, an 
insignificant and indLstinct figure, Ls. seen toildng up a 
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staircase which ascends mysteriously and infinitely into the 
vaulted recesses.. Aspiration matches. the endlessness of a 
prison which both traps the artist in his finitude-and 
suggests a possible .escape into infinity for the man who 
would persevere against terrible odds.. The toils of 
mortality are dreadful engines of torture and chains which 
hang heavily, yet aspiration is infinite and hope endless. 
The prison itself, and its staircases, is unfinished, an 
emblem of endless growth and possibilit.ies.; the artist is 
repeatedly redisovered,. his figure reflected time and again 
until lost in the indistinctness. of the upper vault. 
Such an image of Coleridge as artist lies at the heart 
of the present study. Through such an image will be examined 
Coleridge's religious and theological conclusions, in the 
belief that art and aesthetics can illuminate and refresh the 
religious life. Obv,ersely, theology may be the conserving 
source for a theory of the almost limitless freedom of the 
artist as inspired creat.or. In Coleridge's. own time, De 
Quincey was aware of tensions in his thought between 
aesthetics and poetry, Christianity and philosophy, 'their 
occasional connections or approaches, and their constant 
mutual repulsions 1 • 6 Ardhdeacon Julius Hare, a theological 
commentator, caught the tone of Piranesi 1 s influence and 
characterized the conflicts of Coleridge's concerns as a 
spiritual quest. He dedicated his book The Mission of the 
Comforter (1846) - 'To the honoured. memory of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, the Christian philosopher, who through dark and 
winding paths of speculation was led to the light, in order 
that others by his.guidance might reach that light 1 • 7 Later 
in the nineteenth century a clear schism occurred between 
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those who read Coleridge as a religious writer and those who 
read him as a poet and literary critic. It was ·most clearly 
focussed in an acrimonious debate in the Fortnightly Review 
. 8 in 1885 between John Tulloch and H. D. Tralll. Tulloch, who 
had emphasized Cole~idge's place in the religious history of 
his century in Movements of Religious Thought in Britain 
during the Nineteenth Century (1885), defended Coleridge as a 
'spiritual thinker' in the tradition of Hooker, Milton and 
Jeremy Taylor. Traill, whose Coleridge was published a year 
earlier, dismisses Coleridge's religious thought as confused 
mysticism, detached, unsystematic and insubstantial. Among 
theologians and in the literary frate~nity, Coleridge 
continued to be a source of inspiration, and occasionally the 
link between his imaginative insight and his sense of the 
divine in the work of theology was recognized. A. C. Swinburne 
wrote that 'the ardour, delicacy, energy of his intellect, 
his resolute desire to get at the root of things and deeper 
yet, if deeper might be, will always enchant and attract all 
spirits of like mould and temper' .9 Nevertheless the sense 
of ruined genius and of what might have been, and the image 
10 
of, in Lamb 1 s words, 1 an Archangel a little damaged 1 , 
remained. Leslie Stephen described Coleridge's career as 
'the history of early promise blighted and vast powers all 
11 but running hopelessly to waste'. 
There is, of course, truth in what Stephen says. Yet, 
as in Piranesi 1 s etchings, the sense of unfinished ruin is a 
necessary element in Coleridge's task. For if it were 
finished and achieved, the book would be closed and infinity 
foreshortened .. The dispute continues in our own time. Some 
have rightly warned against the tendency to regard Coleridge 
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as the omnicompetent master of all that he attempted. Thus, 
recognizing the poor quality of the political Essays on His 
Times which have been republished in thB Colle~ted Coleridge, 
E. P. Thompson has remarked that 'it is altogether proper that 
this inflated reputation should be so damaged' . 12 
Nevertheless, such criticism becomes misguidedly destructive 
when, as in the case of Norman. Fruman 1 s Coleridge, the 
Damaged Archangel (London 1972), the.obsession. with sources, 
Coleridge's plagiarisms and eclecticism and his personal 
shortcomings, serves merely to obscure the entelechy 
governing the diversity of his pursuits. For his notions of 
symbol and imagination give an integrity to his attention to 
religion -where they find their origin - 1 aesthetics, 
literature, ethics and politics. Furthermore, his experience 
as a poet seems to have suggested an analogy between the 
poetic mind and the mind which is imaginatively responsive to 
the fundamental mystery of divine inspiration. The common 
rhetoric for which Coleridge laboured in all his writings has 
been well characterized by Stephen Happel - 'words made 
beautiful by grace' . 13 
Coleridge's position between literature and religion 
might be illustrated by referenc.e. to a paper by Mary Midgley 
in her book Heart and Mind (Brighton,l981), entitled 
'Creation and.Originality'. Mary Midgley denies the notion 
of creating or inventing new moral values through the will, 
for what generates thoughts is the imagination. 1 4 Furthermore, 
thoughts are generated within an unbroken continuum, so that 
new thoughts develop from what has gone befGre, and old 
thoughts do not become. obsolete. In what sense, however, can 
the imagination be .said to generate or create, on the 
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religious model of divine creation, since people are not gods? 
Midgley is specifically using Nietzsche and Sartre in 
giving a religious reference to the notion of creation, 
describing man as God 1 s successor (p. 46). She raises two 
problems from this description. First, that God's creation 
is complete and finished. By analogy, therefore, each of us 
adds not to a developing continuum of creation, but creates 
an individual, self-sufficient and solipsistic world with 
self at the centre. Second, the point of ascribing the task 
of creation to God at all arises out of its essential 
mysteriousness. Is it helpful to transfer such mysteriousness 
to the human craftsman, for do we not therefore end up by 
simply saying that we do not understand at all how it is done, 
whether it be art or the creation of moral values? 
Agnosticism has merely spread from the divine to the human. 
In response to these problems Mary Midgley suggests that 
talk of creating values through the will necessarily involves 
the aping, even the outdoing, of God (p. 48). Nietzsche and 
Sartre are simply trying to fit man into the God-shaped hole, 
left after th~ death of God. Turning more positively to the 
mystery of human originality, she addresses herself first to 
the fact of individuality - that everyone is different. From 
this she draws the expression 'the world is always being 
created anew' (p. 52), since each person's vision of the 
public world is unique, unparalleled, and irreplaceable, and 
she refers to Chesterton's remark that the suicide destroys 
not just one man but the whole world, since his world can 
never come again. 
From the activity of the individual in the world, 
Midgley examines the nature of genius in the individual. What 
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is special about. Blake, Socrates, or - we might add 
Coleridge? Using the image of the mine, and of the individual 
digging within the self, she stresses that, though hard work 
may be necessary., the great artist like Blake or Shakespeare 
will eventually produce what seems much more found than 
deliberately fashioned (p. 55). Thus many artists speak of 
inspiration, and thus it would be odd to make the will central, 
although a willed act of perseverance may be necessary. She 
then makes the important distinction between the individual 
who stands out because merely eccentric and the genius whose 
originality is worth following. Properly, artistic creativity 
is valuable to and addresses humanity as a whole, just as 
does the act of divine creation. 
Creation, therefore, Mary Midgley begins to conclude, is 
something less pretentious than a single, splendid act, but 
is going on all the time, moving and developing. Such 
creation 
demands chiefly courage and clear-headedness. 
Innovators in this field innovate by their acts, not 
by new intellectual feats or by talk. Workers of art 
are, I think, just a special class of such acts .... 
It is the combination that is new, not the elements. 
(pp.57-8) 
In Coleridge, however, we take an important further step. 
For Midgley's artist is no more than the 'maker' described 
by Plato in the Timaeus, who follows the demiurgos or 
supreme artisan in bringing order out of a. pre-existent 
chaos . 15 His facu.lty Coleridge might characterize as the 
secondary Imagination. The primary Imagination, however, as 
'the repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the .infinite I AM 1 , 16 lies in the Judaeo-
Christian theory of God's creativity 'ex nihilo' and 
dependent upon no prior, logical necessity. This tradition 
- 8 -
of Genesis, St. Athanasius and_St. Augustine,. sets before the 
artist the tremendous image. of God's creation. 
In his division of the imagination into primary and 
secondary, Coleridge sets the creative artist between these 
two traditions, the Platonic and the Judaeo-Christian. The 
result is described by Milton Nahm. 
From the perspective of such a reconciliation, the value 
of the theory of unlimited and unrestricted creative 
power ... may be discerned. As philosophic issues, the 
ideas of pure creativity, the unique individual, and 
absolute freedom are for the artist and for the 
aesthetic percipient limiting co~eptions. By using 
them in this way, man may at once measure his present 
achievement in terms of perfection and give himself a 
goal of value, definable, unattainable, but progressively 
approachable without limit. By means of such limiting 
conceptions, the artist adjusts the infinitely variable 
and flexible instruments of art to I~e artistic 
structure and to the aesthetic end. 
The discipline of art, therefore, opens the particular to the 
universal and the finite to the infinite. The Bible, so 
often described by Coleridge in the context of literary 
genius, 'contains a Science of Realities: and therefore each 
of its Elements is at the same time a living GERM, in which 
the Present involves the Future, and in the Finite the 
Infinite exists potentially 1 • 18 In the creativity of the 
artist is born the 'symbol', 'that most glorious birth of the 
God-like within us•. 19 As in the symbol, heaven itself may 
be imaged in a dew-drop, so in reflection upon the nature 
and genius of the artist - or, for Coleridge, in self-
reflection - may be perceived something of the nature of 
God's original creating power and of the divine revelation 
to our 'inward experience'. 
Although this study will follow a rough chronological 
course through Coleridge's life, its purpose is in no sense 
biographical. Of necessity, each chapter deals with much 
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the same issues as ita predecessors, since Coleridge's 
opinions and beliefs were .a development from, and construction 
of, a fundamental position, adopted early and constant 
through his life. The result here is, perhaps, a series of 
different perspectives on a few common issues, a number of 
aids to reflection. Very close to the heart of the study is 
Coleridge's developing 'Polar Logic', which issued finally 
in the Trinitarianism of his later years. A similar 
centrality was given to polarity by Owen Barfield in his 
book What Coleridge Thought (Middletown,l971), most 
particularly in his chapter, 'Man and God', where he 
concludes that only in the recognition of tri-unity, the 
three 1 in 1 one and one 1 in 1 three, do we come to recognize 
and become conscious of our real selves, and begin to 
apprehend the nature of the divinity. 20 
The concluding chapter focusses upon specific 
examples of how what is examined in this study may be of 
importance for both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
There is little evidence that Austin Farrer was particularly 
influenced by Coleridge, but _the relevance of the debate 
arising out of The Glass of Vision (1948) to central issues 
in Coleridge is striking. Other examples from twentieth 
century theology might. have been chosen. For instance, 
Pamela Vermes' description of the perfection of human nature 
through the imitation of God, as described in the writings of 
Martin Buber, bears comparison with Coleridge's sense of the 
divine perceived.through the nature of man made in God's 
image. In her book Buber on God and the. Perfect Man (1980), 
she describes the. idea of divine revelation, not as .a fixed 
image but in deed and action. 21 More recently, Northrop 
- 10 -
Frye's study of the Bible and literature, The Great Code 
(London, Melbourne,& Henley,l982), establishes a series of 
bases for discussion. remarkably consonant with those which 
direct Coleridge's religious thinking and reflections on 
literature: the nature of the observer as observed and. artist 
as spectator; the understanding of language, and particularly 
the word 'God', as a process ever 'accomplishing itself'; 
the rejection of a notion of revelation as simply the 
conveyance of information from an objective divine source to 
a subjective human receptor. 22 
What is here undertaken, therefore, is not simply an 
historical study of an episode in English literature and 
theology. It is pursued in the belief that Coleridge's 
experience and practice as poet, critic, theologian and 
philosopher represents matter of universal importance in all 
these fields, which each generation must rediscover and 
attend to for itself. 
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II THE ROMANTIC CONTEXT 
·Norman fruman 1 s Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel 
(London 1972) stands as a sad monument to the tendency of 
many critics to regard Coleridge's work as little more than 
a mosaic drawn from his extraordinarily wide reading. The 
danger is, then, that he becomes merely a channel for the 
work and ideas of others - David Hartley, Kant, the German 
transcendentalist philosophers, or the English seventeenth 
century divine s. The present study will attempt to focus 
solely upon the immediate subject, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
as a unique genius who was yet highly sensitive and original 
in his reading. 
J. S. Mill's article of 1840, comparing Coleridge with 
Bentham, perceptively identifies. why Coleridge is such a 
difficult writer (and why, therefore, it might be easier 
simply to dismiss him as a plagiarist). 
By Bentham, beyond all others, men have been led to ask 
themselves in regard to any ancient or received opinion, 
Is it true? and by Coleridge, What is the meaning of it? 
The one took his stand outside the received opinion, and 
surveyed it as an entire stranger to it, the other 
looked at it from within, and endeavoured to see it with 
the eyes of a believer in it; to discover by what 
apparent facts it was at first suggested, and by what 
appearances it has ever since been rendered continually 
credible - has seemed, to a succession of pers~ns, to be 
a faithful interpretation of their experience. 
Coleridge is entirely involved in his material. His enquiries 
and poems matter deeply to him as a sinning, loving and 
creative being. He worries at the meaning of things and 
endeavours (a significant word) to see. Here is no cold 
observer or analyst. 
The following pages set Coleridge in the context of 
European Romant.icism. Many of the writers Coleridge did not 
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know, and they are not intended to illustrate influences on 
him. The purpose, very briefly, is to .indicate that the 
major themes of this book are to be found.across a wide 
spectrum of English, German and French w~iters more or less 
contemporary with Coleridga. They have in common the 
characteristic of being literary critics or creative literary 
writers using religious forms and att~nrling to ultimately 
religious or theological issues. In them, literature cannot 
be understood apart from thealogy, while theology begins to 
find a new language in literature. Poetry and divine 
revelation; the poet as prophet; the creative role of the 
imagination; the task of irony; these are some of the themes 
of Romanticism to which Coleridge was peculiarly sensitive. 
As poet, theologian, philosopher and literary critic his 
contribution was profoundly significant for English 
literature and theology in the nineteenth century. 
Internationally, he was a key figure in the aesthetic, 
theological and philosophical aftermath. of the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment and .the work of Immanuel Kant. 
l. Poetry and Religion 
In the 'Essay, Supplementary to the Preface to Lyrical 
Ballads' (1815), Wordsworth writes of the affinity between 
poetry and religion: 
.•... between religion- making up for the deficiencies 
of reason by faith; and poetry - passipnate for the 
instruction of reason;. between religion - whose element 
is infinitude, and whosa ultimate trust is the supreme 
of things submitting herse.lf to circumspection~ and 
reconciled to substitutions.; and. poetry.- ethereal and 
transcendent, yet incapable to sustain.her existence 
without sensuous. incarnation.2 
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It is the classic English statement. of a relationship which 
is explored repeatedly in European Romanticism, recognizing 
both the illumination which the spiritual casts on the 
physical and Lhat the spiritual only has sen~e· in relation 
to the physical. The elusive qualities of poetry are 
described by Navalis in terms of religious mysticism and in 
its feeling for the arcane and the revelatory (Offenbarende). 
Er stellt das Undarstellbare dar. Er sieht das 
Unsichtbare, fi..ihlt das Unfuhlbare. (It represents that 
which cannot b~ representea. 3 It sees the invisible, is aware of the imperceptible,) 
This mystical tendency in. Romanticism - present also in 
Coleridge - finds its fullest expression in France in the 
work of the Vicomte de Chateaubriand (1768-1848) and his 
friend Pierre-Simon Ballanche, whose prose-poem Orph~e (1827) 
celebrates the transcendental powers of the artist. 
Le poete ne fait gue traduire en paroles humaines ce 
que lui a ~t~ r~vel~ sur le plan spirituel ..... C 1 est 
toujours une verite religieuse gue le poete est charge 
de transmettre. Religion et puesie ne font qu 1 une 
seule et meme chose. (The poet only translates into 
human words that which has been revealed to him on the 
spiritual plane ..... It is always a religious truth 
which the poet is entrusted to transmit. ~eligion and 
poetry are merely one and the same thing.) 
A recurring theme of Romantic criticism is poetry as a 
channel for divine revelation. According to Wilhelm Heinrich 
Wackenroder (1773-97), a close friend of Ludwig Tieck (with 
whom Coleridge corresponded),. God speaks to us through two 
languages, those of Nature and.Art. In the latter he 
communicates through artists whom. 'He has. anointed as His 
favourites'. Combining the spiritual and the sensuous, the 
work of art sharpens,human perception in a manner approaching 
the divine. 
Ist es aber erlaubt, also von dergleichen Dingen zu 
reden, so m~chte man vielleicht sagen, dass Gott wohl 
die ganze Natur oder die ganze Welt auf ahnliche Art, 
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wie wir ein Kunstwerk, ansehen mo.ge. (If it is 
permissible to .speak of such thiftgs in this way, one 
m~ght perhaps say that God may indeed regard the whole 
of nature or the entir3 world in such a way as we 
regard a work of art.) 
Wackenroder 1 s writings are characterized by. a sense of art as 
a sacred and numinous object and.of the artist as a quasi-
divine creator. In a similar way Shelley describes poetry as 
'something divine' in A Defence of Poetry (1821). Poetry 
ascends 1 to bring light and fire from those eternal regions 
where the owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not even 
soar'. It is, indeed, a revealer, that which lifts the veil 
from things hidden; and a creator, for it 'creates anew the 
universe' as 1 it purges from our inward sight the film of 
familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our being'. 
Jesus Christ, above all, was a poet since, in the tradition 
of Plato and the ancients he 
divulged the sacred and eternal truths contained in 
these views to mankind, and Christianity, in its 
abstract purity, became the exoteric expression of the 
esoteric d~ctrines of the poetry and wisdom of 
antiquity. 
2. The Role of the Poet 
The role of art in the revelation of things hidden and 
divine went hand in hand in Romantic criticism with the sense 
of the poet as priest. 
Dichter und Priester waren im Anfang eins~ und nur 
sp~tere Zeiten haben sie getrennt. Der echte Dichter 
ist aber immer Priester, so wie .der echte Priester 
immer Dichter geblieben. Und sollte nicht die Zukunft 
den alten Zustand der Dinge wieder herbeif~hren? (In 
the beginning poet and priest were one, and only later 
times -have.saparated them. But the true poet is always 
a priest, just as th.e true. priest.ha.s. always remained 
a poet. And should n9t the future bring back anew the 
old state of things?) 
When Navalis wrote this in 1798, Coleridge .had already 
delivered his Six Lectures on Revealed Religion (1795) in 
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which he expressed a profound awareness .of the defects of the 
established Church and its clergy. Contemptuous of the 'Toad 
of Priesthood' , 8 Coleridge was discovering the poet's power, 
in purifying and recreating his own mind, to awaken spiritually 
a church and people sunk in 1 Paleyite 1 apologetic and clerical 
abuse. Ballanche put it in a nutshell - 1 Le po~te est 
pretre' . 9 
The poet was one inspired with a mission. to communicate ~ 
mankin~ the workings of divinity. After his short and tragic 
life, Thomas Chatterton (1752-70) became a cult figure 
representative of the original mind crushed by authority, his 
suicide symbolic of youthful genius destroyed by materialism 
and philistinism. As the poet-martyr, Coleridge pictures him 
beside the 'eternal Throne' glowing with a 'fire divine' 
which illuminates the 'sad and gloomy hour' . 10 Among 
Coleridge's associates Robert Southey and Joseph Cottle 
edited the authoritative edition of Chatterton's works in 
1803. In 'Resolution and Independence'. (1802), Wordsworth 
invokes the memory of 'the marvellous boy', while Keats -
often compared with Chatterton in his own untimely death -
dedicated his Endymion (1818) to his memory. In France no 
less than England Chatterton was venerated, most notably in 
Alfred de Vigny 1 s highly successful play Chatterton (1835) 
and the subsequent translation of Chatterton's works into 
French in 1839. In his Preface to the play, de Vigny affirms 
that his concern ia solely with. the poet. 'Le poete ~tait 
tout pour moi; Chatterton n 1 ~tait qu 1 un nom d 1 homme 1 • (The 
poet was everything for me;.Chatterton was only a man's 
name). 11 In Stella (1832), de Vigny attributes to Chatterton 
a definition of the inspire~ task of the poet. 
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Chatterton resta dans sa premi~re immobilit~; c'~tait 
cella d 1 un homme absorb~ par un travail int~rieur qui 
ne cesse jamais et qui lui fait voir des ombres sur ses 
pas. Il leva seulement les yeux au plafond, et dit: 
- Le poete cherche aux ~toiles quelle route nous 
montre le doigt du Seigneur. 
(Chatterton remained in his initial stillness; it was 
the stillness of a man absorbed by an inner labour 
which never ends and which makes him aware that ghosts 
are shadowing him. He merely raised his eyes to the 
ceiling, and said: 
- The poet searches i~2the stars the route which God's fingBr shows to us.) 
Friedrich Schlegel in his Athen~um Fragmente (1798-1800) 
developed the idea of the poet as the mediator of the divine. 
We cannot see God, but the divine is evident everywhere and 
particularly 'in der Mitte eines sinnvollen Menschen 1 • (in 
the midst of a man of sense). The poet, whose task is to 
create and think in a divine way, and 1 mit Religion leben' 
(to live with religion), mediates to the rest of mankind. 
Vermitteln und Vermitteldwerden ist das ganze hohere 
Leben des Menschen, und jeder Kunstler is Mittler fur 
alle ubrigen. (To mediate and to be mediated is the 
entire higher life of men 13and every artist is a 
mediator for all others.) 
Responsible in this way to his fellow-men, the poet becomes, 
in Wordsworth's deliberately religious expression, 'the rock 
of defence for human nature' . 14 The notion of the poet as 
prophet was deeply embedded in Romantic thought. The 
centrality of the Biblical tradition and the revelatory 
status of poetry in Romanticism wer~ to a large extent, the 
effect of Bishop Robert Lowth's Lectures on the Sacred Poetry 
of the Hebrews. They were first delivered as the Oxford 
Poetry Lectures in 1741, and published in Latin in 1753. 
Their influence spraad to Germany when an annotated. Latin 
edition was produced by the theologian Johann David Michaelis 
in 1758 (Volume 2, 1761). Coleridge used Michaelis' work 
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extensively in the Lectures on Revealed Religion. Lowth 1 s 
Lectures were finally translated into English .in 1787. 
At the h~art of the bishop 1 s study is the relationship 
between the prophecy and the poetry of the Bible and a new 
under standing of the 1 poetic 1 quality of much. of the Old 
Testament, born of his investigations into Hebrew prosody. 
It was a relationship which was repeatedly explored in 
Romantic writings. Shelley wrote in A Defence of Poetry: 
Poets, according to the circumstance of the age and 
nation in which they appeared, were called, in the 
earlier epochs of the world, legislators or prophets: 
a poet essentially comprises and unites both these 
characters. For he not only beholds intensively the 
present as it is, and discovers those laws according to 
which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds 
the future in the present, and his thoughts are the 
germs of the flower and the fruit of latest time. Not 
that I assert poets to be prophets in the gross sense 
of the word, or that they can fortell the form as surely 
as they foreknow the spirit of events: such is the 
pretence of superstition, which could make poetry an 
attribute of prophecy, rather than prophecy an 
attribute of poetry. A poet P!5ticipates in the eternal, 
the infinite, and the one ..... 
3. The Creative Imagination 
Coleridge 1 s classic distinction. between the primary and 
secondary imagination in Biographia Literaria draws directly 
upon Schelling 1 s Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie 
(1799), and more generally is the culmination of a poetic 
tradition in eighteenth century England in which the young 
Coleridge was immersed. His early poem 1Religious Musings 1 
(circa 1794-6), on which, Coleridge claimed in 1796, 1 I build 
all my poetic pretensions 1 , 16 is prefaced by lines from Mark 
Akenside 1 s didactic poem Pleasures of the Imagination (1744. 
1756). Coleridge had.read deeply in Akenside 1 s work. In 
his poem, Akenside divides. the pleasures of the imagination 
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into two parts. The primary pleasures are connected broadly 
with the objective world of 'fixities and definites 1 , the 
world of the Coleridgean.faculty of fancy. The secondary 
pleasures are linked.more closely with the creative faculties 
of man, both sensual and intellectual. Akenside, it would be 
fair to say, would have found familiar the idea .of imagination 
which 
dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; 
or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still 
at all events it struggles t~7 idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital ••..• , 
Thus Coleridge characterizes the secondary imagination. 
In the writings of William Blake, the poet creates his world 
by the forming power of his imagination. 'As a man is, So he 
Sees 1 • 18 Blake claims that the Bible is both more 
entertaining and instructive than any other book because it 
is addressed to the imagination (rather than the reason or 
the understanding), and the world of the imagination which 
the poet realizes 1 is the world of Eternity; it is the divine 
bosom into which we shall go after the death of the Vegetated 
body'. And so the poet Blake writes: 
I assert for My Self that I do not behold the outward 
Creation & that to me it is hindrance & not Action; it 
is as the Dirt upon my feet, No part of Me. 'What', it 
will be Question 1d, 'When the Sun rises, do you not see 
a round disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea?' 0 no, no, 
I see an Innumerable company of the Heavenly host 
crying "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty." I 
question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more 
than I would Question a Wind~~ concerning a Sight. I 
look thro 1 it & not with it. 
In the matter of the creative imagination, recurring 
themes in Coleridge's poetry and. criticism are common currency 
in the writings of the Romantics. His discussion of the 
eighteenth century distinction between fancy and imagination 
in Biographia was pre-dated by two years by Wordsworth's 
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extensive examination of it in the 'Preface' to the 1815 
edition of Lyrical Ballads. The form of the dream which 
Coleridge employed in 'Kubla Khan', one of his greatest 
meditations on the nature of poetry and poetic creation, 
apart from his endless prose discussions on the phenomena of 
dreams in his lette~, was used repeatedly by Keats in his 
critical letters. On 22 November 1817 he wrote to Benjamin 
Bailey: 
The Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream -he 
awoke and found it truth -Adam's d~eam ... seems to 
be a conviction that Imagination and its empyreal 
reflection ~D the same as human Life and its spiritual 
repetition. 
In France, Victor Hugo was writing of 'ideas' in a manner 
similar to that of Coleridge in On the Constitution of Church 
and State (1830). No doubt both were writing in the 
philosophical tradition which was profoundly affected by the 
1 noumena 1 of Kant. But, while Coleridge was writing a 
political tract, Hugo in his 1822 Preface to Odes was writing 
of poetry. 
Les beaux ouvrages de poesie en tout genre, soit en 
vers, soit en prose, qui ont honore notre siecle, ont 
~ ~1 ~ tt " . t, ' . " t reve e ce e verl e a pelne soup~oncee auparavan , que 
la poesie n 1 est ~as dans la forme des idees, mais dans 
les idees elle-memes. La poesie c 1 est mut ce qu 1 il y 
a d 1 intime dans tout. 
(The lovely works of poetry of every kind, whether verse 
or prose, which have brought honour to our century, have 
revealed this truth scarcely before suspected, that the 
poetry is not in the form of the ideas, but in the ideas 21 themselves. Poetry is the intimate essence. of everything.) 
Another important Romantic. theme, central to Coleridge's 
writings, is the principle of progression. A. W. Schlegel, 
whose work on Shakespeare in particular was so influential 
on Coleridge, sums it up thus: 
Die tote und empirische Ansicht von der Welt is\ dass 
die Dinge sind, die philosophische,. dass a,lles im ewigen 
Werden, in einer unaufh~rlichen Sch~pfung begriffen ist, 
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worauf uns schon eine Menge Erscheinungen im gemeinen 
Leben gleichsam lLinstossen. 
(The dead and empirical view of the world is that things 
are, but the philosophical view is that all is in 
perpetual 'becoming', is engaged in a continual 
creation, as indeed is as it were demonstra;~d to us by 
a multitude of phenomena in ordinary life.)-~ 
It was this sense that progression and change was always to 
be preferred to mere dead arrangement which makes so much 
Romantic writing elusive and difficult to grasp. It further 
linked in with the notion of the poet as a quasi-divine 
creator, adopting almost the role of the divine creator. In 
England, certainly, it was something of a reaction against 
the eighteenth century notion of the divine watch-maker, that 
view of creation and the world which states 'that things are'. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that Coleridge encountered 
the idea of 'progressiveness' in his early heroes Priestley 
and Hartley, for it is one of the central ideas in their 
systems of necessitarian optimism. In particular it is 
prominent in Priestley's Essay on the First Principles of 
Government (1768) and Discourses on the Evidence of Revealed 
Religion (1794), both of which were used extensively by 
Coleridge in his 1795 lectures. Thus, as well as being part 
of a wider climate of Romantic theory, the emphasis upon 
'progression' and 'organic' in Coleridge's later writings is 
a significant development from his ideas of 1795. 
4. Symbol and Organic Form 
Friedrich Schlegel remarked in his Athen~um Fragmente 
that as Nature is organic (organisch), so what is most 
beautiful must also be organic. The same is true of morality 
and love. But it was his brother A. W. Schlegel who made the 
distinction between mechanical and organic form which was so 
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important for Coleridge. 
Mechanisch ist die Form, wenn sie durch aussre Einwirkung 
irgendeinen Stoffe bloss als zuf~llige Z~tat, ohne 
Beziehung auf dessen Beschaffenheit erteilt wird, wie 
man z.B. einer weichen MAsse eine beliebi~e Gestalt ~ibt, 
damit sie solche nach der Erhartung beibe~alte. Die~ 
organische Form hingegen ist eingeboren, sie bildet von 
innen heraus und erreicht ihre Bestimmtheit zugleich mit 
der vollstandigen Entwicklung des Keimes. 
(Form is mechanical when, through external force, it is 
imparted to any material merely as an accidental addition 
without reference to its quality; a~ for example, when 
we give a particular shape to a soft mass that it may 
retain the same after its induration. Organic form, 
again, is innate; it unfolds itself from within, and 
acquires its determination contem~~raneously with the 
perfect development of the germ.) 
Schlegel's Vorlesungen ~ber dramatische Kunst und Literatur 
(1809-11), delivered in Vienna in the spring of 1808, became 
widely known in England after their translation into English 
by John Black, the ffiitor of the Morning Chronicle, in 1815. 
There is little doubt, however, that Coleridge knew them in 
German, since the passage quoted appears in a literal 
translation forming part of a lecture on Shakespeare, probably 
dating from 1808. 24 A further Romantic commonplace found in 
both Schlegel and Coleridge on Shakespeare and dramatic art, 
is the distinction between classical and Romantic or Gothic 
forms. Victor Hugo in his Preface to Odes et Ballades (1826), 
making the same distinction, criticizes the mechanical 
regularity of contemporary French architecture. 
Une cath~drale gothique pr~sente un ordre admirable dans 
sa naive irr~gularite; nos edifices fran~ais modernes, 
auxquels on a si gauchement applique l 1 architecture 
grecque ou romaine, n 1 offrent qu'un desordre regulier. 
Un homme ordinaire pourra toujours faire un ouvrage 
regulier; il n'y a que les grands esprits qui sachent 
ordonner une composition. Le createur, qui voit de 
haut, ordonne; 1 1 imitateur, qui regarde de pres, 
r~gularise. 
(A gothic cathedral presents a ~onderful order in 
its naive irregularity; our modern French buildings, to 
which Greek and Roman architecture has been so clumsily 
applied, offer merely a regular disorder. Anyone will 
always be able to make a regular work; it is only great 
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spirits who know how to order a composition. The 
creator, with elevated vision, shapes; the 2~mitator, 
who ohserves from close up, systematizes.) 
The artist, then, whether architect or poet, is inspired, 
a quasi-divine ereaLor bringing life and illumination, 
revealing the secrets of divinity. In his essay 'On the 
Principles of Genial Criticism concerning the Fine Arts' 
(1814), Coleridge, linking art with what is beautiful, defines 
beauty as 'the reduction of many to one 1 • 26 It is, as he 
points out, an ancient formulation, and it links the Romantic 
notion of organic form with the development of the idea of 
the symbol, which, in contrast to the eighteenth century, 
focussed on the individual and the particular rather than the 
general. Thus Navalis wrote: 
Wie die Philosophie durch System und Staat die Krafte 
des Individuums mit den Kraften der Menschheit und 
des Weltalls verstarkt, das Ganze zum Organ des 
Individuums und das Individuum zum Organ des Ganzen 
macht - so die Poesie in Ansehung des Lebens. Das 
Individuum lebt im Ganzen und das Ganze im Individuum. 
Durch Poesie entsteht die hochste Sympathie und 
Koaktivitat, die innigste Gemeinschaft des Endlichen 
und Unendlichen. 
(Just as philosophy through system and state reinforces 
the energies of the individual with the energies of 
mankind and the universe, making the whole to be the 
organ of the individual and the individual to be the 
organ of the whole - so does poetry with respect to 
life. The individual lives in the whole and the whole 
in the individual. Through poetry arises the highest 
congeniality and interactivity, the c~?sest association 
between the finite and the infinite.) 
Coleridge, in his definition of symbol in The Statesman's 
Manual (1816) regards it as that which draws the whole out of 
attention to the particular. The poet, reducing the 
unmanageable many into one, sees in the individual, whether 
person or flower, mountain or natura.l phenomenon, something 
of eternity and the infinite. In the symbol, the poet fans 
the flame of faith, which otherwise is .in danger of being 
'buried' in the dead letter, or its name .and honors usurped 
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by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding' . 28 
5. Religion and Irony 
Coleridge summed up his speculations about the one and 
the many in the familiar phrase, 1 multeity in unity' , 2 9 
which is an example of irony, according to a definition of 
the term which would include any sharp or seeming contrast. 
What is unified cannot be multiple. But. the dialect of irony, 
both as disintegrative of old relationships and perceptive 
of new relationships in apparently incongruous situations, of 
opposition and reconciliation, was a base factor in the 
Romantic definition of the essence of reality as 'becoming'. 
Such percept ion Friedrich Schlegel called 'Wit z' (wit) , and 
Coleridge the secondary Imagination. Caught in the creative 
dialectic of ideal and real, infinite and finite, Schlegel 
characterizes the 1 Transzendentalpoesie 1 of Romanticism. 
Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; ja das 
ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, dass sie ewig nur werden, 
nie vollendet sein kann. Sie kann durch keine Theorie 
erschopft werden, und nur eine divinatorische kritik 
durfte es wagen, ihr Ideal charakterisieren zu wollen. 
Sie allein ist unendlich, wie sie allein frei ist, und 
das als ihr erstes Gesetz anerkennt, dass die Willk~r 
des Dichters kein Gesetz uber sich leide. 
(Romantic poetry is still becoming; that is indeed its 
true essence, that it is perpetually becoming, it can 
never be finished. It can never be exhausted by any 
theory, and only a divinatory criticism could dare to 
risk characterising its ideal. It alone is endless, 
it alone is free, and it acknowledges as its first 30 
statute that the poet's free will submits to no law.) 
Schlegel's 'wit' is a willed. act of perception, a process 
towards consciousness. which epistemologically parallels the 
ontological process of change in the universe. It reflects 
the emotional long in .. ~ for 'Fulle' (abundance) , the boundless 
life which resides in the infinitely becoming heart of 
reality. Irony criticizes the misplaced emphasis on the 
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fictions of the finite mind, and releases the imagination to 
link finitude with infinitude. Irony then becomes, in 
Tieck 1 s phrase, 1 Das Gottlich-Menschliche in der Poesie' (the 
d . . h . t ) Jl lVlne- uman ln poe ry . 
The force of irony residing in the tension of opposites, 
the Romantics developed the concept to convey their sense 
that the spiritual can only be perceived in relation to the 
physical, while the physical can only be understood in the 
light of the spiritual. And so, for. Coleridge, while 'all 
our forms of comprehension are confined to Phaenomena, or 
objects of Sense' , 32 human existence becomes barren and 
absurd when taken literally and without the illumination of 
the divine, 1 the translucence of the Eternal through and in 
the Temporal' . 33 Yet it is through irony, also, as it 
unsettles and undercuts, that the fragment become a Romantic 
literary form of such importance, nowhere more so than in 
1 Kubla Khan'. For the fragment embodies the Romantic sense 
of incompleteness and restless progressJ more than that it 
invites an active,imaginat~e response to pursue and 
reconstruct the lost whole. In the poetic fragment, the 
divine mysteries dimly beheld by the poet are revealed in a 
symbolic indication of wholeness. 
The poet's task is a religious one. Poetic inspiration 
lays upon him the prophetic burden of mediating divine 
revelations to mankind. Coleridge's vocations as poet and 
theologian are therefore inseparable, and each is regulated 
by the discipline of the critic and the philosopher. 
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III THE EARLY WRITINGS AND 'THE EOLIAN HARP' 
On 14 October 1797, Coleridge wrote to John Thelwall. 
I can at Limes feel st1·ungly the beauLies, you 
describe, in themselves, & for themselves - but more 
frequently all things appear little - all the knowledge, 
that can be acquired, child's play -the universe 
itself - what but an immense heap of little things? -
I can contemplate nothing but parts, & parts are all 
little - ! - My mind feels as if it ached to behold & 
know something great - something one & indivisible -
and it is only in the faith of this that rocks or 
waterfalls, mountains or caverns give me the sense of 
sublimity or majesty! - ~ut in this faith all things 
counterfeit infinity! -
The last phrase is found also in a notebook entry of late 
1796. 
inward desolations -
an horror of great darkness 
great things that on th2 ocean 
counterfeit infinity. 
It can be traced back to Coleridge's reading of Ralph 
Cudworth's The True Intellectual System of the Universe 
(1678), which he borrowed from the Bristol Library from 9 
November to 13 December, 1796, 3 having already referred to it 
briefly in the previous year. Cudworth writes of 'Number, 
Corporeal Magnitude, and Successive Duration', that they may 
only 'Counterfeit and Imitate Infinity'; that 'there is 
nothing truly Infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in Power, 
nor in Duration, but only One Absolutely Perfect Being or The 
Holy Trinity' . 4 In his letter to Thelwall, Coleridge 
describes the 'unregenerate mind' of 'The Eolian Harp' (line 
55), which aspires to the one absolutely perfect Being, and 
which, for the Cambridge Platonists, meant the Holy Trinity 
or the first hypostasis of the Divine Triad of Plotinus. 
Later, Coleridge was to conclude that in the counterfeiting 
of infinity, the particular and the individual provided 
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intimations of the infinite and the absolute. He draws upon 
Schelling in the Biographia Literaria to demonstrate that 
within the flux of time and space, 'time per se' is compresent 
and the 'absolute self' supratempora1. 5 Moreover, his 
developing theory of symbol recognized that the eternal and 
universal is glimpsed through the particular and individual, 
and God in man, made in God's image. 
During his early years he developed the habits of 
reflection and self-reflection whereby he learnt that 'in the 
component faculties of the human mind itself 16 is the key to 
truth about man, the world and God. Such self-reflection is 
a necessary prelude to. theology. It is closely linked also 
with what Coleridge later called his 'Polar Logic', which is 
already apparent in the early poetry, most particularly 'The 
Eolian Harp' (1795). This was initially drawn,. quite 
possibly, from Jacob Boehme's earliest work, Aurora oder 
Morgenr~te im Aufgang (1612), which, Coleridge claimed, 'I 
had conjured over at School 1 • 7 According to Boehme, the 
essential condition for all progression and creativity, is 
the tension between opposed forces. 
The notorious difficulty of drawing into coherence the 
wide diversity of Coleridge's thought and writings resides 
partly in his constant desire to bind all together and to 
aspire to the One, the absolute. Yet it does account for the 
linking of all his forms of thought to an underlying 
religious concern, for it may be said that the purpose of 
religion is 1 re-ligere 1 , to bind together or re-bind. 
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1. Early Religious Writings and The Watchman (1796) 
Between February 1797 and. February 1798, Coleridge wrote 
a series of five autobiographical letters to his friend 
Thomas Poole, outlin't!\3 his family history and his own 
childhood to his schooldays at Christ's Hospital. The 
letters do not always agree factua.lly with other later 
childhood reminiscences, notably in Biographia Literaria 
(1817) and in the notes which Coleridge provided for James 
Gillman's The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London, 1838). 
They do, however, provide an early reflection on his 
childhood which suggests how Coleridge regarded himself 
during the period of his greatest poems and shortly before 
his 1798-9 tour of G~rmany. 
In the first letter, dated 6 February 1797, Coleridge 
refers with some amusement to the Methodist 111 Experience 11 in 
the Gospel Magazine' , 8 by which he means the tradition of 
spiritual autobiography taken up by the Methodists in the 
eighteenth century, which includes John Bunyan's Grace 
Abounding to the Chief of Sinners (1666). Despite his 
amusement, the techniques of such autobiography contributed 
in no small way to Coleridge's own religious profession 
through self-reflection in both poetry and prose. Indeed, as 
his point of departure in his metaphysical and religious 
explorations is the fact of personal weakness, guilt and 
suffering, so Coleridge admits. that. the task of autobiography 
'will be a useful one; it will renew and deepen my 
reflections on the past; and it will perhaps make you behold 
with no unforgiving or impatient eye those weaknesses and 
defects in my character, which so many untoward circumstances 
have concurred to plant there' .9 
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It was through such self-reflection that Coleridge came 
to recognize that the process of inspiration which the poet 
experiences shares much in common with the mystery of divine 
inspiration, that both are projected in images 'which cannot 
be decoded, but must be allowed to signify what they signify 
10 
of the reality beyond them'. 
The second letter to Poole, of March 1797, reveals, in 
some detail, Coleridge's admiration for his father, a 
clergyman of sound and broad learning - 1not a first-rate 
Genius -he was however a first-rate Christian' . 11 Indeed, 
such was Coleridge's up-bringing that at the age of three, 
he claims, he was already capable of reading a chapter of the 
Bible, and in the next letter, dealing with the years 1775-8, 
his expanding reading of 'tales of Tom Hickathrift, Jack the 
Giant-killer, &&&&& 1 , was terminated by his father, who burnt 
such books. 12 They haunted the young boy's mind and induced 
day-dreaming. Coleridge concludes this third letter with 
some remarks on his childhood prayers. 
- I suppose you know the old prayer -
Matthew! Mark! Luke! & John! 
God bless the bed which I lie on. 
Four Angels round me spread, 
Two at my foot & two at my bed /hea~7 -
This prayer I said nightly - & most firmly believed the 
truth of it. -Frequently have I, half-awake & half-
asleep, my body diseased & fevered by my imagination, 
seen armies of ugly Things bursting in upon me, & these 
four angels keeping them off. 
There is evidence to suggest that by 1794, Coleridge had 
ceased to say his prayers. Yet the nightmares continued, as 
his poems and letters bear witness,. and would continue until 
the imagination itself recognized afresh the controlling 
patterns and images of faith in the prophetic role of the 
poet. 
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Despite his disapproval of the boy's reading habit, it 
seems that his father .was particularly fond of his youngest 
son, and intended that he should be a clergyman. Samuel, 
however, continued to read of 'Faery Tales, & Genii', and 
reflected to Poole that it was this which established him in 
his life-long habit of endeavouring to see all things as a 
harmony, to see the One in the many, and to perceive the 
infinite through the finite and the particular. His mind, 
'habituated to the Vast' by his reading, Coleridge 
imperiously dismissed empirical evidences. 'I never regarded 
my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief'. He 
concludes: 
Those who have been led to the same truths step by step 
thro' the constant testimony of their senses, seem to 
me to want a sense which I possess - They contemplate 
nothing but parts - and all parts are necessat~ly 
little - and t~J Universe to them is but a mass of 
little things. 
The last of the five letters is chiefly concerned with 
Coleridge's experiences as a school-boy at Christ's Hospital. 
It is a prosaic and dry account, reflecting the misery of the 
lonely child, 'pent 1 mid cloisters dim 1 • 1 4 Yet during these 
years, according to Charles Lamb, on evidence supplied by 
Coleridge himself, he was becoming fluent in Greek and 
unfolding 'the mysteries of Jamblichus, or Plotinus (for even 
in those years thou waxedst not pale at such philosophic 
draughts)' . 15 
In BiographLa Literaria Coleridge claims that before he 
was fifteen he had bewi.ldered himself with metaphysics and 
16 theological controversy. Lucyle Werkmeister, in her 
article 'The Early Coleridge: His "Rage for tvletaphysics 11 1 
(Harvard Theological Review 54 (1961) 99-123) argues that 
Coleridge's studies were prompted at an early age by his 
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recognition of guilt and its resultant suffering. Certainly 
his sense of failure and inadequacy throughout his life was 
to initiate much self-reflection and established in him a 
deep yearning for strength, support and forgiveness. The end 
products were to be the discussions of original sin in Aids 
to Reflection (1825) and the endless Trinitarian musings in 
the 'trichotomous logic' of the last notebooks. Miss 
Werkmeisterts explanation of Coleridge's early response to 
this recognition of guilt in his 'rage for metaphysics' (a 
phrase taken from Gillman's Life p.23) is less than 
satisfactory. Gillman records that this rage was 'occasioned 
by the essays on Liberty and Necessity in Cato's Letters, and 
more by theology'. 1Cato 1 is a pseudonym for John Trenchard 
and Thomas Gordon, and their Letters were part of a controversy 
between the Newtonian apologist and correspondent of Leibniz, 
Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) and the Deist Anthony Collins (1676-
1729). His argument, in brief, is that human suffering is 
caused by vice, and that, of himself, man is unable to 
overcome vice. Coleridge, suggests Werkmeister, discovered 
the proof of 1 Cato 1 s 1 contention in himself. 17 
The problem was met, she continues, in his reading in 
Neoplatonism and particularly Plotinus 1 Enneads. In such 
juvenile poems as 'Easter Holidays' and 'Quae Nocent Docent', 
both composed while Coleridge was a school-boy, he is supposed 
to be following the Plotinian purging of the soul by 
'virtue' through which.it reasserts its original goodness. 
For according to Plotinus: 
' ' ' t'' A~~\o<.L ~E:V ~~o( 
' ' "~ 1tpo5 To<.. E.y . .J . 
(Virtues are 
vices to its 
due to the ancient state of our soul, 18 
chance encounter with things outside it.) 
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Although Coleridge claimed to have pondered on Plotinus at 
Christ's Hospital, it is difficult to derive from his 
earliest poems more than immature platitudes such as might 
be expected from an unhappy yet undeniably talented boy. 
Yet he who Wisdom's paths shall keep 
And Virtue firm that scorns to weep 
At ills in Fortune's power, 
Through this life's variegated scene 
In raging storms or calm serene 19 Shall cheerful spend the hour. 
If any consistent theme can be derived from these earliest 
poems it is of the helpless children of Christ's Hospital, 
worn by 'wan Resignation struggling with despair 1 • 20 Even at 
this stage, in one sense, Coleridge longs for a saviour, for 
the Lord who 'beholds with pitying eye' to rescue him from 
his misery and inadequacy. Yet, concurrent with this he 
believes in an extreme form of Necessitarianism which led to 
the abandonment of prayers and the presupposition that God 
has literally predetermined every detail of life. 
He knows (the Spirit that in secret sees, 
Of whose omniscient and all-spreading Lo~I 
Aught to implore were impotence of mind) 
Between 1794 and 1796, Coleridge's poems proclaim, in an 
abstract manner, the principles of harmony, unity and optimism, 
governed by the law of Necessity. 22 Underlying the 
abstractions, however, is the experience of human weakness, 
so that the study of David Hartley and Joseph Priestley was 
never quite separate from a watchfulness of the life within 
himself. 'I do not like History~ Metaphysics, & Poetry, & 
'Facts of mind' - ..... are my darling Studies', wrote 
Coleridge in 1796. 23 By 1797 he 'utterly recanted' the 
sentiment contained in the line 'aught to implore were 
•24 impotence of mind.. It was true to human nature and 
experience to offer 'petitions ... to Deity'. 
- 36 -
Coleridge's relationship with the thought of David 
Hartley was always uneasy, nor on the other hand was it an 
aberration which he later shed. Elements in the thought of 
Hartley were consistent with his long~term objectives and 
with what finally emerged from his life-long experience as a 
poet, a man and a philosopher. He was attracted initially to 
Hartley's model of human growth as the first clue to what in 
the 'Essays on the Principles of Method' was later explored 
as the 'principle of progression' . 25 For the model did 
suggest a crude vegetable analogy to human growth which 
hinted at a view of organic mental development answering to 
Coleridge's experience of himself and his own mind. It is 
possible also, as Stephen Prickett has pointed out, 26 to see 
the threefold characteristics of human nature - Prudence, 
Morality and Religion - as set out in the Preface to Aids to 
Reflection, 27 as a re-vised Hartleianism, reducing to three 
Hartley's seven stages of human development from Sense to 
Theopathy. 
The paradox in Coleridge's relationship with Hartley 
between the system which does not precisely fit the individual 
experience finds a parallel in his uneasy response to the 
French Revolution. In May 1793 he attended the trial in 
Cambridge of the Unitarian William Frend which resulted in 
Frend 1 s expulsion from his Fellowship at Jesus College. 
Frend had profoundly influenced Coleridge's religious and 
intellectual devBlopment during his undergraduate days, and 
the trial was part of the reaction against suspected 
radicalism by 1793, after the events of the French Revolution. 
On 21 January Louis XVI had been executed and on 1 February 
France declared war on England and Holland. Coleridge's 
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political radicalism had been ignited by Frend and fanned by 
Robert Southey whom he met in June 1794. By September of the 
same year the two poets had collaborated in a drama in three 
acts, The Fall of Robespierre, wherein Southey reaffirmed the 
nobility of Revolutionary princfuples. 
never, never 
Shall this regenerated country wear 
The despot yoke ... 
Sublime amid the storm shall France arise, 
- she shall blast 
The despot 1 s pride, and liberate the world! 
(Act III) 28 
For Coleridge, nowever, the Revolution was the public 
expression of what was, in the end, a private vision. Kelvin 
Everest, in his book Coleridge's Secret Ministry (1979) has 
well expressed the relationsh~p between private and public in 
Coleridge 1 s radicalism. It 
..... starts with Southey, not the intellect, but the 
strong, sympathetic man. And much of his best poetry 
will grow out of an essentially private mode of vision, 
the deep self-absorption of complete domestic security; 
but it is poetry about belief, about value, and in this 
aspect its vision transcends the narrow limits of a 
basis in domesticity. We cannot understand the 
conversation poems in particular unless we. realize the 
sp~cial 29sonance for Coleridge of the public in the 
prlvate. 
By the early 1790's, public reaction against the enormities 
of the French Revolution brought suspicion upon Unitarians 
and any who seemed to share its dangerous intellectual and 
radical views. Coleridge's radical activities became ever 
more self-isolating. For his public pronouncements were 
generated by his individual experience and the intellectual 
attempt to come to terms with it, until the inevitable 
disillusionment.led to a division between the stance of 
radicalism and. the domestic,, pastoral tone of. the conversation 
poems, dedicated to 'Peace, and this Cot, and thee, heart-
honour'd Maid!'JO 
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Nevertheless, this ought not to be seen simply as a 
retreat from public life to domesticity. 31 Rather, it 
establishes the distinct.ion and relationship between public 
life and the privata.life of the individual in which social 
experience and political theory begins; discovering the 
general in the particular or the infinite in the finite. It 
lies at the heart of C.oleridge 1 s theory of symbol and, in the 
later writings, of the discussions about Christ as both 
universal and the particular man in history. 32 The 1795 
Lectures on Revealed Religion are his first sustained attempt 
to relate the nature of man as an individual and as a social 
being in the context of his views on religion, politics and 
morality. The Lectures,. it seems, were written in haste and, 
in places, are only in the form of rough notes. They do 
however reveal the breadth of Coleridge's reading at this 
early stage, and that some of his later diverse developments 
in literature, philosophy and theology are implicit in this 
early material. 
It is not easy to fix Coleridge in any single intellectual 
tradition in the Lectures. Of overriding importance in them 
is the psychological evidence offered in support of the truth 
of Christianity by David Hartley (1705-57) in his 
Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations 
with notes and additions by H. A. Pistorius (3 Vols. 1791; lst 
Ed. 1749). But he also used Cudworth's The True Intellectual 
System extensively, revealing his early respect for 
seventeenth-century English Platonism. The tone which 
characterizes the Lectures is well described by Coleridge in 
a letter to South~y as 'the pious confidence of Optimism' , 33 
drawing upon the Hartleian notion of 'benevolence' which, by 
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the theory of association, changes love of self into love for 
family and, ultimately, all mankind. The manner of the 
enquiry is entirely characteristic of Coleridge throughout 
his life. In the Prospectus he describes one. of the purposes 
of the first lecture as the establishment of the 'Necessity 
of Revelation deduced from the Nature of Man' . 34 The truths 
of religion must always be tested by experience, and mankind 
is discovered in the undertaking of his proper activity when 
reflecting Divine revelation or enlightenment. In the fourth 
lecture Coleridge writes: 
..•.. though I had never seen the Old or New Testament, 
I should become a ChJ~stian, if only I sought for Truth 
with a simple Heart. 
Christianity answers the. deepest needs of human nature and is 
continually being adjusted to the capacity of its recipients, 36 
for revelation is an 'optic glass' which assists 'without 
contradicting our natural vision' and enables us 'to see far 
beyond the Valley' of our present world. 37 
In one of his earliest notebook entries, entitled 
'Sermon on Faith' (1794) , 38 Coleridge insists that scripture 
nowhere contradicts 'Reason', and that Faith and Reason 'are 
all operations of one faculty'. Writing to Southey in October 
of the same year, he qMotes Mary Evans, his first love, that 
'Faith be only Reason applied to a particular Subject' . 39 
These remarks are entirely consistent with the 1Confessio 
F ide i 1 ( 181 0 ) , A i d s t o Ref 1 e c .t i on and Con f e s s i on s of an 
Inquiring Spirit, subtitled 'Letters on the Inspiration of 
the Scriptures' (1840). 
Another of Coleridge's concerns in the Lectures is the 
problem of sin and how it is to be dealt with,40 raising the 
question of the nature of Jesus Christ. 
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That in the most corrupt Times of the Jewish state there 
should arise the Son of a. Carpenter who in his own 
conduct presented a.perfect example of all human 
excellence and exhibited a system of morality, not only 
superior to the ethics of any single Philosopher of 
antiquity but to the concentrated Wi~dom of every 
Philosopher of every age and nation, and this unspotted 
by one single error, untinged with one prejudice of 
that most prejudiced people among .who.m.he was educated 
is a fact that carries with it an.irresistable face of 
conviction, and is of itself 4in the most philosophical sense of the word a Miracle. 
Again, and in a remarkable way, this draws together a number 
of themes which preoccupied Coleridge throughout his life, 
yet within the context of Hartley's 'system of necessity'. 
Human sin and failure, the need for redemption, Christ's 
\ 
identification with human. nature, are addressed .under an 
attempt to call up the theory of association in defence of 
Christian apologetics. For Christ's freedom from the 
characteristics of his age and its philosophical limitations 
breaks the law of association which would tie the individual 
to his period and its customs, and is therefore a 
'psychological miracle' .4 2 
Also from Hartley, but more from Jos~ph Priestley and 
from the intellectual Unitarians of Bristol, Coleridge learnt 
the notion of 'gradual progressiveness 1 4J in the religious 
life. The sense of continual process, development and 
restlessness became a keystone of his notion of art as 
perpetually creative and de-creative, of irony as 
contradicting the temptation to settle upon finite 
conclusions, and of faith as a yearning in the finite being 
to reach out to the infinite where all coheres in the 
Absolute and the One, of which we now perce.ive but the many 
parts. In 1795, however, the notion learnt from Priestley 
was an important element in his 'optimist' philosophy, and in 
the writings of Unitarian acquaintances like the Revd. John 
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Prior Estlin of Bristol,44 which Coleridge was soon to 
question and reject, as early as The Watchman (1796). 
On 16 June 1795, Coleridge delivered a 'Lecture on the 
Slave Trade 1 aL Lhe Al3::>.ewbly Coffee-house 011 the Quay, 
Bristol, which was later re-worked as the essay 'On the Slave 
Trade 1 in the fourth number of his short-lived periodU:.t.,The 
Watchman.4 5 The Lecture contains Coleridge's first reference 
to the faculty of the imagination. 
To develope the powers of the Creator is our proper 
employment - and to imitate Creativeness by combination 
our most exalted and self-satisfying.Delight. But we 
are progressive and must not rest content with present 
Blessings. Our Almighty Parent hath therefore given to 
us Imagination that stimulates to the attainment of real 
excellence by the contemplation of splendid Possibilities 
that still revivifies the dying motive within us, and 
fixing our eye on the glittering Summits that rise one 
above the other in Alpine endlessness still urges us up 
the ascent of Being, amusing the ruggedness of the road 
with the beauty and grandeur of the ever-widening 
Prospect. Such and so noble are 46he ends for which this restless faculty was given us -
In many respects this foreshadows the.definition of 
imagination in Biographia Literaria, chapter 12. There 
Coleridge draws upon his later reading in German philosophy 
and develops what is here suggested in a more original way -
the repetition in man of the divine creative activity, the 
combining of disparate elements and the ascent of knowledge 
b th . f th . . t. 4 7 y e exerclse o e lmaglna lon. But in the 'Lecture 
on the Slave Trade' and throughout The Watchman it would 
appear that Coleridge's doctrine of progressiveness and 'the 
contemplation of splendid Possibilities',. are secondarily 
derived from his early reading in Priestley and Hartley. 
When he reworked the Lecture for The Watchman, Coleridge 
developed his discussion of 'Benevolence' as an element in 
creativeness, drawing directly on David Hartley.4 8 
Politically, he still believed in the progression towards 
- 42 -
perfection of revolutionary France, and that 'the juvenile 
ardour of a nascent Republic would carry her on, by a rapid 
progression, in a splendid career of various improvement' . 49 
ml l ,.p ·~~ -P~ t~"h~l~+ •• l (;; ·w·v~·.L·~ct .l£>~.1."::<+ ·u·"'c.u-' l'rl ..L, .... ,.q4· 1- t1 e J... an g u. a g c v J.. J:-J v r J... e c J.. u ..1. ..L ...L u :i , ~ -'- - v J...j ~ / 
according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary) was in the air. 
It derived from Rousseau, Jean Condorcet (1743-94) and the 
French Philosophes, and had been already used in England by 
William Godwin in an earlier reference in 1793, in Political 
Justice (I43). In The Watchman, Coleridge refers to the 
English translation of Condorcet's Esquisse d'un tableau 
historique des progr~s de .. l 'esprit humain (1794). 
"Let us (says Condorcet) be cautious not to despair 
of the human race. Let us dare to foresee in the 
ages that will succeed us, a knowledge and a happiness 
of which we can only form a vague and undetermined 
idea. Let us count on the ~~rfectibility with which 
nature has endowed us ..... " 
Indeed, 'optimism' seems to have been much under discussion 
in Coleridge's circle during 1795-6, and for Coleridge 
himself it was a religious subject. In The Watchman he wrote 
that 'they therefore who struggle for freedom fight beneath 
the banners of omnipotence! • 51 The image of calling in the 
Omnipotent to fight the inevitably successful battle is also 
found in the notebooks of 1795-6, and the poem 'Religious 
Musings' (1794-6), on which, wrote Coleridge in a letter of 
11 April 1796, 'I pin all my poetical credit' . 52 This 
preoccupation might well account, in part, for his early 
attraction to the philosophy of Leibniz (1646-1716), of whom 
he wrote from Germany in 1799 that he was 'almost more than 
a man in the wonderful capacious of his Judgement & 
Imagination! 153 In 1801 he still felt that it was worth his 
while to search out Leibniz's works in the Dean and Chapter 
Library of Durham. For in the Essais de Th~odic~e (1710), 
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Leibniz taught the basic agreement between the realms of 
nature and grace and the admission of the best possible world 
for the kingdom of God and for human happiness. He also 
recognized the principle of individuality proper to the 
concept of God and for man's freedom, which was threatened by 
the mechanistic pantheism of Spinoza. 54 This latter principle 
remained with Coleridge as a vital element in his rejection 
of the pantheist tradition, but in Biographia Literaria 
(Chapter 8) he renounces Leibniz 1 s best possible world as 
'repugnant to our common sense 1 • 55 
While Coleridge, despite his assertions to the contrary, 
never completely overthrew the doctrines of association, the 
seeds of doubt concerning an 'optimist' philosophy are sown 
in The Watchman itself, and their origins are in the 
literature and poetry of the eighteenth century. In the 
issue for 2 April 1796, Coleridge printed a lengthy extract 
from William Crowe's poem 1 Lewesdon Hill' (Oxford 1788). He 
had borrowed a copy of the work in a collection of recent 
poetry entitled Poetical Tracts Vol. 3 from the Bristol 
Library between 2 and 10 March 1795, 56 and there are other 
evidences of Coleridge's attraction to and use of 1 Lewesdon 
Hill' before April 1796. 57 Crowe, the public Orator at 
Oxford, was known for his radical and pro-republican 
sympathies and his public. support at least for the initial 
stages of the. French Revolution. His radicalism was 
accompanied, however, by a dislike of mechanist psychology and 
Hartleian necessitarianism, whose advocates are denounced in 
1 Lewesdon Hill'. They set out: 
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..... to prove that what must be must be, 
And shew how thoughts are jogg 1 d out of the brain 
By a mechanical impulse; pushing on 
The minds of us, poo5 8unaccountables, To fatal resolution. 
Coleridge's references to imagination in the 'Lecture on the 
Slave Trade', as progressive and moving towards perfection, 
may have been derived equally from Crowe's poem or from the 
poetry of Akenside, with which he was also well acquainted, 
rather than the 'optimism' of Hartley and Priestley. While 
the subject of the lecture is political, Coleridge's terms 
are drawn from the language of aesthetics and poetry, his 
description of beauty in relation to the imagination recalling 
Addison's qualities of greatness, novelty and beauty. In Mark 
Akenside 1 s poem The Pleasures of Imagination (1757), which 
commends these Addisonian qualities, imagination enlarges the 
prospect until 'infinite perfection close the scene' , 59 
while in 1 Lewesdon Hill' it leads 'by soft graduations of 
ascent' to increased knowledge and wisdom. There is another 
reference to the imagination by Coleridge in a fragment of a 
theological lecture of 1795, which, again, rests heavily on 
the poets. Imagination is given to us by 1 our Almighty 
Parent' as that which 
..... stimulates to the attainment of real excellence, 
by the contemplation of sp lendid possibilities, that 
still revivifieS the dying motives within us, and 
fixing our eyes on the glittering Summits that rise 
one above the other in Alpine endlessness, still urges 
us up the ascent of Being, amusing the ruggedness of 
the road by the beauty and wonder of the ever-widening 
Prospect. The noblest gift of Imagination is th~ 0 power of discerning the Cause in the Effect ••••. 
Once again, in a tentative way and like the references in the 
'Lecture on the Slave Trade', this account of the functions 
of the imagination looks forward to Biographia Literaria in 
its description of an active power, related to the activities 
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of reason ('discerning the Cause in the Effect'), and 
penetrating to the limits of human potential with endless 
persistence. It has a vitality which owes little to Hartley 
and Priestley, but is well represented in 1 Lewesdon Hill' and 
The Pleasures of Imagination, embracing concerns moral, 
religious, intellectual and aesthetic. 
It seems, therefore, that in 1795-6, Coleridge was alert 
to contemporary political and philosophical discussions of 
optimism, perfectibility and progress. Certainly he found 
much that was attractive in the writings of Hartley and 
Priestley, establishing patterns of thought that were to 
remain with him. Nevertheless, he was also learning from a 
tradition of English poetry whose concerns were similar. 
William Crowe was a political radical, but also a poet who 
questioned profoundly doctrines of necessity and mechanist 
psychology. In the prose of The Watchman Coleridge was 
beginning to recognize the importance of such questioning, 61 
and, despite having declared himself to be 'a compleat 
Necessitarian' in December 1795, 62 increasingly in his poetry 
of 1795 he was beginning to question the moral implications 
of Hartley's teachings even while Hartley remained as an 
important influence orr his methods of reading·and composition. 63 
This is most evident in 'The Eolian Harp' (August-October 
1795). Generally, by 1796, it is clear that the leading 
concerns of Coleridge's thinking throughout his later life 
are becoming apparent. A youthful concern for radical 
politics led to self-questioning and the examination of 
certain philosophical principles. This involved the 
realization of the importance of his vocation as a poet and 
of the perspectives of religion. Poetry and theology become 
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increasingly interdependent and his writing is of a man who 
is trying to come to terms with the workings and complexities 
of his own mind. The habit of self-reflection is becoming 
established, and the religious life is more and more 
perceived as something 1felt 1 • 
In a letter to John Prior Estlin of 26 July 1802, 
Coleridge states that his religious concerns focus upon 'the 
original corruption of our Nature, the doctrines of 
Redemption, Regeneration, Grace, & Justification by Faith' 
and that Joseph Priestley .has become .quite inadequate as a 
guide in these rnatters. 64 Christianity must deal with the 
practical problem of human sin and corruption, and the 
imagination, taught by poetry, can begin to furnish mankind 
with an insight into revealed religion. Already in The 
Watchman, Coleridge is beginning to recognize this, 65 and 
further to perceive the dangers of a dogmatic religion, 66 and, 
perhaps most important of all, to wrestle with the 
relationship of the individual and particular to the whole. 67 
From this sterns the central problem of the unity of the many 
in the One, the theory of symbol wherein the particular is 
necessary to render intelligible the general and universal, 
the ambition of the finite for the infinite, and the balance 
of opposites in the Polar Logic which became the preoccupation 
of Coleridge's last years. In the explicit Unitarian 
radicalism of 1794-6 is much unease and speculation which 
foreshadows his later ~eligious and literary thinking. 68 
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2. The Early Prefaces to Poems, and Early Critics 
Coleridge's first collection of poems to come before the 
public was published in 1796 under the title Poems on 
Various Subjects. Included in it were 'Religious Musings', 
'Monody on the Death of Chatterton' and 'Songs of the Pixies'. 
The Preface to the collection is perhaps his earliest 
substantial reflection on the nature and purposes of his 
poetry, making two points which were later to be developed 
in his more mature verse and criticism. 
First, poetry is the expression of a process of self-
reflection which is preserved from 'egotism' and self-regard 
by a rigorous exercise of the intellect. 
The communicativeness of our nature leads us to describe 
our own sorrows; in the endeavor to describe them 
intellectual activity is exerted; and by a benevolent 
law of our nature from intellectual activity a pleasure 
results which is gradually associated and mingles as a 69 corrective with the painful subject of the description. 
This process was most comprehensively explored in Biographia 
Literaria and linked with a theology which recognized man in 
his true nature as made in the image of God. Second, 
Coleridge regards his public not in general but as 1 a number 
of scattered individuals', every one unique and responsive in 
his own way. When addressing a whole, the poet must be 
conscious of the particular individuals within it, just as 
later a symbol was the necessary particular by means of which 
the whole and the general might be perceived and addressed. 
The One is only to be seen in the many. 
Also in 1796, Coleridge wrote an Introduction to a 
privately-printed 'sheet of Sonnets collected by me for the 
use of a few friends' , 70 in which he describes the composition 
of the sonnet. He refers particularly to the writings of 
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William Bowles whose 'Fourteen Sonnets' had been published in 
1789, and the characteristic of the sonnet of self-reflection 
or the expression of 'some lonely feeling'. The brevity of 
the sonnet form enables the poem to 'acquire, as it were, a 
Totality, - in plainer phrase, may become a fVhole 1 • 
Coleridge continues: 
..... but those Sonnets appear to me the most exquisite, 
in which moral Sentiments, Affections, or Feelings, are 
deduced from, and associated with, the scenery of 
Nature. Such compositions generate a habit of thought 
highly favourable to delicacy of character. They create 
a sweet and indissolub17 1union between the intellectual 
and the material world. 
In atmosphere so eighteenth century, these remarks do begin 
to intimate a unifying activity, and an interaction between 
the mind and the natural world which suggests an early 
approach to the later formulation of the secondary 
72 Imagination in Biographia Literaria, chapter 13. Finally, 
in this Introduction, Coleridge re-iterates that the sonnet, 
inasmuch as it 'domesticates with the heart', becomes a part 
of the reader's identity and forces him to reflect upon 
an..t to percecve ln. fti.rfl.self . 
himselfAthe infinite possibilit,ies glimpsed in the 'union 
between the intellectual and the material'. 
In 1797, Coleridge published a second edition of his 
Poems, an abbreviated form of the Poems on Various Subjects, 
and with his 1796 Preface reprinted, largely unchanged. Poems 
of Charles Lamb and Charles Lloyd were added to his own. The 
Preface to the Second Edition is his first formal response to 
public criticism, and he is prepared to admit his faults. 
'My poems have been rightly charged with a profusion of 
double-epithets, and a general turgidness 1 , he confessed. 73 
Much of this he has pruned away. Nevertheless, he denies the 
charge of obscurity, since an author is only obscure 'when 
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his conceptions are dim and imperfect, and his language 
incorrect, or unappropriate, or involved'. Coleridge, looking 
back to Milton, Gray and Collins, claims that the difficulty 
of reading lies not so much in the verse itself as in the 
'high and abstract truths' to which it attends by the 
exercise of a 'warm and rapid' imagination. To his 
contemporaries a poet may seem to be obscure, while future 
generations come to appreciate his genius. Coleridge was 
certainly not insensitive to his public, this criticism or 
disregard, but there is much truth in his identification of 
the purpose of his poetry for him. 
Poetry has been to me its own "exceeding great rev1ard 11 : 
it has soothed my afflictions: it has multiplied and 
refined my enjoyments; it has endeared solitude; and 
it has given me the habit of wishing to discover the 
Goo~ 4and the Beautiful in all that meets and surrounds me. 
Much in these early Prefaces of 1796-7 is suggestive of 
later developments in Coleridge's poetry and criticism. 
Further, these hints link his literary work and reflections 
to his increasing concern for theology. Poetry is a means of 
self-examination, of discovering the nature of the 
relationships between the self and the material world, and of 
glimpsing thereby a wholeness and an ideal which the aesthetic 
mind of the poet identifies with the God and the Beautiful, 
and which the later Coleridge regarded in a more theological 
light, as the infinite or the transcendent perceived in the 
secret places of the heart and mind of man. 
All this, however, as Coleridge rightly recognized in 
1797, was beyond the powers of contemporary critics to 
discern. Inevitably they saw him in eighteenth century terms 
and provide a timely reminder that Coleridge learnt his 
trade as a poet in the traditions of the English eighteenth 
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century. In those terms, a reviewer in the Monthly Mirror 
for June 1796 could write that 1 Mr. Coleridge is a poet of 
the first class' . 75 An article in the Monthly Review, 
attributed to John Aikin (1747-1822), lavishes praise on 
'Religious Musings•, 76 which Coleridge himself felt to be 
something of an embarrassment by 1797, a poem merely 
derivative of the thoughts of others and turgid in expression. 
Reviewers do indeed criticize Coleridge for his 'bombast', 
his 'compound epithets' and his 1affectation•. 77 But their 
main suspicion is reserved for Coleridge's reputation as a 
political radical, and, whatever his poetic merits, he is, 
in the end, generally regarded as a young man led astray in 
politics and potentially dangerous if taken too seriously. 
It is not to be disguised Lwrote the Monthly Mirro~l 
....• that he is one of those young men, who, seduced 
into a blind and intemperate admiration of theoretic 
politics, forget the necessa7~ discrimination between 
liberty and licentiousness. 
Contemporary reviewers rarely perceived the real import 
of Coleridge's work, not least because it cut across so many 
of their assumptions and critical presuppositions. Inasmuch 
as he wrote in the traditions of the eighteenth century, they 
recognized his talent as a poet, but the great and original 
poems of 1798 left them bewildered. There is some attention 
given to criticism of 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner' in 
chapter 4. 79 It was left to friends like Charles Lamb to 
discern initially the significance of his writing. 
Increasingly in the nineteenth century the nature of his 
poetic sensibility and literary criticism was discovered in 
the context of contemporary theological concerns. Thus, the 
Conclusion of the present study will give some brief 
attention to Coleridge's place in the literary and theological 
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concerns of the nineteenth century, and then, at more length, 
to a modern debate which involves theologians and literary 
scholars. 
3. 1 At once the Soul of each, and God of all'. Jacob Boehme 
and 'The Eolian Harp' 
Much has been written about Coleridge's 'Conversation 
Poems' of 1795-8, and not least 'The Eolian Harp', first 
published in 1796. The remarks made here, therefore, will 
be limited to the specific purposes of the present discussion. 
In the conversation poems, principally 1 The Eolian Harp', 
'Reflections on having left a Place of Retirement 1 , 'The Lime-
Tree Bower my Prison', 'Frost at Midnight' and 'Fears in 
Solitude', Coleridge explores thoroughly the tensions between 
his public and his private life, the community and the 
individual, and what 1 is 1 and what 'might be'. In 'The 
Eolian Harp' this exploration is made in the context of a 
growing uneasiness about Hartleian necessitarianism and 
mechanism. 
It should, of course, be recognized that lines 26-33 
were no part of the original poem, and appeared only in the 
version of 1817 in Sibylline Leaves, In many ways they now 
form the heart of the poem, illustrating both that Coleridge's 
mature thought was a direct development from his earliest 
work, and that there is an undoubted immaturity about the 
rest of the poem. 
0! the one Life within us and abroad, 
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul, 
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light, 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where -
Methinks, it should have been impossible 
Not to love all things in a world so fill 1 d; 
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Where the breeze warbles, and the mute 8Btill air Is Music slumbering on her instrument. 
The connection between these lines and those which link the 
music of the wind-harp with experience of the universal, 
lines 44-8, is clear, but equally clear, as Humphrey House 
has indicated, 81 is the lack in the earlier lines of any 
close integration with the perception of the human senses. 
And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diver.sely fram 1 d, 
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all? 
Nevertheless, the outline of Coleridge's mature thinking 
is clearly present in the earlier lines. The possible 
relationship between the 1795 version of 1 The Eolian Harp' 
and Coleridge's schoolboy reading of Boehme's Aurora has 
82 
already been noted. In a letter to Ludwig Tieck of 4 July 
1817, he wrote: 
Before my visit to Germany in September, 1798, I had 
adopted (probably from Behmen 1 s Aurora, which I had 
conjured over at School) the idea, that Sound was = 
Light under the praepotence of Gravitation, and Color 
=Gravitation under the praepotence of Light: and I 
have nev~5 seen reason to change my faith in this 
respect. 
There is one line in the 1817 version of 1 The Eolian Harp' 
which clearly links in with this idea, 'A light in sound, a 
sound-like power in light', and specific passages in Aurora 
have been suggested as sources. Duane Schneider proposes 
Aurora X:ll and 15 as the original of Coleridge's 'sound-
light theory', while J. B. Beer prefers Aurora IV:29 and X:l. 8 4 
Despite Coleridge's claim of early reading iri Boehme, there 
is no specific evidence of such precise references before 
1817. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that the earlier 
version of the poem was influenced by the writings of the 
German shoemaker. For in Aurora is revived the old alchemical 
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sense of the mutual illumination of man and nature, and the 
correspondence between man and nature in Boehme provided for 
Coleridge a means of reuniting in his poetry human feelings 
and intellectual processes, which were always in danger of 
dissociation in eighteenth century poetry. In Aurora also, 
the heart, its energy likened to the rays of the sun, is the 
source of warmth, linked with the idea of the Son as the 
1 light 1 in the Father, and the Holy Spirit as the sense of 
outgoing motion. 85 
But it is to the reworking of the 1 The Eolian Harp 1 and 
to the later marginalia on Boehme that we must look for the 
specific linking of such early hints to Coleridge's mature 
literary, philosophical and religious concerns. There is a 
detailed reference to the 1 sound-light theory' in a letter of 
12 January 1818. 
Thus - I Prothesis 
Chaos 
2 & 3 Thesis and Antithesis = Light, and Gravity - or 
Matter, that is, phaenomenon imponderabile, and Body, 
phaenom. ponderabile et fixum: each necessarily 
supposing the other as co-existent and inexistent or 
co-inherent. 4. Synthesis, in two forms, namely, 
Indifference, and (I want a proper term; but in the 
absence of a better, let me say) Combination. - For 
instance, Sound is to Light what Color is to Gravity -
viz. Sound = Light under the predominance of Gravity: 
Color = Gravity under th8 6predominance or, as it were, the Dynasty of Light. -
Coleridge continues by defining the law of Polarity or 1 the 
Manifestation of unity by opposites'. This, and the elaborate 
system of natural philosophy which Coleridge was developing 
by 1818, was heavily dependent upon his reading in Schelling 
and Heinrich Steffens, 87 although its articulate beginnings 
can be traced back to February 1808, the date of the earliest 
marginalia made in the four volume 1 Law 1 edition of Boehme's 
Works which Coleridge acquired from De Quincey in 1807 or 
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1808. The annotations continue as late as March 1826. 
A note on Aurora, probably dating from 1808, defends the 
orthodoxy of Boehme on the Trinity. The 'actuality of 
reality 1 in the infinite Trinity lies beyond the power of 
language to articulate and mankind, therefore, must recognize 
the inadequacy of its intellect. 88 Indeed the 'eternal and 
creative Mind 1 of God may be glimpsed by the finite, human 
spirit only in the discontinuity of the opposition of thesis 
and antithesis or 'the Ipseity, which in all eternity God 
realizes in the Alterity, co-inherently the reality of 
each other 1 • 8 9 Coleridge argues from Boehme that the fixing 
of the 1 act of adhesion' to God in the will rather than in the 
intellect lies at the heart of the idea of God's 1 personeity 1 
and the denial of pantheism. 
In these marginalia, however, he insists that he is 
merely recognizing in Boehme what had been his 'own original 
Conception' of Polar Logic. 9° Certainly he continued to 
develop the conception throughout his life, and it remained 
as the sheet-anchor of his mature Trinitarian theology. In 
the early poems, it seems, Boehme assisted Coleridge in the 
articulation of his reaction against the eighteenth century 
poetry of 'sensibility', and in Aurora also he would find 
expressed his own experience of the fallenness of man and 
his desire to regain Paradise. The correlation between 
Coleridge's later poetry and.his reading in Boehme will be 
examined in some detail below, in chapter 6, 91 and in the very 
late marginalia in the 1 Law 1 edition, probably dating from 
1825-6, he continues to discuss at length Boehme's Polar 
Logic, the 'necessity of a Negative or re-introductive 
Principle in the infinite Nature', and to suggest that from 
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Boehme may be elicited the 'true Joanna-Pauline doctrine of 
- 92 
the Eucharist'. Nevertheless, as a theologian he was not 
uncritical of Boehme, aware that his final Christian 
resolution must rest rather on a 1detailed commentary on the 
Gospel of St. John' - the planned climax of his never-
completed Opus Maximum. 9J Boehme, indeed, paved the way, as 
Coleridge demonstrates in a note on Aurora in which he comments 
on the treatment of light in the creation and Incarnation. 
That not Heat but Light is the Heart of Nature is one 
of those truly profound and pregnant Thoughts that even 
and anon astonish me in Boehme's writings ..... The 
affinity ..... of the Flesh and Blood generally to 
Light I trust that I shall make clear in my commentaries 
on the first and sixth chapters of the Gospel of John. 
Hence in the Logos (distinctive e~~rgy) is Light, and 
the Light became the Life of Man. 
In the end, however, the Fourth Gospel alone might prove that 
'Christianity is the true Philosophy', while Boehme, along 
with Giordano Bruno and Spinoza, was to be considered among 
the 'Mystics and Pantheists' .95 
In the marginalia to Boehme's Works, it must yet be 
admitted, are some of Coleridge's earliest, extended 
meditations on the Trinity or 1 Truinity 1 of God drawn from 
the principles of Polar Logic, and that in the earlier 
version of 'The Eolian Harp' the clear influence of Aurora 
can be traced. In a very private way, the poem is an example 
of Coleridge's early poetic ambition to provide a frame of 
reference which was theological and moral for a nation and 
world beset by upheaval and strife, and in which the politics 
of revolution needed the prophetic guidance of the poet, 
since 'the Bard and the Prophet were one and the same 
character'. 96 The tone of 1The Eolian Harp' is intimate and 
conversational, beginning with the description of a scene in 
nature to which the senses - sight, smell and hearing -
- 56 -
respond. Via the image of the wind-harp, the description 
moves to the inward play of the poet's consciousness. The 
outer and the inner mingle in a delicate interaction of the 
phy~ical ~nJ Lhe lnLerlor, until ~ moment of vl~lon l~ 
achieved, balanced between the finite particular and the 
infinite - 1 at once the Soul of eac4 and God of all'. The 
poet finally returns to the nature scene, shared with his 
wife, with which he began. Coleridge made various changes 
in the published versions of the poem before the final form 
of 1817, when it was first entitled 'The Eolian Harp', but 
apart from the addition of lines already referred to, they 
have little bearing on the present discussion. 
The term 'plastic', used in the climactic lines 44-8, 
was widely used in the 1790's, and was almost certainly 
derived from Ralph Cudworth and seventeenth-century English 
Neo-platonism, describing a formative and organizing principle 
within nature. In 'The Eolian Harp' and other poems of this 
period, this principle threatens to merge the personal, 
transcendent Creator of the Christian tradition with the 
'Anima Mundi' of the Stoics and Neoplatonists which indwells 
the material world and all consciousness. Coleridge 
recognized that he was moving in the direction of pantheism. 
Thus, the final lines of the poem return to the domestic 
Christian piety of his wife Sara, an aspect, indeed, of his 
own mind. He turns from 'these shapings of the unregenerate 
mind' (line 55), and to a religion which attends to man's 
need for salvation. 
I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels; 
Who with his saving mercies heated me, 
A sinful and most miserable man. 
(lines 60-2) 
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The Christian piety, however, cannot wholly deny or overcome 
the visionary moment, and, in some ways, Coleridge's life can 
be characterized as a continuing effort to achieve a 
reconciliation between the two. The struggle culminated in 
his mature meditations on the Trinity and in the attempt in 
the projected Opus Maximum to reconcile what Thomas McFarland 
describes as the 1 I am 1 and the 'it is 1 • 97 1 The Eolian Harp' 
provides early evidence of the perception of a universal 
wholeness, 'the One Life within us and abroad', in the 
reflective act of consciousness, by which, through 'the 
universal Law of Polarity' reconciling the outer world of 
'object' and inner world of 1 subject 1 , it recreates the 
natural world within which it is itself created and of which 
it is still a part.9 8 In the poem, the human and non-human 
world meet at the point of visionary consciousness, and by 
the imaginative act of the poet, the finite is opened 
momentarily to the infinite.99 
4. Giordano Bruno and the De umbris idearum (1582) 
The Italian Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) was, together 
with Boehme, one of the 'Mystics and Pantheists' which 
Coleridge was to consider in the fifth Treatise of the Opus 
Maximum. He is referred to at this point, not because he was 
particularly significant in Coleridge's early writings, but 
because his use of his work in the early years of the 
nineteenth century is a logical development from his earlier 
use of Boehme, and his transformation of Bruno points to his 
later Trinitarianism. 
Coleridge first refers to Giordano Bruno in a notebook 
entry of March-April 1801, quoting from two works, the De 
.,;;• 
_ ...... 
':;y;;t; ..... 
Memory system based on Giordano Bruno's De qmbri~ idearum 
(Shadows), Paris, 1582 
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monade (1591) and the De innumerabilibus immenso (1591). 100 
In another entry of November 1804, he lists eleven works of 
Bruno, while in a footnote to The Friend No. 6, 21 September 
1809, he wrote that 1 out of eleven works, the titles of which 
are preserved to us, I have had an opportunity of perusing 
six. 101 It seems certain that one of these six works was the 
De umbris idearum, which is mentioned in the 1804 notebook 
entry, and quoted from in the Preliminary Essay 'On the 
Principles of Genial Criticism Concerning the Fine Arts' 
102 (Felix Farley's Bristol Journal August, 1814). 
Coleridge was well-read in the Renaissance and Hermetic 
tradition of which Bruno was a representative, and aware also 
f . t d d . t . . 103 o l s egeneracy an l s pure orlglns. Not least he was 
suspicious of its mysticism when separated from the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, without which it was intellectually 
vacuous and spiritually distorted. In Aids to Reflection 
(1825), Coleridge categorically denounces any such private 
inspiration which is not linked to universal experience by 
the bonds of reason and scholarly humility. 
When a man refers to inward feelings and experiences, 
of which mankind at large are not conscious, as 
evidences of the truth of any opinion - such a man I 
call a Mystic: and the grounding of any theory or 
belief on accidents and anomalies of individual 
sensations or fancies, and the use of peculiar terms 
invented, or perverted from their ordinary 
significations, for the purposing of expressing these 
idiosyncracies and pretended fac154of interior consciousness, I name Mysticism. 
The De umbris idearum was Bruno's first published work 
on the art of memory, the purpose of which was to impress on 
the psyche particular images, organized in such a way as to 
promote the return of the mind and intellect to unity and a 
perception of the unity of the All in the One. 105 In the te 
umbris the universe is reflected in the mind as a religious 
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experience, being grasped in its unity through an art of 
memory which arranges significant images and symbols. Thus 
the mind begins to perceive a coherence in all things, and 
through this unifying activity to experience a divinity at the 
heart of and beyond the particulars of nature. Bruno, an 
ex-Dominican friar, is ardently religious, but in the pagan 
traditions of the Egyptian mysteries, and in the opening 
dialogue of the De umbris, the book is presented by Hermes as 
a rising sun of Egyptian revelation. 
Clearly Bruno's vision of diversity enlightened by 
unity, and of the One encountered in the All was attractive 
to Coleridge. Yet he diverges from Bruno in that he retains 
that Judaeo-Christian tradition, to abandon which is to fall 
into the delusions of empty mysticism and pantheism. For 
where Bruno seeks the One, Coleridge seeks the Tri-unity, and 
where Bruno searches within the world for his principle of 
unity, Coleridge seeks beyond and above. Nevertheless, 
Coleridge's debt to Bruno is a further instance of his 
readiness to draw upon a wide diversity of material in the 
development of his thinking and practice in literature, 
philosophy and theology which may be traced from his 
earliest writings through to his most mature meditations on 
poetic practice and Christian belief. 106 
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IV 1 KUBLA KHAN', 'THE RIME OF THE ANCIENT MARINER', AND 
'DEJECTION' 
It is not the purpose of the study to try and establish 
with any precision the historical origins of these three 
poems. 1Kubla Khan' was probably written in the autumn of 
1797, rather than the summer as Coleridge claims in his prose 
Preface to the poem. Yet the Preface itself, which has so 
profoundly influenced the way in which the poem has been 
understood, is much later, and it was published only in 1816. 
According to a note which Wordsworth dictated to Isabella 
Fenwick in 1843, 'The Rime of the Ancient ~lariner 1 was 
planned by Coleridge and himself during a walk on the Quantock 
Hills in the spring of 1798. On 23 March, Wordsworth records, 
'Coleridge ... brought his ballad finished' . 1 A month 
previously, on 18 February, 1798, Coleridge had written to 
Joseph Cottle, 'I have finished my ballad- it is 340 lines.• 2 
In the Lyrical Ballads of 1798 it was 658 lines and was to 
undergo extensive revisions and the important addition of 
prose marginal glosses in 1815-16, published in Sibylline 
Leaves (1817). The earliest draft of 'Dejection' was 
addressed as a letter to Sara Hutchinson, and dated 4 April 
1802. The subsequent drastic revisions of the poem have been 
examined by Herbert Read in his essay 'The Creative Experience 
in Poetry 1 , 3 as the process of using control and order to 
enable the poet to regard his own confession; to adopt the 
perspective of spectator and artist. As Coleridge himself 
wrote in 1808, 'the spirit of poetry must of necessity 
circumscribe itself by rules . . . It must embody in order to 
reveal itself. ,4 
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In brief, 'Kubla Khan' and 'Dejection' might both be 
described as fragments, while 'The Ancient Mariner' was 
completed only by a prose gloss which has the effect of 
unsettling the text of the poem itself. In all three poems 
there is a sense of a wholeness, vast beyond human 
comprehension, which the poet momentarily intimates in his 
imagination. While the revisions tend to create new narrative 
levels which force poet and reader to become spectators of 
themselves as the poetry is experienced, and which open the 
way for a pattern of reflections pointing to an infinity, and 
to the glimpsed completeness and unity. 
l. 1 Kubla Khan' and the Tomorrow Yet to Come 
On the Saturday morning of 14 October 1797, Coleridge 
wrote a letter to John Thelwall. It tends to confirm a note 
on an autograph copy of the poem in the relatively recently 
discovered Crewe MS 5 which contradicts in a number of ways 
the factual claims of the published Preface. The note merely 
records: 
This fragment with a good deal more, not recoverable, 
composed, in a sort of Reverie brought on by two 
grains of Opium, taken to cheat a dysentery, at a Farm 
House between Porlock & Linton, a quarter of a mil~ 
from Culbone Church, in the fall of the year 1797. 
In the first sentence of his letter Coleridge mentions having 
been absent for a day or two - the stay near Porlock -, while 
the preoccupations and even language of the letter are 
strongly suggestive of 'Kubla Khan'. 'My mi~d feels as if it 
ached to behold & know something great' wrote Coleridge, 
- something one & indivisible - and it is only in th~ 
faith of this that rocks or waterfalls, mountains or 
caverns give me the sense of sublimity or majesty! -
But in this faith all things counterfeit infinity! 
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He concludes with some lines from 'This Lime-Tree Bower my 
Prisod (1797), beginning with line 38, misquoted as 'Struck 
with the deepest calm of Joy' . 7 The prose Preface is an 
expansion of the brief Crewe MS note with a lax concern for 
facts which suggests that its purpose might be other than 
simply conveying to the reader a sequence of past events. 
Rather, it prepares the reader for the experience of reading 
the poem which conveys sublimity through the images of caverns 
and exotic scenery, and then anchors sublimity in the more 
domestic setting of Porlock, for all things, indeed, 
counterfeit infinity. 
The reader, drawn into the creative processes of reading, 
glimpses in his imagination an infinite unity, 'a distinct 
recollection of the whole 1 • 8 Yet it remains an intimation, 
for 1 a person on business from Porlock 1 (lines 26-7) will 
always arrive as finitude puts bounds upon the infinite 
vision. For all that a 'dim recollection' remains (line 30), 
and that is enough to draw the reader back to the fragment 
of poetry with its mysterious indications of a vision that 
can never be fully recovered. The process is uncomfortably 
asymptotic, and the tomorrow is always yet to come. 
D. F. Rauber has described the person from Porlock as 
'necessary to create the illusion of the cut short rather 
than the stopped 1 .9 That 1 Kubla Khan' is a fragment may be 
a deliberate exercise of the Imagination; of the primary 
Imagination which repeats in the finite mind the infinite act 
of divine creation, and of the secondary Imagination whose 
re-creative potential must necessarily be incomplete and 
fragmentary. 10 If, as Rauber suggests, there is here the 
familiar Platonic or Neoplatonic conception of progressively 
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more shadowy images or reflections of the full reality, there 
is also in 'Kubla Khan' and Biographia Literaria a clear link 
between Coleridge's poetic concerns and his later theological 
and philosophical interests which they both prompt and 
illuminate. 
1 Kubla Khan' begins with a paradise garden decreed by an 
emperor who is threatened by the past of his 'ancestral 
voices'. But the paradise which is threatened by Original 
Sin is found again by the poet and his vision which he has 
but to remember in order to re-create an image of the harmony 
and wholeness of the Paradise with which the poem concludes. 
In 1815, Coleridge wrote to Wordsworth that he hoped his 
poetry would have 'affirmed a Fall in some sense, as a fact, 
the possibility of which cannot be understood from the nature 
of the Will, but the reality of which is attested by 
E • & C • I 11 xperlence onsclence . While, as will be discussed, one 
of the themes of 1 The Ancient Mariner' is the problem of the 
origin of evil, in 1 Kubla Khan 1 it is not the ontology of 
evil, but the theological task of the poetic imagination 
which is explored, as 1 revives 1 the symphonic vision and 
rebuilds Kubla 1 s dome; paradise lost and regained. 
Despite the oriental barbarism of 'Kubla Khan', it 
remains within the structural plot of the Judaeo-Christian 
t d . t . 12 d . t . . th . ra l lon, an l lS Wl ln this context that the echo of 
Plato's Ion in the poem must be placed. 13 In the Ion the 
connection is made between the poet and the divine, and the 
poem is understood as a gift from beyond the poet himself. 
Literally possessed by the divine, the poet embodies a 
mystery which must remain within the encircled sanctuary. 
Plato's Socrates says to Ion that: 
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(beautiful poems are not human, not made by man, but 
divine and made by God: and the poets are nothing but 
the gods' i~!erpreters, possessed each by whatever god 
it may be.) 
Kathleen Raine has looked in some detail into Coleridge's use 
of Plato's images of the poet who draws milk and honey from 
rivers in paradisial gardens as their souls fly from flower 
to sweet flower. 15 In two ways, therefore, Wilson Knight's 
interpretation of Coleridge's poetry in The Starlit Dome 
(Oxford,l94l) is to be distrusted. First, Coleridge does not 
distrust his 1 sc:!ular inspiration' (p .125), since inspiration 
is never actually 'secular', but linked with the divine. 
Second, his 'orthodox belief' (p.99) cannot be said to clog 
his imaginative faith, since if Coleridge can be regarded as 
reaching an orthodox profession of Christianity it is through 
the experience of the poetic imagination upon which he 
reflected. Furthermore the structure of 1 Kubla Khan' lies 
firmly within the traditional plot upon which Christian 
theology is set. 
But we must be careful to distinguish between the·poet 
who is possessed by a divine frenzy which is not his own, and 
the self who reflects and recollects. For as Coleridge 
deliberately establishes a number of narrative levels in 
'The Ancient Mariner', so in 1Kubla Khan' he prompts 
reflection by an interplay between a number of perspectives 
or visionary centres. In the last stanza, for example, he 
switches from first person to third person narrative; the 
poet with flashing eyes and flo ating hair, mysteriously and 
divineyinspired, is distanced from the visionary (in the 
first person) who deliberately recollects and re-creates what 
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once he saw. Different again is the dry and, one suspects, 
ironic third person narrative of the Preface. The effect of 
these parallel levels of perspective is to prompt the reader 
to reflect creatively upon his own reading, to perceive that 
his own limited vision and reductive rationality will supply 
a person from Porlock to cut short the 'dream' which is 
released and completed only when, in the third stanza, the 
imagination and creative powers assume command and the poet 
is received in holy fear and reverence, and the vision 
becomes a religious experience. 
It is not precisely accurate to describe 'Kubla Khan' as 
being about the act of poetic creation. 16 Rather, as a 
deliberate fragment, it has as its subject the poet's 
consciousness of his process of creation. He is looking at 
his language, what it is doing to him and what he is doing to 
it. The perceptual process is obviously not a response to an 
observed, external landscape. The lush descriptions are 
rather the transformation of subjective, internal experiences 
into public objects. But neither is the poem simply an 
example of the desire of the human psyche to create objects. 
For as the language becomes active in the processes of 
reading, its metaphor of mental process is drawn back in a 
new, creative and imaginative experience. That which the 
poem describes would not be were it not for the poem-as-it-
is-read. 
By the Khan's decree, almost a divine fiat, is the 
pleasure-dome brought into being. The poet's dream o~ vision, 
conducting that act of creation through language, repeats the 
eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM, an act of the 
imagination in its primary aspect. But the vision ends in a 
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'lifeless ocean' (line 28) and the threat of the ancestral 
voices. It is picked up in a Coleridgean reconciliation of 
opposites, the 1 sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice' (line 
36), in an exercise of the conscious will of the poet: the 
imagination in its secondary aspect, progressively de-creative 
and creative, revives the vision. The waking mind of the 
poet, both artist and spectator, turns the poem's subject 
into object, even to himself. The vision itself is 
extinguished - 1close your eyes with holy dread' (line 52) -
as the poet embodies an imaginative fulfilment of paradise 
where reconciled opposites are discovered to be one from the 
first. Thus Coleridge describes the poet in Biographia: 
The poet, descr~bed in ideal perfection, brings the 
whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination· 
of its faculties to each other, according to their 
relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and 
spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, 
each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, 
~o w~ich.we ~1ve exclusively appropriated the name of 
1mag1nat1on. 
The creative poet is no dreamer without will. He sets about 
reviving the vision of the Abyssinian maid in the third 
stanza of the poem. Later, in Biographia, Coleridge clearly 
criticized Hartley's associationalism as defective in the 
controlling powers of will, reason and judgement. 18 In 
1 Kubla Khan 1 , lines 37-47, the poet in the first person 
speaks in the conditional. His conscious will reaches out to 
a revival of his vision and the 1 deep delight' which would 
result from it. Then at line 48 comes the switch to the 
third person. By his own prophecy, as it were, the poet is 
made visible, distanced from himself. The creator becomes 
the spectator and self-reflection has resulted in a self-· 
transcendence which points beyond the poetic fragment to a 
mysterious infinity. The blindness of the audience and the 
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inward gaze of the poet's 'flashing eyes' looks forward to 
the blind old man of 'Limbo', whose 'eyeless Face all Eye' 
gazes within to a transcendent mystery, the divine illumination 
no longer a vision - for the dream is broken -,but an inward 
. 19 
experlence. 
The Preface to 1 Kubla Khan', with gentle irony, shakes 
the reader out of a literal reading which fails to perceive 
that the dream and the fragment are metaphors for what is 
happening to him. 20 Like the prose gloss of 'The Ancient 
Mariner', it draws the reader into a participatory role which 
takes him ultimately beyond the prison of language and image, 
for language can trap things in its finitude. Its capacity 
to project an image of what is there may act like a person 
from Porlock, while the heightened consciousness of the poet 
may find, paradoxically, in his poetic creativity a release 
by language from language, so that it may begin to intimate 
what is not there, a glimpse of Paradise or the tomorrow yet 
to 21 come. 
In his essay 'On Poesy or Art' (?1818), Coleridge 
describes artistic creativity in the man of genius as both 
an 'unconscious activity' and also 'according to the severe 
laws of the intellect' . 22 It is the 'co-ordination of freedom 
and law'. Mary Rahme concludes that: 
..... the symbols created by the artist are not 
representations merely of objective outer nature, nor 
are they representations of the artist's own subjective 
feelings. Rather they are forms created by the human 
mind in the same way that the forms of nature are 
created by the Divine Mind. The implication is that 
the artist is peculiarly fitted by his genius to achieve 
an insight into this process and re-create it in his 
art. Thus a symbol is both a result of, and, in a sense, 
a representation of, the art~~tic insight which inspires 
and guides its own creation. 
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This dual nature of poetic activity settles it firmly in the 
central preoccupation of all Coleridge's thinking; that polar 
logic whereby one becomes two while yet remaining one. 
Wi~hout imagining polarity, the nature of reason is not to be 
understood, and nor is the nature of God, since 'God is 
reason' •
24 The apparent dislocations of 1 Kubla Khan' - the 
person from Porlock, the Preface from the poem, the sunny 
dome and ic~y caves, the third stanza from the first two 
stanzas - reflect the two worlds of the poet, the conscious 
and the unconscious, or perhaps the conscious and the self-
conscious. The fragment which is the conscious intellect 
creates the impulse to move beyond the broken form to an 
infinity, so that, in a sense, the poem never really ends. 
2. The Two Worlds of 'The Ancient Mariner' 
It is recorded that Coleridge described 'The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner' as a work of 'pure imagination' . 25 He 
dismissed 'the obtrusion of the moral sentiment so openly on 
the reader as a principle or cause of action'. The artistic 
freedom of the poem must be preserved both from a theory of 
the imagination encountered by Coleridge in his reading of 
Kant 26 and from those interpretors who seek to impose an 
arbitrary pattern on the poem on the basis of preconceived 
philosophical or theological structures. Leaving aside any 
moral or interpretative imperatives, the narrative must be 
allowed to do its own work on its own terms, while the reader 
needs to become aware of the delicate interaction between the 
various levels of narration and the way in which this sustains 
two ontological bases of form, here described as the two 
worlds of the poem. Briefly, on the one hand, there is the 
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assumption that society and the self, through art, are 
encompassed by an ultimate transcendent. Second, there is 
the contrasting assumption that, by structuring its life upon 
simple 'orthodox' religious formulations, society and the 
self appear to be self-creating and self-sustaining, paying 
lip-service to an imagined deity by a suitably respectable 
code of conduct. The ambiguous co-existence of these two 
worlds will be the subject of the conclusion to this section. 
Although the close observation of natural phenomena and 
powerful physical detail of 'The Ancient Mariner' encourage 
one to agree with David Jones that 'the imagination takes-off 
best from the flight-deck of the known, from the experiential 
and the contactual 1 , nevertheless, as 'pure imagination', the 
poem is a willed creation of the poet drawing little upon 
what has actually been seen or experienced in the world. 27 
Furthermore, it eludes critics who would roughly clamp pre-
formed philosophical or theological systems onto its 
narrative structure, systems in which it can more or less be 
proved that Coleridge was well-read. 28 However, if such 
arbitrari:y imposed patterns serve only to distort a reading 
of the poem, it is equally unacceptable to follow critics like 
John Livingston Lowes in The Road to Xanadu (London,l927), or 
Maud Bodkin in Archetypal Patterns in Poetry (London,l934), 
who argue that there must not be a meaning in the poem 
because any meaning we can guess at would be too petty. It 
is fantasy without meaning - the despairing conclusion of most 
of Coleridge's contemporaries. 
However, it will not do to fight shy of 'meaning' in 
this way since, as a literary critic, Coleridge was well aware 
that narrative flows according to particular rules, and 'as 
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rules are nothing but means to an end previously ascertained ... 
we must first ascertain what the immediate end or object of 
the Lnarrativ~7 is 1 • 29 During the course of the narrative 
its rules and object may indeed be hidden from our 
comprehension, since it could be said that more important 
than any predictable relation between events is rather the 
opposite - not that some earlier event leads necessarily to 
a later. one, but that a later event requires, as its 
necessary condition, some earlier one. 30 This very hiddenness 
of the rules of the game can encourage the unwary reader into 
a grateful adherence to landmarks of meaning which lie 
temptingly on the surface of the narrative. Coleridge 
himself warns us against taking the simple rule - 'He prayeth 
well who loveth well' - too much at face value in his reply, 
already mentioned, to the redoubtable Mrs. Barbauld, who had 
complained that the poem 'was improbable, and had no moral': 
..... as to the want of a moral, I told her that in my 
own judgement the poem had too much; and that the only, 
or chief fault, if I might say so, was the obtrusion of 
the moral sentiment so openly on the reader as a 
principle or cause of action in a work of such pure 
imagination. It ought to have had no more moral than 
the Arabian Night's tale of the merchant's sitting down 
to eat dates by the side of a well, and throwing the 
shells aside, and lo! a genie starts up, and says he 
must kill the aforesaid merchant, because one of the 
dat~ shells ~fd, it seems, put out the eye of the 
gen1e 1 s son. 
If 'The Ancient Mariner' ought to have had no more moral than 
this, the fact remains that it has, and that the Mariner's 
moralizing is, to say the least, uncomfortable in the context 
of the poem. Secondly, within its own confines, the sequence 
of the Arabian Nights' tale is unexceptional. Any interpreter 
- and therefore any reader - of a narrative will tend to 
impose constraints on it, structures of explanation drawn 
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from the theoretical presuppositions Gf a culture or 
institution with their morality or religion, and which come 
between the reader and the text. Interpretation is therefore 
almost inevitable, but a 1pure narrative 1 in a work of 'pure 
imagination' will also play its own game against the 
interpreters, its art, triumphant in deceit, transferring the 
ground for hope in a sceptical and mysterious universe from 
structural orthodoxies to ambiguity and holy dread. 32 
One ~f the themes of 'The Ancient Mariner' is the problem 
of the origin of evil. In a letter of 10 March 1798 (two 
weeks before he completed the poem) to his brother George, 
Coleridge declares his belief in the doctrine of Original Sin 
and demonstrates his knowledge of Augustine's theology. 33 
In a letter from Charles Lamb, written early in 1797, we 
learn that Coleridge was contemplating a long poem on the 
Origin of Evil. 34 Much later, on 3 November 1810, he wrote 
in the 1Confessio Fidei': 'I believe, and hold it as the 
fundamental article of Ch~istianity, that I am a fallen 
creature' ; 35 and in a manuscript note on Richard II, of about 
1810, he suggests that both dramatic and epic poetry (like 
'The Ancient Mariner') 1 are founded on the relation of 
providence to the human will ..... In the drama, the will is 
exhibited as struggling with fate ..... and the deepest 
effect is produced when fate is represented as a higher and 
intelligent will, and the opposition of the individual as 
springing from a defect' . 36 This mystery, explored in the 
poetry, finds a different expression in the poet's post-
Kantian phase of Christian philosophy and theology, and such 
writings as the 1 Confessio Fidei' provide probably the best 
theoretical commentary on 'The Ancient Mariner'. It will be 
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examined later in some detail. However, as Maud Bodkin has 
said, 1 it is hard to force the meaning conveyed by imaginative 
speech into terms more precise than that speech itself' . 37 
To the poem, therefore, we turn for enlightenment. 
It has been remarked that, if read apart from the 
distorting critical effects of outside sources, a narrative 
will perform its own work on its own terms. Further, 
Coleridge asserted that narrative fol~ows particular rules 
dedicated to an immediate end or object. In the note on 
Richard II he makes the important point that the narrative 
must have a narrator 'from whom the objects represented 
receive a colouring and a manner'. The narrative of 'The 
Ancient Mariner' operates on three distinct levels, over all 
of which Coleridge himself hovers ultimately and invisibly. 
These levels - of narrator, the Mariner and the reader, -
between them sustain the two ontological bases of form, the 
two worlds of the poem, one inhabited by the Wedding-Guest 
and finally embraced by the Mariner in his concluding moral 
of love for all things, and the other quite arbitrary and 
beyond his understanding or control. 
The first level is maintained by the narrator, who, 
controlled by Coleridge as part of the complex narrative 
pattern, establishes the self-generating and self-sustaining 
world of the poem: 'It is an ancient Mariner'; 'There was a 
ship'. The narrator, by selectively choosing what we see, 
gives the poem its colour and ethos. More important he 
controls the pace and even the sequence of events, in the 
basic fictional dimension of time, creating what Coleridge 
describes in Biographia Literaria as the peculiar logic of 
poetry. As compared with the logic of science this is 'more 
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difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent 
on more and more fugitive causes' . 38 Such logic can often be 
mistaken for arbitrariness, dangerous to the reader because 
its rules are hidden. 
The second narrative level is represented by the Mariner 
himself who, with a particula~ and limited degree of self-
knowledge relates, as he tells his story, in a complex and 
often ambiguous way to the other two levels - the narrator and 
the representative of the third level, that is the reader. 
For, come what may, the reader, by making judgements and an 
imaginative response, is there in the poem as much as any of 
the characters. Like the Wedding-Guest he adheres to the 
Mariner as he tells his tale, while he drifts in and out of 
a relationship of trust with the narrator, who has a 
treacherous habit of misleading the too-trusting reader. 
Thus, the reader may ask, is it not naive to accept the final 
moral that 1he prayeth well who loveth well' at its face 
value? Whatever the Mariner may say, it is surely not self-
evident that God loves everyone. And yet the suspicion 
remains - perhaps it is right to be naive. 
It ~s both important to understand that the narrative is 
composed of words and therefore imagin~ry insofar as the words 
are divorced from any observable reality, and to perceive that 
its theme sustains a pattern of interpersonal relations in 
which the reader is.inextricably involved. The machinery of 
the poem involves albatrosses, ships and lighthouses, but the 
machinery is not the same thing as the theme. Because the 
narrative is unreal and imaginary it is therefore a logically 
independent and self-sustaining world requiring the reader 
to indulge in the 'willing suspension of disbelief ... which 
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constitutes poetic faith 1 J9 and to recognize the sometimes 
paradoxical and puzzling elements in a coherent whole. 
Everything - each consequential action in an ambivalent 
world - must be accounted for in the logic of the narrative. 
From the multiple perspective of such a world the reader may 
return to the apparent logic of his own, enlightened maybe, 
a sadder and a wiser man, perhaps 1 a little,nearer Hagia 
Sophia 1 • 40 
The earliest critics of 1 The Ancient Mariner 1 were 
almost uniformly hostile precisely because they were not 
prepared to undertake the necessary willing suspension of 
disbelief, and wished to grasp the poem in the familiar mould 
of their understanding and within their reassuring critical 
orthodoxies. A review of Lyrical Ballads in the Critical 
Review for October 1798, attributed to Robert Southey, 
complains that: 
Many of the stanzas are laboriously beautiful; but in 
connection they are absurd or unintelligible ... We 41 do not sufficiently understand the story to analyse it. 
In the same vein, there appeared in the Monthly Review for 
June 1799: 
L'The Ancient Mariner~! is the strangest story of a 
cock and a bull that we every saw on paper: yet, 
though it seems a rhapsody of unintelligible wildness 
and incoherence, (of which we do not perceive the 
drift, unless the joke lies in depriving the wedding 
guest of his share of the feast) there 4~re in it poetical touches of an exquisite kind. 
Finally, in the British Critic, the poem was condemned for 
1 a kind of confusion of images, which loses all effect, from 
not being quite intelligible 1 .43 
LunQQ~ 
The repeated~is for the poem to be clear to the 
understanding and to carry a definable message. However, the 
tone changes with the criticism of Coleridge 1 s friend Charles 
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Lamb, and an essay attributed to John Gibson Lockhart (the 
biographer of Scott) in Blackwood's Magazine for October 1819. 44 
Instead of wishing to control the poem by their understanding 
of its 'meaning', Lamb and Lockhart are content to be controlled 
by it. Neither try to make sense of the poem, as such, being 
not so concerned with what it means, rather with what it 
does. They describe their own responses to the narrative: 
'I never so deeply felt' (Lamb); '··· it is a poem to be felt, 
cherished, mused upon, not to be talked about, not capable of 
being described, analyzed or criticized'. (Lockhart). But 
Lamb and Lockhart were aware that their approach was in danger 
of robbing them of any language at all with which to talk 
about the poem. Their experience of the devices of story-
telling crossed the limits of understanding as they remained 
open to the affective power of the narrative. As Coleridge 
himself was to confess concerning the Christian scheme of 
things, Lamb and Lockhart might admit of the power of 'The 
Ancient Mariner', that it is a 'fearful Mystery I pretend 
not to understand - I cannot even conceive of the possibility 
of it - but I know that it is sol ,4 5 
Professor Frank Kermode in his book The Sense of an 
Ending suggests that the Bible and the theologians who seek 
to interpret it are attempting to give some coherence and 
shape, even a literary form, to the 'endless successiveness' 
of world history. The literary artist follows the theologians. 
Fictions, Kermode would say, meet a need, summed up in what 
Bacon said of poetry which may 1give some show of 
satisfaction to the mind, wherein the nature of things doth 
seem to deny it 1 .46 The artist, in other words, plays a dual 
role, creative of a finite, ordered world wherein, 
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simultaneously, an infinity of endless successiveness demands 
an acknowledgement of human limitation; demands of the artist 
a de-creation of his ordered world. Friedrich' Schlegel, 
whose concept of Romantic irony will be discussed in chapter 
5, balances the artist between 1 Selbstschopfung 1 (self-
creation) and 1 Selbstvernichtung 1 (self-destruction). 
This duality is sustained by Coleridge in the fiction of 
'The Ancient Mariner', identifiable in the two ontological 
bases of its form, the one resting upon an ultimate 
transcendent directing human life and society and the other 
concealing behind religious platitudes a belief in the self-
supporting and sufficient nature of society and the individuals 
which compose it. A study of this duality is, in the end, a 
religious exercise, an exploration into poetry which is 
'neither simply theological, nor simply aesthetic, but ... an 
indivisible union of the two' . 47 What is required in reading 
Coleridge's poetry is an awareness of his belief that poetry 
and all artistic narrative exists in movement and openness. 
It never reaches the poise of perfection, and points beyond 
itself to an infinity beyond the range of literary or 
aesthetic criticism. More precisely, a special type of 
attention to language is demanding in reading such poetry -
to the ambivalences of the inter-relationship of the images 
which are presented by a variety of narrators, and to the life 
inhering in a particular order of words. An attitude of faith 
is demanded of the reader, since, as John Coulson has 
suggested of Coleridge: 
For him the primary response to language is not 
analytic, but fiduciary. In religion, as in poetry, 
we are required to make a complex act of inference 
and assent, and we begin by taking on trust 
expressions which are usually in analogical, 
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metaphorical, or symbolic form, and by acting out the 
claims they make: understanding religious l~~guage is 
a fuQction of understanding poetic language. 
On examining in detail the sequence of events and images 
in 1 The Ancient Mariner', it becomes plain that no simple 
chain of cause-and-effect is operative. Unless we are prepared 
to isolate sections of, and elements in, the narrative, the 
poem as a whole proceeds on the basis of an arbitrary and 
apparently discontinuous series of incidents. The dramatic 
context is established abruptly - 1 it is an ancient Mariner'. 
A gulf is fixed between the merry world of the wedding and 
the haunted, dream-like world of the Mariner. As an isolated 
problem the contrast provides nourishment for critics who 
would wrench its 'symbolism' out of the context of the whole 
narrative. What could be more arbitrary than that? As the 
unfortunate Wedding-Guest, one of three, asks, why does the 
Mariner single him out? What has all this to do with me? 
The retiring reader may ask the same question, and yet be no 
less involved in the complex narrative structure of the 
poem. 1 He cannot choose but hear. 1 49 
Why does the Mariner shoot the albatross? Is it through 
sheer pathological misery or the wanton destruction of the 
possibility of affection? 50 Is it an example of Coleridge's 
belief in the Augustinian concept of original sin, by which 
1 an evil ground exists in my will, previously to any given 
t , bl t f t' ' ' I 51 ac , or ass1gna e momen o 1me 1n my consc1ousness . 
Perhaps that may be so, but it cannot therefore be linked into 
any identifiable sequence, since the result of the crime in 
good weather or bad produces a correspondent reaction among 
the sailors of approval or disapproval as it affects them for 
good or ill. One could describe the sailors as theologians 
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and moralists in the mould of Archdeacon Paley, in whose 
Natural Theology (1804) attention is given to the question 
of external evidences, to the almost total neglect of the 
content of religion. Paley's motive is to establish man's 
happiness. Consequently self-interest threatens to demolish 
morality. 
After the killing of the albatross, the weather is, as 
always, unpredictable, open to any interpretation the 
Mariner, the narrator or the reader may wish to supply. 
Coleridge supplies none, respecting the weather for what it 
is. The Mariner's recovery from the worst of his depression 
in the blessing of the water-snakes is partial, a recognizable 
psychological and aesthetic necessity wherein the failure 
which is required for individual spiritual growth engenders 
a childlike sense of weakness and distress. Nevertheless, 
the recognition of love and blessing of the snakes is no great 
affirmation or example of the gratuitous operation of divine 
grace. It is not so much a step forward in a linear moral 
progression, but the necessary recognition of the irreparable 
damage which has been done and the first intimation of a 
platitudinous religious affirmation which is a statement of 
loss rather than gain. 
But, apart from what can be recognized as a perfectly 
acceptable psychological drama operative in the Mariner 
himself, the poem is increasingly strewn with supernatural 
and gothic horrors which have their own. logic in the drama of 
crime and punishment: phantom-ships with wraiths dicing for 
men's souls; the ship's miraculous propulsion; seraph-bands; 
earthquakes; and insanity in the Pilot's boy. On the one 
hand, the origin of these horrors may lie in Coleridge's 
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contemporary reviewing of Gothic literature for the Critical 
Review. 52 In particular he had been reading J. G. Lewis' 
The Monk (1796) in which features a vivid 'flesh-and-blood 
ghost', a 'Spectre-woman ... who thicks man's blood with 
cold 1 • 53 He was not, however, one to be taken in by the 
'perpetual moonshine of ... the literary brood of the Castle 
54 
of Otranto 1 • What, therefore, was his purpose in including 
derivatives of such nonsense in a serious poem, and how far 
do they relate to the psychological and spiritual crisis of 
the Mariner and his ambiguous recovery which meets so 
inadequately the vision of horrifying potential which has 
been glimpsed in human nature? 
According to J. H. Green, Coleridge's admirer and 
literary executor, the 'great Coleridgean position' can be 
summed up thus: 
Christianity, rightly understood, is identical with 
the highest philosophy, and apart from all question of 
historical evidence, the essential doctrines of 
Christianity are necessary and eternal truths of 
reason - truths which man, by the vouchsafed light of 
Nature and without aid from documents or trad~~ion, 
may always and anywhere discover for himself. 
Although this was to be the basis for many critical 
pronouncements on Coleridge, 56 it will not do if the literary 
communication of 'The Ancient Mariner' is to be taken 
seriously. The ostensible faith finally declared by the 
Mariner that: 
He prayeth best, who loveth best 
All things both great and small; 
For the dear God who loveth us, 
He made and loveth all -
(lines 614-17) 
may certainly imply that traditional Christian doctrine and 
morality may be made manageable within the reasonable 
confines and constitution of human experience and the human 
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mind. It was taken into Victorian hymnody and the Victorian 
sense of a Christian dispensation undergirding a well-
structured society in which God confirms the rich man in his 
castle and the poor man at his gate. Of 1all things bright 
and beautiful', Mrs. C. F. Alexander (1818-95) would say, in 
words very reminiscent of the Mariner: 
He gave us eyes to see them, 
And lips that we might tell 
How great is God Almighty, 
Who has made all things well. 
In the Mariner's experience, however, the world is indubitably 
unfair and hostile. It has been suggested that the 
inconsequential nature of the Nariner 1 s progression from 
abject misery and grief in guilt to a partial recovery which 
;t 
carries withAa need for periodic confession, is psychologically 
perfectly comprehensible. Some device is required to enable 
us to cope with a world so full of menace and threat. The 
sense in the Wedding-Guest and the Mariner himself of being 
unfairly singled out was well known to Coleridge in his 
unfortunate life. At the end of his poem 1 The Pains of 
Sleep' (1803), he wrote pathetically and childishly: 
Such griefs with such men well agree, 
But wherefore, wherefore fall on me? 
To be beloved is all I need, 7 And whom I love, I love indeed. 5 
Petulant this may seem, yet do we not convince 
ourselves of the genuineness of our love for others, and the 
purity of our motives? Like the Mariner, do we not enfold 
our self-justification in the guarantee of religious 
respectibility? Such a process of self-questioning is 
important for each reader since each partakes of the narrative 
structure of the poem. As Coleridge wrote in 'Dejection': 
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..... we receive but what we give 58 And in our life alone does Nature live. 
The change in the Mariner stems from a changed attitude to 
himself: the response of the reader will be conditioned by the 
reader's attitude to himself. Yet odd forces are at work in 
the narrative, obscuring the familiar landscape of experience 
from which that attitude draws its customary shape and logic. 
For whatever the Mariner says, and quite possibly 
believes, it is quite clear that the 'dear God who loveth us' 
is, in the context of the poem, a deity with an indevendent 
mind and will whose expression of love for his creation is, 
to say the least, ambivalent. Why should the sailors all die 
while the Mariner suffers only - after the throw of a dice -
Life-in-Death? Why, indeed, should God have allowed the 
albatross to suffer such a fate? What relation does this 
trusted and loving God have with the Polar Spirit and his 
fellow daemons who grimly threaten the Mariner, but lately 
relieved of the albatross about his neck, with 'penance more' 
(line 409)? What is the objective correlative of the 
phantoms which people the poem and which do, undeniably, have 
a physical effect on the narrative, providing, if nothing 
more, physical propulsion for the ship's homeward journey. 
No theory of psychological discontinuity is sufficient to 
embrace this world of spirit effects which, however hard we 
may try to account for the~ lie outside the concluding 
psychological package conveyed in the Mariner's closing 
words. Nor is it sufficient to claim that~ after all, man 
cannot bear very much reality, for the experience of the 
Mariner is more than he is prepared to admit in his own 
narrative, an experience under the dominion of a metaphysic 
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more profound than the concluding 'Christian' affirmation. 
What doctrine of the Fall and Redemption through Grace there 
is in the poem, is mysterious and laden with paradox, bearing 
within it an agony of repetition 'at an uncertain hour', and 
if wisdom yet also sadness. 
But if this pattern of Fall and Redemption in 'The 
Ancient Mariner' bears no simple religious affirmation, yet 
neither is it irretrievably fractured because it cannot 
sustain Green's 'great Coleridgean position' of poetry 
regarded as deducible from the constitution of the human mind. 
It should not be regarded simply as an exploration into the 
psychological origins of guilt and suffering, 59 but as a 
literary exercise illustrative of the poet's power to convey 
the paradoxes and dualism of the religious experience which 
is balanced between the transcendent and the immanent and 
lies at the heart of other pairs of words which Coleridge took 
and developed from his eighteenth century inheritance or 
reading of Kant - fancy/imagination; understanding/reason. 
His approach to words and language is profoundly significant 
of his sense of the religious experience, and thus it behoves 
the critic to attend to the literary and narrative techniques 
of 'The Ancient Mariner' which contribute to its total 
effect and sense, and which link it with the whole corpus of 
Coleridge's writings on religion. 
The interwoven and interdependent three narrative levels 
of narrator, Mariner and the internal contribution of the 
reader, constitute a rhetoric, a 'unity in multeity 1 which 
represents in poetic terms an all-pervading moral-religious-
philosophical preoccupation in Coleridge's writings. A 
symbol, for Coleridge, focusses two separate levels of 
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existence - eternal and temporal, universal and individua160 
- corresponding to the two ontological bases of form of 'The 
Ancient Mariner'. It achieves this through the exercise of 
the imagination, which makes a coherent whole of what appears 
to be disparate, or, as Coleridge described the secondary 
Imagination, 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to 
recreate' . 61 Second, in his theory of the imagination, 
Coleridge extended Kant's discussion of what is primarily a 
representational faculty to one which is creative, shaping 
the world as it is experienced. The wholly created world of 
1 The Ancient Mariner' takes its power and authority from its 
independence as a poetic structure which is purely of the 
imagination, standing over against the outside world and 
society of the reader. Professor Nicholas Lash in his book 
Theology on Dover Beach (London,l979) provides another model 
which illuminates the distinction between Kant and Coleridge 
on the imagination. Giving two dimensions to the human quest 
for meaning and truth, explanation and control (equivalent to 
the Kantian bondage to the world of things, which Coleridge 
called 'It is') is replaced by understanding- though not in 
Coleridge's limited sense of the word -and interpretation 
(which Coleridge called 'I am'). Such knowledge involves the 
commitment, openness and risk of poetic creativity. Professor 
Lash concludes: 
And it is not only in respect of our relationship with 
other human individuals that the model of loving 
attention, of contemplative wonder, is more appropriate 
than the model of explanation and con.tr ol. Something 
similar is the case where those forms of the quest for 
truth characteristic of, for example, 6 ~he poet, the 
artist or the novelist are concerned. 
This creative energy which is released in the poetry 
remained an important element in every aspect of Coleridge's 
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later religious writings, related closely to his thoughts on 
the nature of divine creativity and revelation. As, at one 
level, the narrative of 'The Ancient Mariner' is propelled 
mysteriously and beyond the comprehension or control of the 
protagonists, so in a letter of late April 1814, Coleridge 
accepts the Christian faith 'not as deduced from human reason, 
in its grovelling capacity for comprehending spiritual things, 
but as the clear revelation of Scripture•. 63 This limitation 
of human reason and understanding in the mysteries of 
religion is dealt with at some length in the 'Confessio 
Fidei', which is largely concerned with a matter central to 
the theme of 'The Ancient Mariner' - the problem of sin and 
moral guilt. The Mariner cannot comprehend the mystery in 
which he plays a central part. 'I am born', writes Coleridge 
in the 1 Confessio 1 , 'a child of 11'lrath. This fearful !vlystery 
I pretend not to understand'. 
Nevertheless, the Mariner's conclusion, inadequate 
though it may be, is important as a constructed means of 
corning to terms with a forbidding, incomprehensible pattern 
of events. Nor can this latter 'religious' level be 
altogether endured without some psychological explanation. 
Neither world of the poem seems satisfactory within its own 
terms without the other. As Coleridge wrote in Confessions 
of an Inquiring Spirit (1840): 
..•.. all Power manifests itself in the harmony of 
correspond~2t Opposites, each supposing and supporting 
the other. 
In 1843, Wordsworth dictated a series of comments on his 
poetry to Isabella Fenwick, and in remarks attached to 'We 
are Seven' reveals how extensive his part was in the initial 
stages of the composition of 'The Ancient Mariner'. It was 
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Wordsworth who had been reading George Shelvocke's A Voyage 
Round the World by Way of the Great South Sea (London 1 1726), 
which suggested to him the incident of the albatross. No 
doubt elaborated from Coleridge's reading in contemporary 
Gothic literature, the 'skeleton ship, with figures in it' 
was first hinted at in a dream of his friend John Cruikshank. 65 
Perhaps more important than a survey of such immediate 
literary and personal sources, many of which lie obscurely in 
Coleridge's vast reading of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century books of travel, however, would be an attempt to 
reconstruct the secret purposes of the poem, and its place in 
a tradition of creative writing and philosophy. Contemporary 
events also played their part in its creation and development. 
In a notebook entry of late 1796, Coleridge revealed that 
the mutiny on board H.M.S. Bounty in 1789 had not passed him 
unnoticed. The guilt of the mutineer Fletcher Christian and 
his subsequent wanderings, coupled with the terrible voyage 
of Captain Bligh, cast adrift on the South Seas in an open 
boat, find mention in notebook, letters and finally 'The 
Ancient Mariner'. The 1796 note is no. 22 of a list of 
projected works, and reads, 1 Adventures of CHRISTIAN, the 
mutineer' . 66 Coupled with it, as no. 16, is a plan to write 
1 a dissection of Atheism', which is described as 'an outcast 
of blind Nature ruled by a fatal Necessity - Slave of an ideot 
Nature! 1 In a letter almost exactly contemporary with the 
notebook entry, Coleridge laments upon his lack of domestic 
stability. 
What am I to do then? - I shall be ag8~n afloat on the 
wide sea unpiloted and unprovisioned. 
Such was exactly the plight of Captain Bligh. The letter 
links these references to the later poem L'Alone on a wide 
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wide sea!~7 and suggest, through the name of Fletcher 
Christian, that it may be read as something of a pilgrim's 
progress, the story of a Christian soul who rebels, becomes 
an 'outcast of blind Nature' and eventually struggles back 
to a form of Christian affirmation. The clearest evidence 
for this reading, which provides not a theme but only matter 
for a theme, is supplied by the marginal glosses first 
published in Sibylline Leaves (1817). They do not form part 
of the narrative,dtself, for its autonomy as a work of pure 
imagination is always to be respected, but are Coleridge's 
later contributions to providing a consciously religious 
framework. Indeed, they could be regarded as Coleridge adding 
another layer to the fabric of the work, to be seen not as a 
commentary on it so much as a further interwoven strand 
balanced within its existing texture. Other references in 
the marginal glosses link the poem to certain learned 
traditions, perhaps most significantly that of 1 the Platonic 
Constantinopolitan, Michael Psellus' . 68 
A direct link was established between Coleridge's 
extensive knowledge of the work of the Cambridge Platonists 
and his poem with the addition in 1817 as an epigraph, of an 
adapted quotation from Thomas Burnet's Archaeologicae 
Philosophicae sive Doctrina Antiqua De Rerum Originibus 
(London,l692). Burnet was an admiring pupil of Ralph 
Cudworth (1617-88), whose True Intellectual System (1678) was 
well known to Coleridge. A translation of the Latin reads: 
I can readily believe that there are more invisible 
than visible natures in the universe of things. But 
who shall explain their family, their orders, 
relationships, the stations and functions of each? 
What do they do? Where do they live? Human nature 
has always sought after knowledge of these things, 
but has never attained it. Meanwhile, I do not deny 
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the pleasure it is to contemplate in thought, as though 
in a picture, the image of a better and greater world: 
lest the mind, habituating itself to the trivia of 
life, should become too narrow, and subside completely 
into trivial thoughts only. But, at the same time we 
must be vigilant for truth, and set a limit, so that 
we can distingu~9h the certain from the uncertain and 
night from day. 
Coleridge echoed Burnet in a profound belief in a world beyond 
human observation and conception, and in an approach to it 
through the 'shaping spirit of Imagination'. Despite the 
well-established tradition of the imagination as a 
representational and reproductive faculty upon which Kant 
drew, Coleridge's creative imagination has a place in English 
eighteenth century poetry. Apart from Joseph Addison's ode 
'The Spacious Firmament on high', inspired by Newton and the 
Nineteenth Psalm, 70 James Thomson (1700-48) in The Castle of 
Indolence (1748) portrays the fate of those whose senses have 
quite overcome the creative will. 
Each sound too here, to languishment inclin 1 d, 
Lull 1 d the weak bosom, and induced ease ... 
Entangled deep in its enchanting snares, 
The listening heart forgot all duties and all 71 cares. 
The Nightmare Life-in-Death whom the Mariner encounters, and 
by whom he is won as she dices with Death, brings with her an 
enslavement of the will to act and all freedom of creative, 
emotional response. The equivalent in 'Dejection' is the 
drying up of the poet's creative responses, a death-in-life 
'which finds no natural outlet, no relief 1 (line 23). In that 
Ode, things take life from 1 the eddying of [th~l living soul 1 , 
the creative imagination enduing them with joy and freedom. 
To experience its drying up is to experience a living death. 
This doctrine of creative 1 joy 1 , which the Mariner 
faintly begins to rediscover in the beauty and happiness of 
the water-snakes, lay embedded in the tradition of Christian 
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Neoplatonism from which the epigraph by Thomas Burnet is 
drawn, and in which Milton played a major poetic .role. In 
'At a Solemn Music' (?1633) the World Music which was heard 
in Eden before the Fall is even now occasionally audible and 
can lead us to glimpse the prelapsarian state of paradise. 
The doctrine, conserved by the Cambridge Plantonists, found 
echoes in eighteenth century literature in Addison, Thomson 
and Akenside, who each subscribed to the intellectual tradition 
which believed that man has, or ought to have, a responsive 
'music in himself'. Their heirs were Coleridge and 
Wordsworth, who developed their own doctrine of creative 
1 joy 1 in which the 'pure imagination' of Coleridge achieved 
the most radical expression of the self as primary in 
creative activity. In Mark Akenside's poem The Pleasures of 
the Imagination (1744) and in Addison, on whom Akenside drew 
heavily, the Neoplatonist tradition, combined with a 
reconciliation of modern thought and classical-Christian 
values, was formative in establishing a relationship between 
'joy' and creativity which Coleridge employed extensively. 
This linking of 'The Ancient Mariner' as a poem of 'pure 
imagination' with a tradition of Chr~stian Neoplatonism is of 
crucial importance for the theme of the two worlds of the 
poem. Professor McFarland in his book Romanticism and the 
Forms of Ruin (Princeton 1981) establishes the distinction 
J 
between Kant and Coleridge. The imagination which can almost 
be equated with memory, McFarland links with art in the 
mimetic mode, of which the godfather is Aristotle. The 
mimetic mode reproduces and to some extent focusses experienced 
l 't 72 rea l y. Coleridge's creative imagination, however, 
produces what McFarland calls meontic art, of which the 
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ontological basis is veiled in origins deeper than perception 
or observed experience. To describe he employs a phrase of 
Plato, the godfather of meontic art, in the Theaetetus, which 
speaks of the philosopher as investigating 'the being of 
everything that is', in the process searching 'below the 
earth' and 'beyond the heavens (o~?~~~ 1£ uw~~ ) 1 • 73 It is 
from the basis of such statements that Plato issues his denials 
that mimetic poets are really concerned with the truth. 
McFarland q~otes Karl Jaspers' book Plato and Augustine (New 
York,l962) to summarize the nature of meontic art. 
'Thus Plato knows two worlds: the world of Ideas and 
that of the senses, the world of being and that of 
becoming, the noetic (intelligible) world and the 
world of appearances.' 
The cognizance of 'two worl&1 , with the second 
one as the dwelling place of 'true being', generates 
the meontic mode in art. The 'places beyond the 
heavens' relates to our concerns here and at the same 
time transcends them. But it must be understood as 
no less real than the things that surround us; 
otherwis7 4 the realm of meontic art becomes a pure fiction. 
These two worlds are present in 'The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner', the one partially grasped in the Mariner's 
psychological affirmation of unity and community which falls 
short of the other, a mystery of religion whi6h escapes any 
theoretical formulation or control by doctrine. In the 
resulting dualism, only the poetic imagination in the context 
of the narrative and literary structures of the poem can begin 
to focus and bring coherence to the different levels. For 
theory cannot embrace the two worlds which do not simply co-
exist, one a shadow above the other. Since finite human 
beings, infinitely ironic and self-questioning, can never 
fully comprehend that infinite becoming, between 
aspiration and realization there must be a radical break. 
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For now the Mariner's formulations of community remain a 
psychological necessity, while yet in the imagination 'the 
exalted Christ must be seen as an ideal symbol of hope' . 75 
The problem of historicity in the Christian context of 
Coleridgean 'symbol' will be examined in chapter 7. Among 
his notes on Shakespeare, Coleridge comments on the need for 
'poetic faith' in reading dramatic narrative, before which 
'our common notions of philosophy give way ..... : this feeling 
may be said to be much stronger than historic faith' . 76 The 
effect of the Weird Sisters on Macbeth and their limiting of 
the freedom of his moral will by encouraging him to limit and 
attempt to control an equivocal future, create a double 
perspective similar to that in 'The Ancient Mariner'. 
That I have assigned the true reason for the first 
appearance of the Weird Sisters as the key-note of 
the character of the whole play is proved by the re-
entrance of the sisters, after such an order of the 
king's as establishes their supernatural powers of 
information. Yet still it was information: 'king 
hereafter' was still contingent, still in Macbeth's 
moral will, though if he yielded to the temptation 
and thus forfeited his free-agency, then the link 
of cause and effect 'more physico' would commence; 
and thus likewise the prophetic visions afterwards 
in the fourth act. I surely need not say that the 
general idea is all that can be required from the 
poet, not a scholastic logical consistency in a17 7 the parts so as to meet metaphysical objections. 
Coleridge succinctly expresses the interrelatedness of levels 
which preserve in the dramatic narrative the freedom from the 
necessitarian chain of cause and effect, the delicate network 
of supernatural powers and moral will - albeit tainted -, 
which preserves its apparently arbitrary and inconsequential 
pattern. Macbeth, like the Mariner, exists under the shadow 
of a disturbine dualism, in the realm of the noetic and the 
world of appearances. The Weird Sisters, like the 
supernatural agencies in Coleridge's poem, impose themselves 
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upon Macbeth's moral will in a highly ambiguous way: the 
supernatural world continually leads us back to the moral, 
while the moral repeatedly acknowledges the power of the 
supernatural. Macbeth, of course, unlike the Mariner, never 
finally comes to rest in a psychological compromise which 
enables him at least to endure a relationship with the world 
'beyond the heavens'. He does, however, experience the 
tragic conflict between the two worlds of supernatural 
agencies and his defiant moral will which, in Coleridge, 
despite the final apparently placid words of the Mariner, 
leaves the Wedding-Guest forlorn, and establishes the 
language of revelation and religious experience as stretched 
between two ultimately irreconcilable spheres, vibrant, 
numinous and free from platitude or sterile doctrine. 
3. 'A new Earth and new Heaven'. 'Dejection: An Ode' 
In his marginalia on John Petvin 1 s Letters Concerning 
Mind. To which is added a sketch of universal arithmetic 
(London,l750), Coleridge enlists the aid of Kant in 
rectifying the slovenly use of language. His notes on Petvin, 
a student of John Locke, are dated 14 October 1820. On 
Petvin's remarks concerning God's happines~ Coleridge remarks: 
The very word 'happy' as applied to the Being above 
Fate & Chance, that is strangely lax and slovenly. 
But we will suppose the proper word - viz. blest or 
blissful - this at least implies mind, self-
comprehension - not merely an infinita cogitatio sine 
centro, but a Sel~ 8 as the Copula or proper Oneness 
of all Positives. 
Exact use of language makes 'Dejection: An Ode' (1802) a 
demanding poem to read. 1Joy 1 , 'genial', 'eddying' - such 
words require careful attention and precise placement in 
tradition and in Coleridge's writings as a whole. 
- 98 -
The history of the composition of 'Dejection' is complex 
and not altogether clear. Its details need not detain us 
here, and they are fully considered by George Dekker in his 
NQ 
book Coleridge and the Literature of Sensibility (1978). 1 j 
Suffice it to say that, while its genesis may be as early as 
the summer of 1800, the first complete draft was in the form 
of a letter to Sara Hutchinson, dated 4 April 1802. A 
mutilated version, described as an ode, was published in the 
Morning Post on 4 October 1802, and dedicated to Wordsworth 
under the pseudonym 'Edmund'. The final version was published 
in Sibylline Leaves (1817), much shorter and tighter than the 
original verse letter. Like 'Kubla Khan' and 'The Ancient 
Mariner', therefore, the final version of the poem is the 
result of years of reflection, although Coleridge provides no 
ironic commentary equivalent to the prose Preface and glosses 
of the earlier poems. 
Part of Coleridge's purpose is to contradict Wordsworth's 
teaching that a man may be healed by exposure to nature and 
its forces, 80 and it is no doubt a bitter comment on the 
wreck of Coleridge's marriage and his hopeless passion for 
Sara Hutchinson that 4 October 1802 was Wordsworth's wedding-
day. Coleridge, in a state of depression, has been out of 
doors on a 'long eve, 81 so balmy and serene'. Rationally he 
has grasped its beauty, but his emotions remain unaffected. 
What is required, and missing, is a joy in the poet which will 
respond to the beauty of the scene: 
... is the spirit and the power, 
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower 
A new Earth and new Heaven. 
(lines 67-9) 
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Coleridge, and indeed Wordsworth, would have known the 
emphasis which David Hartley placed on the terms 'Pleasure' 
and 1Joy' as the consummation of love necessitating the 
presence of the beloved object. But for both poets there 
was a more ancient, Christian ancestry for the word which is 
found in eighteenth century poetry. Apart from the reference 
to Revelation 21.1. in line 69 of 'Dejection', more important 
is the use of Acts 17.24-8. Wordsworth quotes the passage in 
his enlargement of 1802 to the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, in 
reference to the poet's art. 
It is an acknowledgement of the bBauty of the universe 
... it is a task light and easy to him who looks at 
the world in the spirit of love: further, it is a 
homage paid to the native and naked dignity of man, to 
the grand elementary principle of pleasure~ 2by which he knows, and feels, and lives, and moves. 
Verse 28 of the passage from Acts reads, 'for in him we live, 
and move, and have our being'. (Authorised Version). For 
Wordsworth and Coleridge these verses are seen as expressive 
of the divine presence of the Holy Spirit in nature, and it 
is through the 'elementary principle of pleasure' that the 
Spirit operates. Thus, 'men and especially poets are most 
like, and interact with, the Holy Spirit when they rejoice' . 83 
Joy is that state of mind which is necessary for the 
poet's creative power. The much-quoted lines: 
0 Lady! we receive but what we give 
And in our life alone does Nature live: 
(47-8) 
might suggest simply an Idealist philosophy in which nature 
is an expression of the creative mind. In fact, there seems 
to be a more specifically theological substance behind 
Coleridge's word 1 joy 1 which recognizes the actuality of an 
independent, external world. Its beauty is perceived only by 
joy: 
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This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist, 
This beautiful and beauty-making power. 
(lines 62-3) 
For John and Charles Wesley in the eighteenth century, 
'joy' was an important emotion, but primarily an attribute of 
God rather than man. The influence of the Methodist revival 
upon English Romanticism, and particularly upon Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, has been traced by Frederick C. Gill in his book, 
The Romantic Movement and Methodism (London,l937). 84 The 
overflowing of Divine joy, according to the Wesley s resulted 
in the great act of creation, 'when the morning stars sang 
together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy'. (J~b 38.7). 
This creative joy finds its echo in man. Charles Wesley 
paraphrased Zephaniah 3.17: 
Thy gracious Lord shall soon for thee 
His whole omnipotence employ, 
Delight in thy prosperity, 
And condescend to sing for joy; 
They God well pleas'd and satisfied 
Shall view his image in thy breast, 
Shall glory o'er his spotless §side, 
And in his love for ever rest. 
As creation comes about through God's joy, so also there is 
Divine joy in his contemplation of man, his own image. For 
Wesley the contemplation is of the church, the 'spotless 
bride'. Coleridge in 'Dejection' repeats the wedding image 
(line 68), but the joy is now as man contemplates man, 
made in God's image - 'We in ourselves rejoice! 1 (line 72). 
A slightly different perspective is found in Mark 
Akenside's poem The Pleasures of Imagination (1757), which 
was well known to Coleridge. Here, as in the Wesleys 1 hymns, 
creation is seen as an overflowing of Divine joy, but now the 
joy comes from the contemplation of uncreated forms. 
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Then liv 1 d the almighty One: then, deep-retir'd 
In his unfathom'd essence, viewed at large 
The forms eternal of created things; 
The radiant sun, the moon's nocturnal lamp, 
The mountains, woods, and streams, the rolling globe, 
And wisdom's mien celestial. From the first 
Of days, on them his love divine he fix 1 d, 
His admiration; till in time complete, 
What he admir'd and ~@v'd, his vital smile 
Unfolded into being. 
In 1 Dejection 1 , the attribute of God is found in man, whose 
experience of joy is an essentially divine activity which 
relates, like the primary Imagination, the creative act of 
the poet to the mysteries of God's creation. For God and man, 
made in his image, creativity finds its genesis in emotion. 
Coleridge is concerned with neither simply a realist 
contemplation of what is there, nor with a 'subjectivist' 
reading of nature as merely a projection of our minds. Rather 
he is seeking to make the 'external internal the internal 
external' , 87 entering into a loving relationship with what is 
outside us so that its mystery may be glimpsed in the 
creative, symbol-making activity of the imagination. It is 
perhaps this sense of the revelation of the Divine in human 
'joy' which lies behind his endless 'disquisitions' on 
subject and object, which Carlyle was to ridicule in his Life 
of John Sterling (1851). 88 
As Coleridge contemplates the beauties of the evening, 
he co"'Vlct'-""' 'I see, not feel, ho1.,r beautiful they are! 1 (line 38). 
His loss is described in the following line, 'My genial 
spirits fail'. What, precisely, does 'genial' mean in this 
context? According to Dr. Johnson, it is 'festive' or 'that 
gives cheerfulness' , 89 linked therefore with the concept of 
joy. In its earliest sense, however, as given in the Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary, genial is a sexual term 'pertaining to 
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marriage', possibly then linked with the image in 'Dejection', 
'Ours is her wedding garment' (line 49. Also, line 68). 
Johnson, also, gives as a secondary sense, 'contributing to 
propagation'. It would be reasonable to find both these 
meanings in Colerjdge - that of joy and of creativity. In 
both senses his spirits had failed him. However, in the 
Shorter Oxford there is a further suggestion which hardly 
seems to be adequately covered by Johnson's third sense of 
'natural'. This suggestion is dated 1827, as 'pertaining to 
genius', deriving from the German 'genial'. The reference is 
to the publication of Carlyle's translation of Wilhelm 
Meister's Travels in German Romance (1827). 
This line of 'Dejection', there seems little doubt, 
echoes Milton's 'So much I feel my genial spirits droop' 
(Samson Agonistes, line 594), and, with some bitterness, 
Wordsworth's buoyant reworking of Milton in Tintern Abbey 
(1798): 
If I were not thus taught, should I the more 
Suffer my genial spirits to dec~~: 
For thou art with me here ..... 
Equally however, for Coleridge, who knew his German well by 
1802, the failure of his genial spirits would suggest, on the 
one hand, a loss of that joyful creativity and productiveness 
which the poet shared with God, and, on the other, the decay 
of his 1genius 1 , that gift which makes him a poet among men. 
He is robbed of inspiration and revelation. 
In the final stanza of 'Dejection', however, the poet 
wishes that the joy which he has lost may be discovered in 
his Lady. 
Joy lift her spirit, joy attune her voice; 
To her may all things live, from pole to pole, 
Their life the eddying of her living soul~ 
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0 simple spirit, guided from above, 
Dear Lady! friend devoutest of my choice, 
Thus mayest thou ever, evermore rejoice. 
( 1 in e s 13 4-9) 
Here joy is the great unifying and animating principle of the 
world, from pole to pole. In his Philosophical Lectures 
Coleridge stated that 'in joy individuality is lost ..... To 
have a genius is to live in the universal, to know no self 
but that which is reflected not only from the faces of all 
around us, our fellow creatures, but reflected from the 
flowers, the tree-s, the beasts, yea from the very surface of 
the Lwaters and th~7 sands of the desert. A man of genius 
finds a reflex to himself, were it only in the mystery of 
being'. 9l But perhaps the most important word of these final 
lines of the poem is 'eddying', and its metaphorical 
implications require careful elucidation. 
It occurs a number of times in Coleridge's writings 
before 1802. An early poem of 1794 'On Bala Hill', contains 
the line, 1 That eddy in the wild gust moaning by' . 92 Hore 
significant is a note of 1797-8 which describes his children 
at play. 
- the elder whirling for joy, the one in petticoats, 
a fat Baby, eddying half willingly, half by the force 
of the Gust - driven backward, struggling forward -
both drunk w~~h the pleasure, both shouting their 
hymn of Joy. 
It is a marvellous description of excited children. But more 
than that, it is placed in the context of 'Joy', which is 
given religious overtones with the word 'hymn'. The younger 
child both controls and is controlled in his movements, a 
balance of opposing forces, one his own energy and the other 
from the elements beyond him. The joy makes him drunk -
again, the suggestion is of possession combined with conscious 
energy. There is an exercise of the will, which is necessary 
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to be seized by joy. One is reminded of the poet in the final 
stanza of 1 Kubla Khan'. Finally there is a note of October 
1799 which describes the fall of the River Greta. Edward 
Kessler in his book, Coleridge's Metaphors of Being 
(Princeton ,1979), prints it as verse. 94 Here is Coleridge's 
original prose. 
- River Greta near its fall into the Trees - Shootings 
of water threads ~ down the slope of the huge green 
stone - The white Eddy-rose that blossom'd up against 
the stream. in the scallop, by fits & starts, o~~tinate 
in resurrection - It is the life that we live. 
The Eddy-rose is the foam caused by the water which is 
thrown up against the downward current of the stream. Like 
the child's 'eddying' in the gusting wind, it is a metaphor 
of the human spirit which ever struggles and falls back, 
creative and decreative. It is, perhaps, an image of the 
poet ever reflecting upon himself, the ironic processes of 
Biographia Literaria whereby our awareness of life becomes 
the life we live. Like 1 Kubla Khan', the eddy reconciles 
opposites which 'like magnetic forces, suppose and require 
each other' . 96 The magnet is implied in 'Dejection' by the 
words 'from pole to pole'. But first, a problem is presented 
in the image of the Eddy-rose. Here are two further examples 
of Coleridge's use of the 'eddy'. 
1 .... in Lear's Lraving~7, there is only the brood~~g 
of the one anguish, an eddy without progression. 
2 .... one of those brief sabbaths of the soul, when 
the activity and discursiveness of the thoughts are 
suspended, and the mind quie~~y eddies round, 
instead of flowing onward -
In the words of 'Dejection', there seems 'no natural outlet' 
(line 23), the eddy being without progression and without 
that openness to infinity which is implied in, for example, 
the fragmentary nature of 1 Kubla Khan', or the deliberate 
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uneasiness of the final compromise of 'The Ancient Mariner'. 
But what, then, of that phrase in the River Greta note, 
'obstinate in resurrection'? The language is deliberately 
Christian, and the resurrection is willed. The will to force 
against the stream, to create counter to the flowing river, 
enables a resurrection to take place. Or, at least, the will 
reaches for the possibility of a resurrection and the creative 
spirit, the 'shaping spirit of Imagination' ('Dejection', line 
86), orientates the being of man in a balance beyond the 
mutable current of life. In Biographia Literaria there is an 
ima~e of a water-insect which wills its way against the 
current, as a metaphor of 'the mind's self-experience in the 
act of thinking' . 99 Its propulsion depends upon the 
momentary 'fulcrum' which is established in the balance of 
the current and the insect's own energy. The passage is 
discussed in detail in chapter 5. 100 
The image of the Eddy-rose suggests no vague or mystical 
search for transcendence or abandonment of the world. As was 
to be clearly stated in the 'Confessio Fidei' of 1810, the 
will is an essential element both in faith and in the 
inspiriting of objects and the things of nature which are 
otherwise 'essentially fixed and dead' . 101 As Edward Kessler 
suggests, the final lines of 'Dejection' anticip&te the 
possible collaboration of 'natura naturata (nature made)' and 
'natura naturans (nature making) •. 102 Here may be picked up 
the double-meaning of 'pole to pole'. On the one hand it 
refers to the whole world of nature which is enlivened by 
'the eddying of her living soul'. On the other hand, the 
image is of the magnet. 
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John Beer in his book Coleridge's Poetic Intelligence 
(1977), and his paper 1 A Stream by Glimpses: Coleridge's 
later Imagination' , 103 examines in some detail various 
references in Coleridge's writings to the terms 1 single 
touch 1 and 1 double touch'. They were used ~n his time to 
describe the operation of the magnet. A magnetic effect 
cannot properly be achieved by 'single touch', or rubbing 
only one pole of the lodestone. 'Double touch', however, 
rubbing both poles, will result in a sustained magnetism, 
apparently through the creation of a 1 vortex 1 • In the 
Philosophical Lectures is recorded his 'long long ago theory 
of Volition as a mode of double Touch 1 ,l04 The vortex of the 
magnet, the balance of the eddy, in Sara Hutchinson is the 
creative power which Coleridge feels he has lost. Such a 
reconciliation of opposites is the bringing of things into a 
unity, the creation of a new Earth and new Heaven. In 
1 Dejection 1 , the theological and biblical background which 
has here been suggested, in the history of the word 1 joy 1 and 
the references to Acts and Revelation, combine with the 
secular imagery of the poem to suggest a further 'double 
touch' - the sacred and the secular which, as 'polar forces' 
in the poetry 1are necessarily unius generis, homogeneous•. 105 
This seems to be a happier reading of Coleridge's poem than 
that suggested by M. H. Abrams who would drive too deep a 
wedge between traditional Christian truths and Romantic 
secular metaphysics, and for whom the 'characteristic 
concepts and patterns of Romantic philosophy and literature 
are a displaced and reconstituted theology, or else a 
l • ' f f d t. l • I 106 secu ar1zea orm o evo 1ona exper1ence 
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As 'Kubla Khan 1 ends with the word 'Paradise', so 
'Dejection' ends with the word 'rejoice'. But the vision of 
the poet was to remain clouded by 'Reality's dark dream! 1 
(~ejection', line 95). Between March and November 1802, 
Coleridge's relationship with his wife became increasingly 
strained. A period of desultory wandering and ill health 
culminated in the departure, on 9 April 1804, for Malta. 
Coleridge did not return to England until 17 August 1806. 
Prior to his departure from Portsmouth, he wrote to the 
Wordsworths: 
I seem to grow 1-1ee.ker & weaker in my moral feelings / 
and every thing, that forcibly awakes me to Person & 
Contingency, strikes fear into me, sinkings and 
misgivings, alienation from the Spirit 1 57 Hope, 
obscure withdrawings out of Life ..... 
In his notebook for 3 May 1804, he records that the sea at 
Gibraltar was 'swarming with insect life, all busy-swarming 
in the path ,108 He lived in the voyage the fate of his 
own Ancient Mariner. 
In the years to come the poet Has to reflect upon his 
creative experience in critical prose - literary criticism, 
philosophical and theological reflections. There is, indeed, 
a continuity of thought and theme through his writings, so 
that what has been discussed regarding three of his greatest 
poems was not lost in the wreckage of his life after 1802, 
but emerges, re-worked in his prose and again in his later 
poetry and the highly theological, and as yet unpublished, 
notebooks of his last years. The deliberate and sometimes 
highly complex prose writings which are to be discussed in 
the next chapter, with all their heavy dependence on 
Coleridge's vast reading in German and English, are 
nonetheless shot through with a belief in the radiant moment 
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of vision in the earlier poems, that joy which glimpses in a 
'state of consciousness' 
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud 
Enveloping the Earth. 
t•D. , .. ~· -· -' ~ · eJec~lon·, ~1nes )4-)) 
The 'glory' is taken into a later poem, 'Constancy to an 
Ideal Object' (?1825), as the halo or ring of light around 
the head of the Brocken Spectre. 109 It is both phantasmal 
and yet perceived to be there, partaking of both human and 
divine - a 'glory' dependent upon both, and 
the generation of the Sense of Reality & Life 
out of ~s, from the Impersonation eff!i~ed by a 
certain phantasm of double Touch ... 
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V THE CRITICAL PROSE 
The second decade of the nineteenth century saw an 
extremely complex and much neglected series of changes in 
Coleridge's poetic and intellectual development. The 
miseries and creative decline recorded in 'Dejection: An Ode' 
hang over the early years of the period, reaching a climax 
with the demise of The Friend and the break with Sara 
Hutchinson in the winter of 1810-11. On the other hand, it 
was the period of his most developed literary criticism, 
including the Shakespeare Lectures of 1811-12 and concluding 
with the publication of Biographia Literaria in 1817. His 
study of literature, against the background of contemporary 
German philosophy and criticism, led him into discussions of 
aesthetics, history and Christian theology, and are a 
necessary study as a prelude to considering both his later 
theological and philosophical writings, and his later poetry. 
1. Coleridge and Kant. Imagination and 1 Anschauung 1 
Biographia Literaria has been described as a book 
largely about poetry, in its definition of the secondary 
imagination giving emphasis and honour to poetic creation. 
Yet, rather than being simply a programme for the writing of 
poetry, its deepest concern is to link the poetic with the 
theological and philosophical concerns of its authors. 1 
Thomas McFarland concludes that: 
... the lineage of the secondary imagination extends 
not only backward beyond Kant to Tetens, but also 
beyond Tetens to Leibniz, and finally beyond Leibniz 
to Plato. With antecedents of this kind, it is 
inevitable that Coleridge's threefold theory of 
imagination actually bears less on poetry than it does 
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on those things that always mattered most to him - as 
they did to Leibniz and to Kant - that is, 'the freedom 
of the will, the i~mortality of the soul, and the 
existence of God'. 
McFarland argues at length, and somewhat restrictively, for 
the direct influence of Tetens on Coleridge's definition of 
the secondary imagination (B.L. Vol. 1. p.202), to the 
neglect, indeed of other sources, primarily the stimulation 
of reading Kant and Coleridge's eighteenth century herita~e, 
not least of his early reading in Hartleian associationalism. 
Johann Nikolaus Tetens (1736(?8) - 1807) was a 
psychologist of some distinction, a professional man of 
science whose vast two-volume work Philosophische Versuche 
~ber die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung (Leipzig, 
1777) was read and extensively annotated by Coleridge. 
Certainly chapters 14 and 15 - entitled 'Von der bildenden 
Dichtkraft' (On the shaping poetic power) - of Tetens' first 
essay are highly suggestive of Coleridge's description of the 
secondary imagination. Tetens describes 'Dichtkraft' as 
'Auflosen' (dissolving) , 'Wiedervereinigen' (reuniting) and 
1 Vermischen' (blending) 3 Tetens, however, was also 
extremely important for Kant in the Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft (1781), and more specifically The Inaugural 
Disserta~ion, De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et 
principiis (1770). This latter work had a profound influence 
on Coleridge, and it seems more likely that he learnt more 
from Tetens filtered through Kant, than from a direct reading 
of the dry original. Furthermore, and despite Coleridge's 
protestations to the contrary, 4 Tetens' sc~entific 
destruction of the theories of Hartley and Priestley 5 runs 
quite counter to the persistence of Hartley in Coleridge's 
poetry and thought in the form of his own idiosyncratic 
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presentation of the law of association. This will be dealt 
with in more detail later in the chapter. 6 
Before considering Coleridge's enormous debt to Kant, it 
would be well to establish some fundamental differences 
between them in their treatments of imagination and 
1Einbildungskraft'. The deficiencies which Coleridge 
perceived in the eighteenth century 'laws of association of 
ideas' might be summed up in his distinction in Biographia 
Literaria between imagination and fancy. For fancy is 
'indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the 
order of time and space' . 7 Yet even while this is felt to be 
subordinate to the creative imagination, Coleridge maintained 
a respect for those 'items of awareness which force upon the 
subject the task of coming to terms with elements in his 
past that have made him what he is 1 • 8 Such respect may 
explain not only the ambivalence of his attitude towards 
associationism in his later years, but also his debt to Kant, 
despite, or even perhaps because of, their differences in the 
matter of the imagination. 
In comparing Coleridge and Kant here, it is useful to 
draw upon the images established in critical discussion by 
M. H. Abrams, of the mirror and the lamp. 9 Kant would 
explain the imagination as fundamentally an act of the 
memory, as reproductive,and art as an imitation of aspects 
of the universe. Coleridge, on the other hand, employs an 
expressive approach. His debt to Kant is enormous, but his 
differences are noted in his practical emphasis on poetry and 
his active concern for religion. 
In Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1 Einbildungskraft' 
is regarded primarily as the capacity to reproduce that which 
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has been experienced or observed, and this is consonant with 
the notion of art in the Kritik der Urtheilskraft (1790), in 
which art is beautiful and great to the extent to which it 
follows or copies nature. In his discussion of the 1 Synthesis 
of Reproduction in Imagination' in the earlier Critique 
(A 100-2), 1° Kant portrays the imagination as finding 
opportunity for the exercise of its powers in the reproduction 
and ordering of external objects. Without such exercise it 
'would remain concealed within the mind as a dead and to us 
unknown faculty'. The passage is well summarized by Kwang-Sae 
Lee: 
The subjective state of the empirical imagination here 
seems to be conceived by the 1 Lockean 1 Kant as being 
'conditioned' by the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination, which, in the present context, might well 
be taken as our scientific con11ption of the primary 
qualities of physical objects. 
Later in the Critique, in the Refutation of Idealism, Kant 
notes that 'determination of my existence in time' (B275) is 
possible only if it presupposes knowledge of external 
objects. Further, The Critique of Judgement emphasises the 
power of the imagination as memory which 1 is able on occasion, 
even after a long lapse of time, not only to recall the signs 
for concept, but also to reproduce the image and shape of an 
object' . 12 Nevertheless, aesthetic judgements demand an 
ordering and the establishment of laws by the imagination 
which is determined by the visible forms before it. 13 In 
aesthetic judgements, the Beautiful is the imitation of the 
beautiful in nature. This ordering is achie~ed by an 
agreement between the imagination and the law of the 
understanding - which Kant calls 'finality apart from an end'. 
Moreover, a particularly Kantian note is struck in that such 
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ordering is directed towards a moral end which is in 
conformity with regulative ideas of 'God', 'Self', 'Freedom', 
'Immortality' and 'Moral Duty'. Regulative ideas by 
definition exclude the 1 subjects 1 of the ideas from cognition. 
This form of agreement between understanding and imagination 
epitomizes the inescapable element of subjectivity upon which 
Kant's entire philosophical system is based. There can be no 
scientific laws, valid for all experience unless we ourselves, 
by our own understanding and imagination impose these laws on 
the appearance of things. 
However, as Austin Farrer has pointed out, 'there is 
nothing like a common orthodoxy as to which the practical 
attitudes or activites are, that anchor floating metaphysical 
theses to the rock of solid experience•. 14 Any extended 
analysis of Coleridge's theory of the imagination would 
probably only succeed in echoing the numerous books already 
written on that subject, and yet there are important 
differences to be observed in a comparison with Kant, not 
least because of the poetic activity already explored in such 
works as 'The Ancient Mariner'. This is so despite 
Coleridge's profound reverence for Kant whom, after fifteen 
years, according to Biographia Literaria, he can still read 
'with undiminished delight and increasing admiration•. 15 
Kant's 1 Einbildungskraft' had a long history in 
philosophy, beginning with Aristotle. Descartes 1 
1 imaginatio 1 is an inferior faculty to 1 intellectio 1 (which 
needs no images). In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes describes 
imagination as 'decaying sense ... so that Imagination and 
Memory, are but one thing' . 16 Indeed, the greatest poetry of 
Wordsworth 'still takes its origin in the memory of given 
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experiences to which he is often pedantically faithful' . 17 
Yet for Coleridge it is 'fancy', mirror-like, which recollects 
and reproduces like Kant's 'Einbildungskraft', while 
1 imagination 1 is a shaping spirit. The artist, trusting more 
to the imagination than to the memory, 18 abandons the minimal 
role of holding up a mirror to nature and shapes the world as 
he experiences it, in metaphor and symbol, his art a self-
expression, illuminating and not merely reflecting. The 
imagination, dissolving, diffusing, dissipating and then 
recreating, is a symbolizing activity, the symbol focussing 
and shaping through the very particularity of an event or 
object the eternal 'ideas' which underlie it and of which it 
is a part. 
For Coleridge art was not a copy of the phenomenal world 
but an ~it ation of it, offering a glimpse into the noumenal, 
and linking the ideal and the real, subject and object. For 
this reason his criticism of the Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft (1788) is v~ry similar to his misgivings about 
Hartley. In both, he felt, religious aspiration was not 
matched by an adequate sensitivity to the psychology of human 
~sight and imagination. According to Kant, the role of the 
practical reason is the realization of a law rather than an 
intuition. 1 9 The phenomenal and the noumenal were bridged 
only by an exercise of our moral duty which provided 
experiential knowledge of a supersensible order. So far 
Coleridge follows Kant in the exercise of a practical reason, 
but then moves beyond the merely moral contact with the 
noumenal. At this stage the ideas of 'God', 'Freedom', and 
so on, are regulative, evidence indeed that 'God created man 
in His own image' yet furnishing the clue to his 'moral self-
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determination' . 20 So far, the imagination, restricted to the 
realm of the ethical and productive merely of a copy of the 
phenomenal world, is well characterized by Benedetto Croce as 
'the sensible and imaginative vesture of an intellectual 
21 
concept 1 • 
Coleridge's extension of the practical reason beyond the 
merely ethical, however, begins in his question in Appendix E 
of The Statesman's Manual as to 'whether Ideas are regulative 
only, according to Aristotle or Kant; or likewise CONSTITUTIVE, 
22 
and one with the power and Life of Nature'. In effect he 
transformed the role of Kant's practical reason from ethical 
theory to the intuition of ideas as real. Imagination is now 
productive of art which is the expression of an intuitively 
known reality, constitutive, and no longer, as in Kant's view, 
only subjectively valid. As regulative ideas now become 
constitutive, religion is seen as the parent of the fine 
arts: 
in all the ages and countries of civilisation 
Religion has been the parent and fosterer of the 
Fine Arts, as of Poetry, Music, Painting, &c. the 
common essence of which consists in ~ 3 similar union of the Universal and the Individual. 
As art deals with the objects of the senses in re, as 
symbols, there is, therefore, 'a metaphysical ground for a 
special religious aim and vision for highest poetry' . 24 The 
importance of this poetic aim and vision is stressed by 
Wordsworth as 'the commerce betHeen ~lan and his Maker LwhicQ.7 
cannot be carried on but by a process where much is 
represented in little, and the Infinite Being accommodates 
himself to a finite capacity•. 25 Imagination and poetry, 
Hhile perhaps seeming to be secular, are essentially 
spiritual. 
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If Coleridge's misgivings about Kant's regulative ideas 
and the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft bear comparison with 
his criticism of Hartley's doctrine of association, it is not 
surprising if his transformation of practical reason 
resembles his pre-Kantian struggle with associationalism and 
his re-shaping of Hartleianism. 26 As far as Kant was 
concerned, Coleridge approached him as a poet. In The 
Inaugural Dissertation, Kant proposes a doctrine of time and 
space (later developed in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft) in 
which, contradicting Leibniz, their objectivity is denied. 
Time is 1 a pure intuition', and space 'a schema for co-
d • t • I 27 or lna lng . This subjective status of time and space has 
the effect of devaluing, ontologically, the world revealed to 
us by the senses. For Coleridge this provided the basis for 
the notion of a creative imagination, or, following his 
defin~ion of the primary Imagination, of 1 a repetition in 
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM 1 • 28 Kant had written: 
The human mind is not affected by external things and 
the world is not open to inspection by it to infinity, 
except in as much as the mind itself together with 
all other things is 2 ~ustained by the same infinite force of one being. 
Embraced by infinity, the imagination is creative in 
perception and able to overcome the 'conditions of 
sensibility 1 , 30 is capable of seeing a unity in the 
fragmented and temporally distracted world. In Biographia 
Coleridge writes of 'time per se 1 in distinction from our 
notion of time, and drawing also upon his reading of 
Schelling's System des transzendentalen Idealismus (1800), 
concludes that the true 'self' of the individual, released 
from the material body which is conditioned by spatiality, 
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experiences everything not separately and consecutively but 
simultaneously. 31 In The Inaugural Dissertation, Kant had 
affirmed that such perceptiveness suggests that 'this world, 
although existing contingently, is sempiternal, that is, 
simultaneous with every time, so that it is therefore wrong 
to assert that there has been some time at which it did not 
exist•. 32 
However, while for Kant the glimpses of infinity which 
are given by the imagination are purely intellectual - ideas 
are regulative only - for Coleridge they intimate something 
ultimately more substantial and speak to poetry and theology. 
The poet took The Inaugural Dissertation gratefully, not 
least Kant's dynamic definition of God as 'the principle of 
the coming into being of all perfection•, 33 which expresses 
the open-endedness of Coleridge's poetry with its 
participation in the limitless process of life which alone e~n~:sse.s 
the truly infinite and inexhaustible divine. Apart from 
poetry, it was the starting point also for philosophical 
irony, which was so important for Coleridge. 
Kant's intellectualism, however, excluded 'intuition', 
since intuition, he says, is passive and bound to forms. 
Coleridge gives a great deal of attention to Kant's term 
1 Anschauung 1 (intuition) in his later prose and particularly 
in the MS Logic (?1822-3), reinstating intuition into the 
process of the creative imagination. Its ultimate place in 
the poet's divine task is represented by a notebook entry of 
May 1830. 
The mind can form no higher conception of blessedness 
in employment, than to have a spiritual intuition of 
the uni?n of the personj!ity of God with his infinity 
and omnlpresence ..... . 
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In God, Coleridge says, we see all things, and God therefore 
represents that unity and harmony which the imagination 
perceives in the particulars which constitute the universal: 
and the spring of inherent activity in the imaginative mind 
is intuition. In a slightly earlier notebook, dated 27 
November 1827, Coleridge wrote a 'corollary' to the statement 
that all things are seen in God~ 
The simplification of the definition of Mind, as 
a pure active and proper Perceptivity: thus cleansing 
my system from ~~e last adhesion of the Berkleian 
Passivity •.••• 
Coleridge repeatedly affirms that, far from being bound to 
forms, the 'insight or intuitive possession of the true 
philosophy' is not to be achieved by that man 'whose 
imaginative powers have been ossified by the continual 
reaction and assimilating influences of mere objects on his 
mind 1 • 36 
It is, however, through objects - whether palace domes, 
albatrosses or embers in the grate - in their symbolic role 
of particulars which enunciate the whole, that the 
imagination works by drawing upon the 'inward experience' of 
man made as a creative soul in God's image. Coleridge's 
most extended discussion of intuition in the Logic is as a 
preface to a long reference to the conceptions of time and 
space which he had learnt from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
and The Inaugural Dissertation. Initially he follows Kant's 
use of 1Anschauung 1 closely. 'Intuition' is a term 'of prime 
necessity in all philosophical enquiries', hitherto neglected 
by English in technical use, and employed periphrastically by 
Hooker as 'equivalent to instinctive, natural or innate', as 
"'immediate beholding" 1 • 37 Quite simply, intuition is merely 
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looking at an object, and is indistinguishably both the act 
of beholding and 'the simple product thence resulting'. 
There is nothing conscious or reflective in it, although 
intuitive knowledge may feed the reflective faculty. Thus 
far, Coleridge follows Kant closely, in his definition, 
'Anschauung, unmittelbare Offenbarung'. (Intuition, 
immediate disclosure). 38 Coleridge confesses the necessity 
for an object upon which the mind can work. 
It would be something worse than absurd to suppose in 
a finite mind the power of creating anything out of 
itself; but what I cannot create for myself 3 ~ must have given to me if I am to have it at all. 
But, moving beyond Kant, he pursues ways in which the 
intuition, in its universal forms, might be antecedent to 
the presentation of the object. Already, echoing Kant in 
The Inaugural Dissertation (p.79), he had dismissed 'the 
doctrine of Malebranche and of some other Cartesians LwhQ7 
have taken refuge in the hypothesis of inspiration or 
immediate acts of divine agency•, 40 which may represent a 
proper piety or even truth, but is suspect as impatient of 
philosophy logically deduced. Nevertheless, 
knowledge a priori is possible, but possible then only 
when the knowledge and the object knoX~' the scire 
and the scitum, are one and the same. 
This doctrine of inspiration assumes the constitutive nature 
of Ideas and an answer to the highest problem of philosophy 
as set by Plato and Plotinus. Coleridge, in setting the 
problem in Appendix E of The Statesman's Manual, concludes by 
quoting a variant version of John. l. 4: 1 (-v · 'Aoy'-'2 6(,)'1 'i' 'hV' koi..L 
.,, ' 
( 7 ' , , ,+,." ...... ' e r 
"\ Jw~ "'\"' To 't'w5 TwY o<.-v ~wrrw\/ 
) 42 life was the light of men . 
(In the Word was life, and the 
Given the nature of space (outward) and time (inward) as 
universal forms in the Logic, Coleridge can appeal to the 
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'productive imagination', variously combining the two, to 
reflect upon particular objects as symbols of the eternal and 
the universal. Imagination balances, or at least holds in 
tension, the finite and the infinite, since it stands also at 
the intersection of the object 'out there', and the mind 
which shapes what it intuit sin symbol and metaphor. The 
artist shapes his world, but in accordance with an infinitely 
regressive yet constitutive Idea of the divine. 
Coleridge borrowed from Schelling's Entwurf eines 
Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799) the distinction between 
the primary (unconscious) Imagination and the secondary 
(conscious) Imagination. 43 The discussion here has focussed 
upon his use of and difference from Kant in his understanding 
of the nature of imagination and intuition in art. Certainly 
-
he found in Kant a toughness of thought which he required to 
free himself from Schelling's romanticism. While there was 
an element of mysticism in Coleridge, his avowed purpose was 
to propound a system 'that of all Systems that have ever been 
presented, ... has the least of Mysticism, the very Object 
throughout from the first page to the last being to reconcile 
the dictates of common Sense with the conclusions of 
scientific Reasoning' . 44 Yet important though Kant was for 
him intellectually, Coleridge was too much of a poetic to be 
satisfied with a merely reproductive 1Einbildungskraft 1 , and 
other sources contributed to his self-expressive imagination 
-apart from Schelling,much English writing of the eighteenth 
century. James Beattie, once much feted as the 6reat 
defender of those who feared the moral anarchy which might 
arise from David Hume's scepticism, wrote in 1762 that 'it is 
not memory, or the knowledge of rules, that can qualify a 
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poet ... but a peculiar liveliness of fancy and sensibility 
of heart' .45 Coleridge certainly read Beattie. Again, 
Joseph Addison's ode 'The Spacious Firmament on high', 
became a popular Protestant hywn. It concludes: 
\vh at t h o ugh , in s o l e mn S i len c e , a ll 
Move round the dark terres~ial Ball? 
What tho' nor real Voice nor Sound 
Amid their radiant Orbs be found? 
In Reason's Ear they all rejoice, 
And utter forth a glorious Voice, 
For ever singing, as they shine, 
'The Hand that made us is Divine'. 
Such Reason, which has no place in the silent universe of 
Newton, is a creative faculty in man whose inspiration waxes 
as the glory and sounds of heaven wane. 
Finally, the symbolic imagination of Coleridge's post-
Kantian writings is a developed expression of the shaping 
power of imagination in 'Frost at Midnight' which reconciles 
ideas based in the opposed systems of Berkeley in An Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) and Hartley's 
Observations on Man (1749), 46 expressive on the one hand of 
an active imagination, and on the other of a passive 
associationalism. The imagination straddles the unresolvable 
tension between things- for Coleridge,the 'It is' -, and 
intuition or 'inward experience', the 1 I am 1 • 
The limits which Kant set upon human knowledge, together 
with the moral necessity which he saw for proposing a 
noumenal realm with God as first cause and authority for the 
categorical imperative, resulted in an unsatisfied desire for 
the absolute in his followers. 47 Furthermore, from Kant 
stemmed an emphasis upon the phenomenal as against the 
noumenal world, which, in the case of Coleridge among others, 
developed into an enquiry concerning the mind's capacity to 
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shape what it sees. How was this despair for the absolute to 
be overcome? How were finite and infinite to be reconciled? 
In the Wissenschaftslehre (1794), Fichte, havin~ concluded 
the non-existence of Kant's noumenal world, denies the 
reality of an external, infinite world which is not created 
by the self. The Ego creates its antithesis, the Non-Ego 
(the finite world) in order to expand its own consciousness. 
But for Friedrich Schlegel, and for Coleridge - who continued 
to be attracted by, though sceptical of, Schle5el 1 s 
pantheism - it was by the means of philosophical irony that 
the noumenal realm of the pure infinite could be glimpsed by 
our finite resources in a 'progressive transition' or process 
of becoming wherein is effected the 'union and interpenetration 
of the universal and the particular' .4 8 
2. Coleridge, the Schlegels and Romantic Irony 
The nature of Coleridge's dependence on German critics, 
confusing enough in itself, is continually muddied by his own 
insistence of his priority, or at least independence of them. 
He managed to persuade some of the truth of his claim, 
although in the case of A. W. Schlegel it was based on the 
erroneous statement that Coleridge's Shakespeare Lectures 
were delivered before the publication (admittedly in German) 
of Schlegel's Vorlesungen uber dramatische Kunst und 
Literatur (Heidelberg,l808-ll). J. C. Shairp in his Studies 
in Poetry and Philosophy (1868) praises Coleridge's 
originality, especially in his distinction between mechanical 
and organic form, drawn, in fact, straight from Schlegel's 
22nd Lecture.49 Shairp was followed by A. W. Ward in his 
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History of English Dramatic Literature (1875). Others, 
however, perhaps. in a better position to realize how closely 
Coleridge could follow a German text, and the priority of 
Schlegel's work, included John Black, the first translator of 
A. W. Schlegel into English, in the Morning Chronicle for 22 
December 1818. Also J. S. Mill in his 1840 essay enlarges in 
a variety of ways on Coleridge's 'posteriority in date' to 
the Germans who influenced him, his position being therefore 
'necessarily a subordinate one' .5° 
As opposed to either of these extremes, it may be 
suggested that Coleridge, who certainly used the Germans in 
his literary criticism, did so in an idiosyncratic way and 
guided by his own theory and literary practice dating back to 
his earliest days. Furthermore he stood at a crucial 
transition-point in the development of German literary 
theory, and, as an outsider, presented an ambivalent attitude 
equally towards an earlier generation in Herder and Schiller 
and the later writings of Friedrich and A. W. Schlegel. His 
presence at such a critical crossing provides a powerful 
catalyst for his later theological and philosophical 
developments. 
For example, in a note made in March 1819 (and expanded 
by H. N. Coleridge in The Literary Remains as mat~rial for an 
1818 lecture 51 ), Coleridge compares the Spirit of Pagan 
Greece with that of Christianity. In the former 'the Ideas 
must be turned into Finites, and these into Finites 
anthropomorphic', while in the latter 'Finites, even the 
Human Form, must be brought into connection with the 
Infinite' . 52 In fact, he is paraphrasing and condensing from 
Schiller's •Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung 1 : 
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Jener ... ist rnachtig durch die Kunst der Begrenzung; 
dieser ist es durch die Kunst des Unendlichen. 
(that Lanci~nt poe1ry7 is mighty through the art of 
limitation3 3this Lmoder£7 through the art of the infinite.) 
Schiller's poetic in his essay is chiefly psychological. The 
remark is made in the context of a discussion of the 
relationship between 'poetry' and 'doctrine'. Coleridge, 
however, further places it within the context of the advent 
of Christianity. Such a literary-historical approach to 
poetry plays no part in Schiller's literary scheme. It was 
something, however, which Coleridge shared with the 
Schlegels, who, although they derived much from Schiller, in 
their literary surveys were propounding primarily an historical 
typology. Thus in the first of his Lectures on Dramatic Art 
and Literature, A. W. Schlegel distinguishes between 
'classic' and 'romantic', ascribing the change to the corning 
of Christianity. Like the Schlegels, and unlike Schiller, 
Coleridge similarly identifies the change of style with 
Christian beginnings. 
In the lectures on Shakespeare delivered variously 
between 1811 and 1814, and the lectures on literature 
delivered in 1818, together with numerous notebook 
fragments, 5 4 Coleridge undoubtedly drew heavily on A. W. 
Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature and 
Friedrich Schlegel's Geschichte der alten und neuen 
Literatur (Vienna.l815), but diverging from them and 
combining their historical poetic with the earlier 
psychological criticism of Schiller. A further element in 
Coleridge's writing lay in the influence on him of Herder's 
Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend (Frankfurt und 
Leipzig,l790), which he carefully annotated, 55 and from which 
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he perceived that to salvage Christianity was both a 
religious and a ~iterary problem. Certainly Coleridge placed 
but small emphasis on the historical events of the life of 
Jesus. Indeed, Jesus' historical existence little more than 
confirmed the eternal truths which man may perceive in 
reflecting on his own nature. Nevertheless, the study of 
literature does involve an historical perspective which may 
enlgihten the study of Christian origins. For if the power 
of the Bible lies in its capacity to find the individual in 
the depths of his being, 56 then a consideration of its 
historical setting will begin to discover the particular 
milieu in which such power was originally generated. As the 
particular present is placed in the context of historical 
particular then a more general and universal view of the 
conditions and nature of religious experience can be built 
up. 57 'Revealed Religion' is, as Coleridge stated in 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit (1840), 1 at once inward 
L . f d T th d t d F t d L . I 58 1 e an ru , an ou war ac an um1nary . 
Clearly Coleridge was combining the thinking of a whole 
period of German critici~m, both theological and literary, 
the result being not merely subordination to them - as Mill 
suggested -, or total originality - as he himself claimed -
but a positive contribution to the process of theoretical 
thinking in the philosophy of art and the German Romantic 
concept of irony. The result was of lasting significance for 
Coleridge as poet, critic, philosopher and theologian. 
Much has been written of 'the disorientating instabilities 
of European romantic irony' , 59 of its open-endedness and 
denial of an absolute order. Less, however, has been said 
about the teaching role of irony, which applies particularly 
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to Coleridge who was, par excellence, a teacher. For, first 
of all, irony e~tablishes a precise and peculiar relationship 
between author and reader, as, for example, in the manner 
already explored in iThe Ancient Mariner'. Then, the teacher 
is not one with knowledge which he seeks to impart to the 
ignorant. Rather: 
He is someone who attempts to re-create the subject 
in the student's mind, and his strategy in doing 
this is first of all to get the student to recognize 
what he already potentially knows, which includes 
breaking up the powers of repression6 ~n his mind that keep him from knowing what he knows. 
The teacher's task, then, is to ask questions rather than to 
answer them; to change rather than consolidate the mental 
level of enquiry. Irony demands that author and reader begin 
at a shared, common level, a move from the known (where the 
author pretends to be), to the unknown (where the author 
actually is). This advance is an act of reconstruction or 
re-creation which cannot really be said, but must be performed. 
From the author's point of view there is risk involved, 
since the performance may fail, but where it succeeds, the 
irony generates an energy out of conflict and disturbing 
ambiguity, and the energy carries the reader to the 
revelation of a new unknown. 
In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge links his reading of 
A. W. Schlegel's lectures with the rest of his philosophical 
study. He begins with Schelling. 
In Schelling's "KATUR-PHILOSOPHIE", and the "SYSTEH DES 
TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEALISMUS'', I first found a genial 
coincidence with much that I had toiled out for my~~lf, 
and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do. 
To Schlegel (to which he next alludes) as to Schelling, 
Coleridge claims priority. The reason for the 'genial 
coincidence' is not far to find. 
- 133 -
We had studied in the same school; been disciplined 
by the same preparatory philosophy, namely the writings 
of Kant; we had both equal obligations to the polar 
logic and dynamic philosophy of Giordano Bruno; and 
Schelling has lately, and, as of recent acquisition, 
avowed that same affectionate reverence for the 
labours of Behmen, and other mys~~cs, which I had 
formed at a much earlie~ period. 
The terms 'polar logic and dynamic philosophy' are of 
fundamental significance to Coleridge's Shakespearean 
criticism and its relation to the German Romantic concept of 
irony. 
A summary of the substance of Coleridge's regard for 
Shakespeare as a poet may be found in an amalgamation of six 
fragments gathered into one by H. N. Coleridge in The 
Literary Remains, and published by T. M. Raysor under the 
title 'Shakespeare's Judgement Equal to his Genius'. 63 In a 
fragment entitled 'Lecture' in Egerton MS. 2800, f.24, 
Coleridge acknowledges a 'continental critic' -undoubtedly 
A. W. Schlegel - in making the distinction between mechanic 
and organic form. The acknowledgement was omitted by H. N. 
Coleridge. Its replacement from Coleridge's original 
manuscript establishes the basic contentions of his reading 
of Shakespeare in the context of Schlegel's work. Further, 
the solution to the critical conflict between genius and 
rules, together with the affirmation of Shakespeare's 
conscious artistic judgement, was discussed by Schlegel not 
only in his Lectures, but as early as his essay 'Romeo und 
Julia' written in 1797 and published in Charakteristiken und 
Kritiken (K~nigsberg 1 180l). There is a fragment on the 
subject written by Coleridge in October 1802 which Shawcross 
and Coburn use as evidence to substantiate Coleridge's claim 
to independence of the Germans. 64 However, the language of 
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the Egerton 1 Lecture 1 suggests that he was translating from 
Schlegel seven years before John Black published his English 
translation of the Lectures in 1815. G. N. G. Orsini, in his 
t • 1 I ~ l . d d '"' 1 l , r. • ' ' ' 6 ') f th ar·.:lc_,_e Go erl ge an ~en egeJ. neconslaerea·, - :ce ers · e 
whole discussion back to Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft 
(1790), Book II: 'Analytic of the Sublime'. Section 46: 
'Fine art is the art of Genius' . 66 
Also, the distinction between 'mechanical regularity' 
and 'organic form' was made by Schlegel whom Coleridge 
follows, sentence by sentence. Yet it would also be true to 
say that it was a Romantic commonplace, 67 and occurs 
frequently in Coleridge who would, no doubt, be anxious to 
establish the point against such eighteenth century 
arguments as David Hume 1 s Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion (1779) Part III. 
Finally, in expansion of the notion of organic form, by 
which Coleridge defends the structure of Shakespeare's plays 
against the demands of the classical unities, he paraphrases 
Schlegel: 
The spirit of poetry, like all other living powers, 
must of necessity circumscribe itself by rules, were 
it only to unite power with beauty. It must embody 
in order to reveal itself; but a living body is of 
necessity an organized one - and what is organization 
but the connexion of parts to ~ 8 whole, so that each part is at once end and means! 
The question then is raised of the nature of revelation -
here poetic, but taken up later by Coleridge in the context 
of the divine - expanding into a statement on what lies at 
the centre of Coleridge's thought, the inter-relationship 
between all the parts of a whole, of which the unity is 
perceived in the structure of each part. It further points 
to the extended discussion of Shakespeare in 'Essays on the 
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Principles of Method' in The Friend (1818). 69 Coleridge 
describes the form and unity of Shakespeare's plays not as 
'mere dead arrangement' (p.457) but as 'continuous transition'. 
Yet such transition or 'principle of progression' is an 
application of Method wherei~ 'everything is in its place' 
(p.449). It is the very antithesis of generalization since, 
as its unity lies in the connexion of parts to a whole, 'we 
find individuality everywhere' (p.457). Of Shakespeare's 
plays, therefore 
we may define the excellence of their method as 
consisting in that just proportion, that union and 
interpenetration of the universal and particular, 
which must ever pervade all works of decided genius 
and true science. 
This principle of Method in the construction of a 
Shakespearean drama involves antitheses between the 
individual and the universal, and in the relationship of 
organic form and unity with progression (p.476), behind which 
lies Coleridge's belief that if the Invisible is denied 'the 
component parts can never be reduced into a harmonious whole', 
relating the invisible to the visible, the infinite to the 
finite (p.44l). 
It is suggested, therefore, that Coleridge's relationship 
with contemporary German literary criticism, and in particular 
A. W. Schlegel's Vorlesungen ~ber dramatische Kunst und 
Literatur, was neither slavish nor totally free but consisted 
in a careful use and adaptation of their work for his own 
purposes. A few more points made by Schlegel in his Lectures 
should be noted in the general context of Coleridge's 
writings. In his discussion of organic form, Schlegel 
develops at some length its quality of innateness and paradox. 
(The tran~rtion used is that of John Black, revised by 
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A. J. W. Morrison in 1846.) 
Orgunical form, again, is innate; it unfolds itself 
from within, and acquires its determination 
contemporaneously with the perfect development of 
the germ. 
The ancient art and poetry rigorously separates 
things which are dissimilar; the romantic delights 
in indissoluble mixturei; all contrarieties: nature 
and art, poetry and prose, seriousness and mirth, 
recollection and anticipation, spirituality and 
sensuality, terrestial and celestial, life and death, 
are by it bl7~ded together in the most intimate 
combination. 
Romantic drama - and Schlegel refers particularly to 
Shakespeare and the Spanish .writer Pedro Calder6n de la 
Barca (1600-81) - perceives and combines the unity even of 
the apparently most disparate. 
For Conception can only comprise each object separately, 
but nothing in truth can ever exist separately and 
by itself; Feeffng perceives all in all at once and 
the same time. 
As his criticism of Shakespeare developed, Schlegel's 
comments can be seen more and more as illustrative of 
Colerige 1 s own earlier poetic practice, particularly of the 
narrative poems. Shakespeare's writings, says Schlegel, are 
a mixture of the 'natural activity of genius' and deep 
reflection with the exercise of judgement (p.359). In 
structure they waive the claims of 1 the logical connexion of 
causes and effects', asserting rather 
... the rights of poetry and the nature of the 
romantic drama, which, for the very reason that it 
is and ought to be picturesque, requires richer 
accompaniments and contrasts for its main groups (p.36l). 
In abandoning a logical sequence of cause and effects, 
Shakespeare adopts the ironic device of multiple levels of 
narration, different characters providing a variety of 
perspectives on situations or other characters in the drama. 
As has been seen, it is a device used by Coleridge in 'The 
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Rime of the Ancient Mariner' and 1Christabel 1 to uproot self-
deception. 
Nobody has ever painted so truthfully as Shakespeare 
has done the facility of self-deception, the half 
self-conscious hypocrisy towards ourselves, with which 
even noble minds attempt to disguise the most inevitable 
influence of selfish motives in human nature. This 
secret irony of the characterization commands admiration 
as the profound abyss of acuteness and sagacity ..... 
In every case we are conscious that the subject itself 
is not immediately brought before us, but that we view 
it through the medium of a different way of thinking 
(p.369). 
What begins in criticism as an analysis of a narrative device 
whereby quite new, revealing and often ironic perspectives 
can be brought to bear on a single subject, was to become a 
matter of great importance in Coleridge's later writings on 
imagination, aesthetics and theology. 
One result, according to Schlegel, is that a sequence 
of events, having a hidden logic, may appear tm be arbitrary 
and inconsequential. Concerning love in Twelfth Night, 
imagination (Einbildung) seems to control an incoherent 
pattern of emotions of which the careful balance only 
gradually becomes apparent. Schlegel, in a manner familiar 
to the reader of Coleridge, contrasts 'imagination' and 
'fancy 1 • 
Die Liebe des musikberauschten Herzogs zur Olivia ist 
nicht nur eine Phantasie, sondern eine Einbildung; 
Viola scheint sich 7 ~nfangs willkurlich in den Herzog 
zu verlieben ..... 
(The love of the music-enraptured Duke for Olivia is 
not merely a fancy, but an imagination; Viola appears 
at first to fall arbitrarily in love with the Duke.) (p.392) . 
It is precisely this contrast between the arbitrary 
appearance of things and, in Shakespearean tragedy 
particularly, the conscious attempts to exercise a moral will 
by a character, to which Coleridge returns repeatedly in his 
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criticism. The classic instance, to which reference has 
already been made, is his discussion of the continGent nature 
of the Weird Sisters' information and its fulfilment in 
M hth ' ... ' 'j.'' ,. 1~7i ,ac .... evl S Sl.rugg..t.e Wl'L.llln DlrnSe 1'.·-
Finally, and not unconnected with the inherently ironic 
contrast in Shakespeare's drama between the apparently 
incoherent and de facto order of events, Schlegel returns at 
the end of his course of Lectures to the question of organic 
form and method. Just as Coleridge rejects 'dead arrangement' 
as a principle of method, so Schlegel seeks to avoid 1festen 
Gruridsatzen' or 'fixed principle'. Coleridge describes 
Shakespeare's unity as a 'principle of progression', while 
Schlegel suggests that 'everything good and excellent ... 
arises more from transient ebullition than fixed principle 1 • 7 4 
The preceding discussion may serve to link Coleridge, 
initially via his Shakespearean criticism but also his own 
poetic practice, with a consideration of the German romantic 
concept of irony. In his own most substantial work of 
criticism, Biographia Literaria, Coleridge exemplifies how a 
metaphorical method and an ironic attitude may act as 
principles of unity in a work which - as he and Schlegel 
might claim of Shakespeare's plays - masks coherence with a 
surface incoherence and fragmentation. Dr. Kathleen Wheeler 
in her recent study Sources, processes and methods in 
Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (Cambridge,l980) has rightly 
emphasized the role of irony in the theory of art, creativity, 
and by implication, therefore, perception and knowledge. In 
establishing a relationship between author and reader, and 
distinguishing between the artist and his art, irony involves 
necessarily an appreciation of the distinction between 
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thought and what is thought about; art and reality; the mind 
as self-conscious and creatively perceptive, inspired to 
reveal what is most truly there by the 'shaping spirit of 
Imagination 1 • 
In a note entitled 'Heads of Lecture the third' of 
February 1818, Coleridge questions A. W. Schlegel's implicit 
assumption of the identity of poet and poem, 75 being himself 
always careful tb distinguish between the man and his work. 
In this he was closer to Friedrich Schlegel, LudwiG Tieck and 
Karl Solger who, among others, were concerned to establish 
the principle of irony as a key factor in Romantic criticism. 
For a poet relates to his poem in an inescapably ambivalent 
way, both as creator and spectator, as controller and one who 
is controlled, as observer and observed. Thus the irony 
which works at the level of a multiple perspective upon a 
particular character or incident (one might cite Browning's 
The .l?ing and the Book (1868-9) ), Horks also at a deeper level 
in the work of art in which both author and reader are 
subject to possibly a variety of critical attitudes. What is 
apparently happening and what is apparently seen may suffer 
discontinuity in the service of a greater continuity. The 
familiar and the.finite may need to be shattered in order 
that the infinite may be glimpsed. 
According to Friedrich Schlegel, higher irony in the 
Romantic sense is self-criticism (Selbstpolemik) transcended. 76 
This leads directly back to the claim that Shakespeare's 
judgement is equal to his genius, to the claim that is, that 
Shakespeare could perceive his poetic genius at work, 
cultivate his own talent and adopt a critical posture 
towards his OHn creations which acquire, thereby, a dialectic 
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and self-consciousness such as lies at the heart of Romantic 
irony. This higher iron~'• however, poses no questions about 
the artifact itself (unlike dramatic irony), but about the 
relationship between the artist and his material, or the 
material and its audience. Indeed it transcends the work 
allowing a perspective from which the roles of author and 
reader, artist and spectator, as apparent opposites are 
necessarily homogeneous, 1 rivals who inhabit the opposite 
banks of the same stream' • 77 And so the artist-spectator, 
creating what he sees, glimpses an infinity in his creation 
through the simple contemplation of the finite. 
The sense of the paradoxical and contradictory nature 
of existence is everywhere apparent in the critical writings 
of Friedrich Schlegel, and the 'tension of opposites' lies at 
the heart of his concept of .irony. Beauty and perfection are 
to be found in the 1Fulle 1 of an ontological chaos from which 
an inexhaustible 'becoming' triggers a process in the 
individual consciousness towards an infinite self and a sense 
of an infinity of becoming. 
Aber die hochste Schonheit, ja die hochste Ordnung ist 
denn doch nur die des Chaos, namlich eines solchen, 
welches nur auf die Beruhrung der Liebe w~rtet, urn 
sich zu einer harmonischen Welt zu entfalten, ... alles 
greift in einander, und uberall ist ein und derselbe 
Geist nur anders ausgedruckt. 
(But the greatest loveliness, indeed the greatest order, 
is then after all solely that of chaos, namely such as 
only awaits the touch of love to develop it into a 
harmonious world, ... everything is involved with 
everything else, and everywhere one a~~ the same spirit 
is expressed only in different ways.) 
The progression of the inexhaustible abundance of this chaotic 
becoming is discussed in the Lyceums-Fragmente and the 
Literary Notebooks in philosophical terms as polarity which 
implies a dialectic as the necessary means of progression 
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towards an ever-greater participati~n in the 1 F~lle 1 , or the 
achievement of - in the language of A. W. Schlegel and 
Coleridge - organic form. Furthermore, polarity is discussed 
in the Lyceums - Fragmente as the relationship between 
1 Bedingt und Unbedingt', the conditioned and the unconditioned, 79 
leading straight back, once again to Coleridge's assessment 
of judgement (conditioned) and genius (unconditioned) in 
80 Shakespeare. 
It is the capacity of 1Witz' or imagination in Schlegel 
(as of the secondary imagination in Coleridge) to strike up 
fertile relationships between seeming opposites. The result, 
however, is not a synthesis as in Hegel's dialectic, for the 
new relationship or perspective must, in turn, be subjected 
to irony and critical analysis - and so on, ad infinitum. 
So, Schlegel insists, 'Irony. is analysis of thesis and 
antithesis' • 81 Similarly in Coleridge's 'Essays on the 
Principles of Method' is the notion of progression as being 
in the nature of art which hovers with self-critical irony 
between the finite and the infinite. Thesis and antithesis 
remain in contradiction, while philosophical irony examines 
the contradiction. Art, therefore, portrays neither infinity 
nor the absolute·but rather perceives and reveals it in the 
human consciousness active in the spiritual longing of the 
process towards the infinite and the divine. The 1 Unbedingt 1 
- the absolute - embraces the finitude of human art. 
What has been said concerning the Romantic concept of 
irony relates to Coleridge both as poet and literary critic. 
Biographia Literaria should be received not only in terms of 
its subject matter, art and imagination, but also as an 
exercise in the perception of the consciousness of the reading 
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and creative processes. It is a practical experiment which 
attempts to gain and to grant insight into the activities of 
creation and perception, the writer and reader continually 
reflecting upon himself, reflecting upon himself, ... : the 
finite pursues infinity. Just as here, and in the 
Shakespearean criticism, the 'Essays on the Principles of 
Method' are of fundamental importance, pertaining also to the 
whole corpus of Coleridge's later religious and philosophical 
writings. In Hints Towards the Formation of a more 
Comprehensive Theory of Life (posthum. 1848), Coleridge 
refers to the 'polarity, or the essential dualism of Nature, 
arising out of its productive unity' . 82 The language employed 
to describe organic unity in terms of the 'principle of 
progression' or 'productive principle', is the same as in the 
earlier writings. Similarly, the relationship between parts 
and a whole which was discussed in 1808 in 'Shakespeare's 
Judgement equal to his Geniu~. is taken up at length in the 
Theory of Life in an examination of the 'principle of 
individuation'. 
I define life as the principle of individuation, or 
the power which unites a given a~~ into a whole that 
is presupposed by all its parts. 
The central themes and processes of Coleridge's work 
reappear in this late, fragmentary writing, which convinced 
its editur, Seth B. Watson, that Coleridge was a 'pious 
Christian' for whom life was not a thing but 'an act or 
process', in which what are sought are not 'historical facts' 
but 'appropriate symbols of great fundamental truths' . 8 4 
Such symbols are d~scovered in the paradoxical relationship 
between the parts and the whole, the finite and the infinite, 
or art and reality, the artist and his creation. 
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In the Table Talk, Coleridge is reported to have 
described Shakespeare in terms of the creator God. 
In Shakespeare one sentence begets the next naturally; 
the meaning is all interwoven. He goes on kindling 
like a meteor through the dark atmosphere; yet when 
the creation in its outline is once perfect, then he 
seems to rest from his labour, and to smile ~~on his 
work, and tell himself that it is very good. 
The Shakespearean divinity was endlessly fascinating inasmuch 
as he may be said to represent that final transcendence in 
which 'polar forces' are found to be unius generis; the 
eternal oppositions and paradoxes of Romantic irony to be 
bound in a magnetic unity. For Coleridge, the existence of 
pairs of opposites is a necessary condition of life. In Aids 
to Reflection he proposes, 1for the purposes of the universal 
Noetic 1 , his Noetic Pentad. 
Thesis 
Prothesis 
Mesothesis 
Synthesis86 
The mesothesis he explailins as follows: 
Antithesis 
When two objects, that stand to each other in the 
relation of antithesis o~ contradistinction, are 
connected by a middle term common to both, the sense 
of this middle term is indifferently determinable by 
either; the preferability of the one or the other in 
any given case being divided by the circumstance of 
our more frequent experience of, ~7 greater familiarity 
with, the term in this connexion. 
The synthesis, as follows: 
Synthesis is a putting together of the two Lthesis and 
antithesis7, so that a third something is generated. 
Thus the ;ynthesis of hydrogen and oxygen is waBBr, 
a third something, neither hydrogen nor oxygen. 
And finally, prothesis: 
... or the Identity of TLhesi~l and ALntithesi~7. 
which is neither, because in it, as the trans~~ndent 
of both, both are contained and exist as one. 
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The prothesis, therefore, in its absolute meaning is the 
Infinite, the One of which the Many are the parts, that 
totality in which 1polar forces' are found to be one from 
the first. 
Romantic irony, from a mortal viewpoint, preserves the 
ability to function and gaze upon eternity by forever 
examining the intrinsic contradictions of those finite 
landing-places, 'doctrinal adhesions' I. A. Richards called 
them, which bind and limit. 90 It would be a mistake to see 
irony, so often deplored by moralists, as serving only the 
voice of eternal denial. In the Opus Maximum Ms 91 Coleridge 
suggests that human personality should not be defined in 
terms of limitation, for it is developed through an expanding 
consciousness and organic growth in continuing struggle to 
transcend the ironies of the suffering Mariner. Yet the 
ironies keep hope alive and make the struggle worthwhile. 
Art thus approaches the divine. Coleridge, in tune with much 
German criticism, explored through the levels of metaphor 
and the concept of irony, the relationship between art, 
religion and philosophy. Karl Solger summarized this unified 
approach to human enquiry and creativity. 
Philosophy, art, and religion are the three necessary 
parts of a harmonious culture; Philosophy without art 
is means without purpose; art without philosophy is 
end without beginning; and both without religion are 
utterly debased, vile and godless: philosophy becom~~ 
insolence and violence, and art arrogant amusement. 
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3. Self-reflection, Biographia Literaria, and the 'Confessio 
Fidei' 
The winter of 1810 found Coleridge in utter despair. 
His marriage was wrecked and his health shattered by opium. 
He feared he would never break the habit and his shame knew 
no bounds. Earlier in the year publication of The Friend had 
ceased, and his will to work was finally broken when his 
beloved Sara Hutchinson left him for good. Dorothy 
Wordsworth wrote, 'We have no hope of him' . 93 It was in the 
depths of his despondency that Coleridge composed his 
1Confessio Fidei', entered in his notebook on 3 November 
1810,94 and published twenty-six years later by his nephew 
H. N. Coleridge in the Literary Remains (1836-9). His 
current reading of English divines, particularly Robert South 
(1634-1716) and Jeremy Taylor (1613-67) is evident throughout 
the 1Confessio 1 • 
Coleridge begins by asserting that man is a responsible 
and Free Agent, possessing a will, a Reason - that is a Law 
of Right and Wrong -, and a sense of moral responsibility 
which constitutes the voice of Conscience. His conscience 
dictates it as a duty to believe in God, whose will is 
absolute, and properly with this absolute will of God man's 
free-will lies in such a relation 'as a perfect Time-piece 
would have to the Sun'. Against this background Coleridge 
continues with the Creed of Natural Religion. The created 
world serves to remind man of the existence of God. The 
notion of God, however, is essential to the human mind, 
called forth by Conscience and evident to Reason. It is 
necessarily insusceptible of scientific demonstration, and 
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just as all language presupposes in the intelligent listener 
those primary notions which it symbolizes, so the evidences 
of nature and the creation presuppose in the mind of man the 
notion of God. 
Belief in God, inspired by conscience, has its origin in 
the moral sense. This is not the case in the realm of 
science. Conscience further dictates as the ultimate end of 
human actions, not the pains and pleasures of this life, but 
hopes for a future spiritual state of being. This ultimate 
perspective on life is guided not by intellectual arguments, 
in Coleridge's terms 'arguments acquired by my Understanding', 
but by reason of Conscience which is 'the sole fountain of 
certainty'. 
From this, the 'Religion of all finite rational Beings', 
Coleridge proceeds to the Creed of Revealed Religion. A 
theme is here begun which was to find its full development in 
Aids to Reflectiun, that of man's fallen nature and his 
redemption 'in Christ Jesus'. 'Calvinism', Coleridge 
asserted, 'is practically a ... soothing and consoling 
system' .95 Nevertheless, while yet in his despair he reached 
out to the divine omnipotence, his reading of Kant was not 
forgotten in his 1Confessio Fidei'. Kant it was who proposed 
for man an independent will, whose Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
as Coleridge wrote on 3 November 1807 to John Ryland, 'has 
completely overthrown the edifice of Fatalism, or causative 
Precedence as applied to Action' . 96 Born a child of wrath, 
man is capable of moral evil, but not of himself of moral 
good. 'This fearful Mystery I pretend not to understand',. 
Coleridge admits, that man remains free and morally responsible 
and yet in conscience is led to believe in a divinity whose 
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will is absolute and by whose grace alone man is saved. The 
certainty of redemption is revealed to the conscience, yet 
not to the understanding, and Christ's life, crucifixion, 
death and resurrection are both the symbols and 1 necessary 
parts of the aweful process' of this Redemption. 
Coleridge makes a final point in the 'Confessio Fidei' 
before concluding with a lengthy analysis of the inadequacy 
of Unitarianism. The Trinity, he asserts, is a doctrine 
commended to us by our conscience. That is, belief in the 
mysteries of religion is declared to be 'real', as opposed to 
the acceptance Qf what is only conceptually clear. In a note 
made five months earlier in June 1810, Coleridge had affirmed 
the priority of the will or moral act over intellectual 
assent in religious matters. He concluded that note, 
'Believe, says St.Augustin, & most profoundly too -and thou 
wilt receive an intellectual conviction, (perception of its 
rationality) as the reward of thy Faith' . 97 
Such, in brief, was Coleridge's religious position in 
1810. When he published Aids to Reflection fifteen years 
later, despite his original intention of compiling an anthology 
from Archibshop Leighton's works, he had ended up writing a 
book on the process of reaching a Christian belief, beginning 
with Need and concluding with Trial. 98 In his 'Author's 
Address to the Reader', he asks a series of questions of his 
'fellow-Christian'. 
Has it led you to reflect? Has it supplied or suggested 
fresh subjects for reflection? Has it given you any 
new information? Has it removed any obstacle to a 
lively conviction of your responsibility as a moral 
agent? Has it solved any difficulties, which had 
impeded your faith as a Christian? Lastly, has it 
increased your power of thinking connectedly - especia~~y 
on the scheme and purpose of the Redemption by Christ? 
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Stephen Prickett has pointed out that what Coleridge was 
trying to establish about the mind in Aids to Reflection 
cannot be understood outside the context of his earlier 
t . d . t. 1 ' 100 poe· lC an cr1 1ca worK. · The title of the work is a 
deliberate double entendre between 'reflection' as a mode of 
thought and as the image cast by a mirror. In Aids, 
Coleridge defines 'thought' as: 
... the voluntary reproduction in our minds of those 
states of consciousness, or ... of those inward 
experiences, to which, as to his best and most authentic 
documents, 1cie teacher of moral or religious truth 
refers us. 
Divine revelation may be given by reflection upon the reflected 
image of God in man as an 'inward experience', to be perceived 
and shaped by the creative imagination.. Because of the 
divine qualities of infinity and eternity, such reflection 
will expect an endless process of dislocation and de-creation 
as it challenges the formal limits imposed as devices of 
order on the self, so that the self, reflecting infinitely 
upon the self, begins to open and reflect truly the image of 
the Divine. Revelation is extended to an interpretative act 
102 in which 'things' become signs or symbols. 
Northrop Frye in The Anatomy of Criticism (1957} argues 
for the autonomy of criticism in culture, and its task of 
destroying the intellectual idolatry of religion with its 
'recurrent tendency ... to replace the object of its worship 
with its present understanding and forms of approach to that 
object'. Religions, claims Frye, despite their 'enlarged 
perspective', cannot embrace the art and criticism which is 
limitless, endlessly hypothetical, and he concludes that 
'between religions "this is" and poetry's "but suppose this 
is", there must always be some kind of tension, until the 
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possible and the actual meet at infinity' . 103 Frye 
criticizes Coleridge for making literary criticism a kind of 
natural theology. That is, while he was right to think that 
the 1 Logosi, the universal Word, was the goal of his critical 
work, he was wrong to absorb this poetic Logos into the 
religious figure of Christ. For the universal Word cannot be 
an object of faith or a personality, since it is precisely 
the 1FGlle 1 or abundance of a process which is infinitely 
becoming and expansive through the critical task of self-
reflection. In one sense Frye is right in his identification 
of Coleridge's goal. But he seriously misrepresents 
Coleridge's approach to the figure of Christ, which, if it 
were as simple as Frye suggests, would make the later 
Christian writings both less problematic and less stimulating. 104 
At this stage it might seem that Coleridge is being 
identified as a kind of early structuralist, concerned not 
with independently existing objects, but with the 
relationships which are constructed and then perceived 
between the observer and the observed, with the correlative 
that any observer is bound to create something of what he 
observes: the divine revealed in the inspired creative act. 
Dangerous though such comparisons always are, there is some 
truth in this. Yet the Biographia Literaria takes us beyond 
the simple conclusion that Coleridge was a structuralist 
before his time. 
For Coleridge, to 1 know 1 the truth was not simply a 
grasping of the facts, but involved the human subject. 
Experience must be subjected to a 'self-revising subjectivity' , 10 5 
to a critical knowledge which overcomes dogmatism and self-
deception. Yet this 1 secular 1 experience must be within a 
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religious context: subjectivity going hand in hand with 
religion. It is this dual commitment which seems to lie at 
the root of the confusion felt by early critics of Biographia, 
'that rambling, confused, and inconclusive work 1 , as one 
reviewer of 1818 described it. 106 In the same journal, 
Blackwood's, John Wilson, better known as 'Christopher North' 
and Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, had written 
the previous year at length on Biographia. 
We have felt it our duty to speak with severity of this 
book and its author - and we have given our readers 
ample opportunities to judge of the justice of our 
strictures. We have not been speaking in the cause of 
titerature only, but, we conceive, in the cause of 
Morality and Religion. For it is not fitting that he 
should be held up as an example to the rising 
generation ... who has alternately embraced, defended, 
and thrown aside all systems of Philosophy, and all 
creeds of Religion; who seems to have no power of 
retaining an opinion, no trust in the principles which 
he defend, b~57who fluctuates from theory to theory ..... 
Coleridge, it was felt, and quite rightly, could never rest 
in a religion with its identifiable, ecclesial traditions or 
in an intelligent subjectivity. Somehow he wanted it both 
ways, and critics like John Wilson could not see that the two 
might be co-inherent. 
From his earliest writings, Coleridge had been concerned 
with 'Facts of mind 1108 and human experience in its 
'inwardness', and asserted t~at 'the mind acts & plays a 
part, itself the actor & the spectator at once! ,l09 It is 
habitually reflecting upon itself at work. In The Friend 
(1808~10), this sense of a reflective conscipusness which 
precedes expression, yet is only perceived and articulated in 
expression, is applied principally to political and moral 
insight. In the Lay Sermons (1816-17) it is examined in the 
context of the public character of religion. It is the 
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'habitual unreflectingness 1 of public religion which has led 
to its 'spiritual slumber' . 110 The remedy is to be sought in 
the process of reading, whereby the individual is encouraged 
to reflect upon the limitations of his existing patterns of 
thought and assumptions, and, Coleridge concludes: 
... this enlargement and elevation of the soul above 
its mere self attest the presence, and accompany the 
intuition of ultimate PRINCIPLES alone. These alone 
can interest the undegraded human spirit deeply and 
enduringly, because these alone belo~~ 1to its essence, 
and will remain with it permanently. 
Initially all that is required is an attitude of trust, a 
'first act of faith ... scarcely less than identical with its 
own being'. Thus, the self is required to engage in an 
endless self-transcendence until faith is given not only to 
the initial attitude of trust, which is 'enunciated in the 
word, GOD', but to the identical and sole sufficient 'other', 
God himself, towards which the self-transcending mind is 
reaching. Religion is the 'interpreter' of this endless 
process of self-reflection, representing 'the concentration 
of All in Each - a Power that acts by a contraction of 
universal truths into individual duties' (Appendix C, p.64). 
Religion is drawn towards Coleridge's theory of the 
imagination for its language and expression. 
This reflective self-consciousness which was 
characteristic of Coleridge's philosophizing and theologizing 
was given early and detailed attention in America by James 
Marsh, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vermont, 
whose 'Preliminary Essay' to Aids to Reflection introduced 
Coleridge's writings to Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82) and the 
transcendentalists of New England. Through Marsh, Aids 
became 1 a seminal text in American intellectual history•. 113 
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The first principles (wrote Marsh), the ultimate grounds, 
of these, so far as they are possible objects of 
knowledge for us, must be sought and found in the laws 
of our being, or th~y are not found at all. The 
knowledge of these, terminates in the knowledge of 
ourselves, of our rational and personal being, of 
our proper and distinctive humanity, and of that 
Divine Being, in whose image we are created. "We must 
retire inward," says St Bernard, "if we would ascend 
upward." It is by self-inspection, by reflecting 
upon the mysterious grounds of our own being, that we 
can alone arrive at any rational knowledg! 1~f the 
central and absolute ground of all being. 
The same principle proved fertile in directions far removed 
from Emersonian transcendentalism. In England, the 
philosopher Shadforth H. Hodgson published his Philosophy of 
Reflection (1878), dedicated to Coleridge, 'my Father in 
Philosophy'. It is, says Hodgson, through 'self-
consciousness' or the 'principle of reflection' that 'all 
conscious beings are agents who help to make the unseen 
world ..... Their volitions are evidences of its otherwise 
115 
unknown nature'. Rather later in Germany, Charlotte 
Broicher 1 s 1Anglikanische Kirche und deutsche Philosophie 1 , 116 
which devotes considerable attention to Biographia Literaria, 
not only identifies Coleridge as a precursor of William 
James on the 1 innere Beglaubigung' (interior verification) of 
religious truth (p.228), but also of Keble, J. H. Newman and 
Hurrell Froude on the imagination in religious belief, on the 
illative sense, and on the will as man's spiritual centre 
(pp.458-93). 117 
In the 'Confessio Fidei', Coleridge writes that it is to 
the conscience, and not to the mere understanding, that the 
certainty of redemption is revealed. The religious quest, 
indeed, like the quest for philosophic unity, is not merely 
intellectual but also emotional and volitional. Man, 
possessing will, reason and a sense of moral responsibility 
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(that is, conscience), reflects upon his own nature until, led 
back repeatedly to a sense of his own limitations, ultimate 
self-expression is revealed, in hope, as 'a God, that is, a 
Being in whom Supreme Reason and a most holy Will are one 
with an infinite Power. L-.. . _7 that all holy Will is 
coincident with the Will of God, and therefore secure in its 
lt . t C b h. Q . t I ll8 u 1ma e onsequences y lS mn1po ence . The process of 
self-reflection will ultimately reveal the Divine, the only 
sufficient Other. 
While in The Friend Coleridge's subject is primarily 
political and moral, in the Lay Sermons religious, Biographia 
Literaria might be identified as an exercise in the processes 
of self-reflection through the act of reading. It is a book 
about reading which makes conscious in the reader the 
experience of the interaction of artist and spectator. He 
becomes thus a part of the created work of art. A primary 
element in Coleridge's endeavour to demonstrate the mind's 
self-consciousness is metaphor, which is addressed in the 
first instance to the imagination. A metaphor is a linguistic 
transference, describing one thing in terms of another, and 
the process whereby words construct a 'reality' from within 
themselves and impose this on the world in which we live. 119 
By the 'shaping spirit' of the imagination, a metaphor first 
links many diverse elements intD a unity and gives language 
the expressive power 'to conquer a realm beyond the immediate 
world perceived by the eye'. As the metaphor sinks into and 
reflects the reader's experience, it requires of him a 
creative act 1 so as to make him lose the consciousness of 
d t k h . th. I 120 wor s - o rna e 1m see every 1ng . 
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Here is an extended metaphor descriptive of the act of 
thinking. 
Most of my readers will have observed a small water-
insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a 
cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic colours 
on the sunny bottom of the brook; and will have 
noticed, how the little animal wins its way up 
against the stream, by alternate pulses of active 
and passive motion, now resisting the current, and 
now yielding to it in order to gather strength and 
a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. This 
is no unapt emblem o121he mind's self-experience in the act of thinking. 
Just as irony may disintegrate old relationships and 
perceive new, so metaphor can illustrate and prompt a new 
perspective and understanding of the perceiving self. The 
human mind is here described in terms of the complex action 
by which the water-insect propels itself upstream. Precisely 
because the description is metaphorical and indirect -
mediated through an illustration which experience can 
grasp -, it demands the exercise of the very mental processes 
which it describes. The truth of the metaphor can only be 
grasped in the active appreciation of it: consciousness 
precedes expression, and expression alone makes consciousness 
available. Thus the self-conscious mind develops. 
Furthermore, it illustrates and exercises the form of mental 
energy which is required to read Biographia. Such metaphors, 
therefore, are 1fulcra 1 on which the mind is consciously 
turned in order to propel itself actively against the current 
of the book. 122 
Part of the difficulty of reading Biogr~phia lies in its 
repeated pressure on the reader to think about what he is 
doing as he reads. More than that, the structure is 
deliberately incomplete. 'You have been obliged', Coleridge 
warns, 1 to omit so many links, from the necessity of 
- 155 -
compression, that what remains, looks ... like the fragments 
of the winding steps of an old ruined tower' . 123 In the act 
of climbing we create the missing stairs. This constructive 
work is further described in Thesis VI of chapter 12, in 
which Coleridge tries to define the I AM, otherwise 
identified as spirit, self and self-consciousness. 
In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being 
and knowing are identical, each involving, and 
supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject 
which becomes a subject by thl2 ~ct of constructing itself objectively to itself. 
At this point, it can be said that Coleridge is not simply a 
primitive structuralist, for structuralists are interested 
primarily in relationships, while it seems that Coleridge's 
attention is focussed firmly upon the reader, rather in the 
manner suggested by Stanley Fish in his paper 'Literature in 
the Reader: Affective Stylistics 1 • 125 Indeed, the principles 
underlying Fish's method should by now be familiar: the 
denial of a point of termination; the adhesion to a process; 
the appeal to and creation of experience. Fish's open-
endedness, however, would not be ultimately embraced by that 
which, in Coleridge, frustrated and confused his early 
critics in Blackwood's, the religious horizon which laps the 
repeatedly experienced finitude of secularity in the context 
of an infinite divinity. Coleridge must return, in the end, 
to the ultimately constitutive nature of the 'ideas' of 'God', 
'Freedom', 'Immortality' and 'Self'. And so, like Schelling 
and unlike Kant, he was looking for an intuitive knowledge 
in which a subjective idea ultimately authenticated its own 
b . t• l"d"t 126 o Jec 1ve va 1 1 y. 
Finally, the discussion of self-consciousness should be 
linked with the concluding paragraph of the 1 Confessio Fidei' 
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on the Trinity, a doctrine commended to us by our conscience 
and 'real' beyond what is conceptually clear. 'The Idea of 
God involves that of a Tri-unity', wrote Coleridge in 1806. 127 
In the principle of polar causality 1 the cause remains 
present in the effect, and is, from one point of view, 
identical with it' . 128 They are distinguished, however, by 
their relative positions. In his examination of cognition and 
consciousness, Coleridge limits conceptual clarity, 
attainable by the understanding, to the principle of identity, 
the mere fact of being. But the principle of polarity, lying 
at the root of the 'unity in multeity 1 , defines the content 
of self-consciousness as tri-une, three 1 in 1 one and one 1 in 1 
three. 12 9 In tri-unity is realised the actual self, the will 
which is ultimately coincident with the Will of God. 
Coleridge sums it up in a note on Donne's Sermon XXXIV. 
Being, Mind, Love in action = holy Spirit are ideas 
distinguishable tho' not divisible, but Will is 
incapable of distinction or division: it is equally 
implied in l. vital Being, 2. in essential intelligence, 
and 3. in effluent Love or holy Action. Now Will is 
the true principle & meaning of Identity, of Selfness: 
even in our common language. The Will, therefore, 
being indistinguishably one, but the possessive Powers 
triply distinguishable, do perforce involve thlJO 
notion expressed by three Persons and one God. 
The purpose of Biographia Literaria might be defined as 
self-construction. If its subject-matter is the imagination, 
its method is to encourage the reader to experience the 
imagination at work. Nevertheless, it should not be taken in 
isolation from the rest of Coleridge's work, lest indeed the 
subjective Pole of the Dynamic Philosophy outg~ow itself. 131 
For it was intended only as a prelude to his major project. 
'It will', wrote Coleridge, 1be an important Pioneer to the 
great Work on the Logos, Divine and Human, on which I have 
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set my Heart and hope to ground my ultimate reputation 1 • 132 
Jerome Christensen describes the method of Biographia 
Literaria as 1 marginal 1 , an investigation into 1 the 
contingency of living in a borrowed homei. As an exercise 
in self-reflection it sheds light on the point that 'all 
philosophical certainties have inconsistencies and 
interruptions; all texts have margins' . 133 Through this 
open-endedness Coleridge sought to focus on the theological 
matter of the relationship between the finite and contingent, 
and the infinity of the divine. How far Coleridge recast a 
true Christian theology in a romantic tradition which saw the 
need for a modern mythology and, as has been argued, 
rejected the structural plot and symbolic imagery of the 
Judaeo-Christian literary tradition, 134 will be a major 
theme of chapter 7. 
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VI THREE LATER POEMS 
1. 1 Limbo 1 and 1Ne Plus Ultra' 
In his book Coleridge as Religious Thinker (Yale, 1961), 
James D. Boulger dismisses Coleridge's later poetry as of 
little value on the ground that, after 1810, Coleridge was 
not emotionally at home in the abstract world of spiritual 
Christianity into which he had thought himself by 
philosophical reflection and self-reflection. The poet, it 
might be said, failed to conjoin the. necessary elements of 
'lofty and abstract truths' with 'impassioned feelings' . 1 
Boulger 1 s comments, faithful to the traditional criticism of 
Coleridge as a poetic failure after 'Dejection: An Ode' 
(1802), fail to appreciate his emotional commitment to 
Christian doctrine in his later years and the integral part 
played by his poetic inspiration in the resolution and 
sustenance of his belief. Nor do they give due credit to 
his continued development as both philosopher and religious 
thinker long after the publication of Biographia Literaria, 
and, not least, the refinement of his poetry from an art in 
which subjective, internal experiences are transformed, and 
reflected upon, as external, public object, to a creative 
activity in which the finite form of the poem functions as a 
window on infinity. In his 'Essays on the Principles of 
Method' in The Friend (1818), Coleridge wrote: 
The finite form can neither be laid hold of, nor is 
it anything of itself real, but merely an apprehension, 
a frame-work which the human imagination forms by it~ 
own limits, as the foot measures itself on the snow. 
Instead of focussing on the solid image, whether palace dome 
or albatross, Coleridge's later poetry, often deliberately 
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fragmentary, intimates, with a delicate and translucent purity, 
a greater mystery and repeatedly invites the reconstruction 
of a wholeness of being of which it is the symbolic indication. 
The origins of the poems 1 Limbo 1 and 1 Ne Plus Ultra' 
are obscured by a chaotic notebook entry dated by Professor 
Coburn as April-May 1811. 3 Ernest Hartley Coleridge dates 
their composition as 1817 and 1 ?1826 1 respectively. However, 
internal evidence apart, the existence of a gloss on 'Limbo' 
in a notebook entry for 1814, 4 its close parallels with the 
concluding chapter of Biographia Literaria, together with a 
strong repudiation of the religious ideas of both poems in a 
letter written to J. H. Green in September 1818, suggest that 
the earlier date is more accurate. Furthermore, the poetry 
reflects the spiritual evolution undergone by Coleridge 
during the crisis years 1810-11, and through which he had 
grown by the end of the decade. His spiritual growth was 
part and parcel of his poetic development, each balancing the 
other. The evolution of the poetry, which was characterized 
by 'progressive realization' rather than simply an 
'aggregation of words 1 , 5 irrigated his own theology of 
revealed religion which, in turn, to some extent repaired 
the fragments of the later poems. The poet guided the 
believer who restored the romantic's sense of ruin. 
In the manuscript form of these two poems, it is clear 
that Coleridge laboured hard in their creation, beginning with 
the themes of corruption, damnation and privation in a 
pastiche entitled 'On Donne's first Poem', and running into 
what was later published as 1 Limbo 1 , which, in turn, is a 
companion-piece to the poem 'Sole Positive of Night', 
entitled 1 Ne Plus Ultra' by E. H. Coleridge. The version 
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here given of 1 Limbo 1 follows Coleridge's final manuscript 
form. 
Tis a strange Place, this Limbo! not a Place, 
Yet name it so - where Time & weary Space 
Fetter 1 d from flight, with night-mair sense of Fleeing 
Strive for their last crepuscular Half-being -
Lank Space, and <scytheless> Time with branny Hands 
Barren and soundless as the measuring Sands, 
Mark 1 d but by Flit of.Shades -unmeaning they 
As Moonlight on the Dial of Day -
But that is lovely ~ looks like Human Time, 
An old Man with a steady Look sublime 
That stops his earthly Task to watch the Skies -
But he is blind - a statue hath such Eyes -
Yet having moon-ward turn 1 d his face by chance -
Gazes the orb with moon-like Countenance 
With scant white hairs, with fore-top bald & high 
He gazes still, his eyeless Face all Eye -
As twere an Organ full of s~lent Sight 
His whole Face seerneth to rejoice in Light/ 
Lip touching Lip, all moveless, Bust and Limb, 
He seems to gaze at that which seems to gaze on Him6 
(lines 11-30) 
What is here almost certainly a poetic self-portrait in the 
old man, finds a remarkable parallel of theme in the early 
10de to the Departing Year' (1796) which was probably 
influenced by Coleridge's reading of Boehme and the Cabala 
and wherein is a godhead whose 'stormy blackness' of Power 
contains within itself Love and Light. 7 The theme is further 
developed in 1Ne Plus Ultra'. More significant however, is 
the close parallel between 1 Limbo 1 and Coleridge's prose 
attempt to develop a metaphysical grounding for his thoughts 
on time in Chapter 24 of Biographia Literaria. 
The sense of Before and After becomes both intelligible 
and intellectual when, and only when, we contemplate 
the succession in the relations of Cause and Effect, 
which, like the two poles of the magnet manifest the 
being and unity of the one power by relative opposites, 
and give, as it were, a substratum of p~rmanence, of 
identity, and therefore of reality, to the shadowy flux 
of Time. It is Eternity revealing itself in the 
phenomena of Time: and the perception and acknowledgement 
of the proportionality and appropriateness of the Present 
to the Past, prove to the afflicted Soul, that it has 
not yet been deprived of the sight of God, that it can 
still recognize the effective presence of a Father, 
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though through a darkened glass and a tur§id atmosphere, 
though of a Father that is chastening it. 
Already in the Biographia, following Schelling, Coleridge had 
asserted that the 'free will' or 'absolute self' was 
supratemporal and experienced 'time per se 1 • Such 
despatialized time is, according to Schelling, not extended 
but rather concentrated into one moment or compresent.9 Now 
the similar moral intelligibility of eternity, blessed in its 
puzzling involvement with time, is contrasted with the 'state 
of the reprobate spirits' which is described by the 'mystic 
theologians' as 1a dreadful dream in which there is no sense 
of reality - an eternity without time, and as it were 
below it - God present without manifestation of his 
10 presence'. 
A more general note should be made on Coleridge's reading 
of Schelling and also Jacob Boehme as a background to 'Limbo', 
before considering more precisely the contribution of poetry 
and poetic form to the poem's effect. In Vom dreifachen 
Leben des Menschen (1620), chapter 4~ 32, Boehme describes 
how 1 when God set the will in the Fiat, then the wheel of the 
eternal essences went forth into a substance and there the 
time had its beginning, which was not from eternity' . 11 
Coleridge associated .theories of 'internal time' with Boehme, 
commenting in The Philosophical Lectures on 1 B~hmen 1 s ideas 
of the Horology or innate Time in all creatures 1 • 12 The 
'Human Time' of 1 Limbo 1 seems to derive directly from 
Boehme's Psychologia vera, oder Viertzig Fragen Von der Seen 
(1620. Translated, J. Sparrow. 1647), in which Question 34 
('What is the miserable and horrible condition of the Da~ned 
Souls?') states that 'their number is not the ·number of any 
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human time', and that 1 t~ey have a sport ... though indeed 
there is no time•. 13 
Underlying and integral to Coleridge's poetic processes 
in the second decade of the nineteenth century are his 
philosophical and theological investigations. 
In its manuscript form the final line of 'Limbo' seems 
to have been written with fresh ink and a fresh quill ('A 
fear, a future fate. Tis positive Negation!'), making it 
appear as a title to the next notebook entry which continues 
in the same quill as the manuscript of 1 Ne Plus Ultra 1 • In 
this way the two poems may almost be regarded as one. Once 
again, the version here given of 1Ne Plus Ultra' follows 
Coleridge's final manuscript form. 
Sole Positive of Night! 
Antipathist of Light! 
Fate's only Essence! Primal Scorpion Rod! 
The one permitted Opposite of God! 
Condensed Blackness, and Abysmal Storm 
Compacted to one Sceptre 
Arms the Grasp enorm, 
The Interceptor! 
The Substance, that still costs the Shadow, Death! 
The Dragon foul and fell! 
The unrevealable 
And hidden one, whose Breath 
Gives Wind and Fuel to the fires of Hell! 
Ah sole Despair 
Of both th' Eternities in Heaven! 
Sole Interdict of all-bedewing Prayer, 
The All-compassionate! 
Save to the Lampads seven 
Revealed to none of all th' Angelic State, 
Save to the Lampads seven 14 That watch the Throne of Heaven! 
As with 1 Limbo 1 , the sources of 'Ne Plus Ultra' are to be 
found in Behmenist cosmology, although no si~ilar precise 
references can be found for the poem's expression of the 
paradoxical polarity of the Godhead. Yet this polarity is 
indeed central to Boehme's philosophy and laid down in his 
earliest work Aurora oder Morgenr~te im Aufgang (1612. 
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Translated, Sparrow. 1656), in which the world is subjected 
to two opposing principles, g~od and evil, light and darkness, 
both of which are aspects of God. More precisely in De 
electione gratiae, oder Von der Gnaden-Wahl (1623. Translated, 
Sparrow. 1655), chapter 4, Boehme describes the movement from 
an undifferentiated and unmanifest eternity to the eternal 
Principles of Fire and Light, existing only mutually, to the 
third Principle, manifested through 'sevens'. However, there 
seems to be no immediate source for the terrifying reality of 
the non-existent hell of 1Ne Plus Ultra', an insubstantiality 
which is Interceptor, sole Despair, and sole Interdict of 
prayer. The poem needs to be read ,in the context of its 
companion-piece 'Limbo', to balance its positive negation, 
partly, indeed, relieved by the Lampads Seven, with the poetic 
irony which affirms what looks like Human Time - an 
affirmation expressed in manifest and revealed deity. 
The letter already mentioned, written to J. H. Green on 
30 September 1818, repudiates this Behmenist notion of 
paradoxical polarity within the divine unity, and provides a 
sound argument for an earlier dating of the poem. It is a 
clear attack on pantheistic tendencies in Boehme, Schelling 
and Coleridge's own reflections on 'bi-polar knowledge' in 
Biographia. He now categorically rejects the two opposing 
principles as aspects of the one God. 
Our first point therefore is - steadily to deny and 
clearly to expose, the Polarity as existing or capable 
of existing in the unity of a perfect Will or in the 
Godhead as ens realissimum. The divine Unity is 
indeed the indispensable CONDITION of this Polarity; 
but both its formal and it's immediate, specific 
OAUSE is in the contradictory Will of the Apostasy. . 15 (Fichte was far nearer the truth than Schelling- ... ) 
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Writing to C. A. Tulk on 24 November 1818, Coleridge condemns 
Schelling as a mere pantheist in the mould of Boehme. For 
their pola~ity is, in Coleridge's later language a 
'contrariness', finding itself in the divine unity not as an 
equipoise of opposites but as a disharmony within a universal 
similarity. 1 Polar forces 1 , he was to observe, '- that is, 
opposite, not contrary, powers - are necessarily unius 
. h I 16 gener~s, omogeneous . Though split they tend towards 
reunion because each opposite has been generated from the 
other, and thus the interest of progressiveness is upheld. 
But in the interest of permanence, 17 in Boehme nature is the 
manifestation of the polar conflict in the deity, God dwelling 
in nature as the soul dwells in the body. So, too, in 
Schelling, 1Natur-Philosophie 1 is lin the end mere Pantheism, 
1 or 11 gemina Natura quae fit et facit, creat et creatur", of 
which the Deity itself is but an Out-birth' 18 
The development of Coleridge's religious thought was, in 
this case, prompted by an increasingly profound sense of the 
nature of evil, which becomes for him far more real and 
independent of the Godhead than the sinister nothingness of 
1Ne Plus Ultra'. However, if theology moved beyond this 
paradoxical polarity of the deity, the 'trichotomous logic' 
of Coleridge's later poetry and prose continued to explore 
the paradoxes of oppositions which were really not 
contradictions, and the reconciliation of apparent opposites. 
Quoting a marginal note made by Coleridge on Kant's 
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, Professor J. H. Muirhead in his 
book Coleridge as PhiJosopher (London,l930) describes the 
workings of 'trichotomy': 
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'seek first for the Unity as the only source of 
Reality, and then for the two opposite yet correspondent 
forms by which it manifests itself. For it is an axiom 
of universal application that manifestio non datur nisi 
per al t erum. Instead therefore of aff ir rna t ion and 
contradiction, the tools of dichotamic logic, we have 
three terms Identity, Thesis and_Antithesis 1 • It is 
only by this principle that he LColeridg~7 conceived 
it possible to advance beyond the limitations of Logic 
or the science of Understanding to a Noetic, or science 
of the Rr~son, which should also be a science of 
Reality. 
So far this study has explored the background to 'Limbo' 
and 'Ne Plus Ultra' in Coleridge's philosophical and 
theological reading, suggesting that his understanding of 
Schelling and Boehme developed beyond the cosmology of the 
poems. Yet a further important point remains to be made, that 
the poetic processes at work were exercising a powerful 
counterforce as a mode of reflection about reality. The 
aesthetic activity of the poetry intensifies ordinary 
experience and perception, a point which lies at the root of 
the distinction between primary and secondary imagination in 
Biographia. Thus, even while it continued to develop, 
Coleridge's religious thought was irrigated by the processes 
in the later poetry of self-reflection and reflection on 
experience. Such critical self-consciousness, as it has been 
explored in the critical prose and the verse, was an ever-
present defence against the forms of custom, prejudice and 
mere understanding divorced from reason which are dangers 
always lurking in the degeneration of Christian doctrine as 
it slides into sterile dogma. 
'Limbo' and 'Ne Plus Ultra' are fragments and create 
fragmentation. The public form of the doctrine that gives 
'Limbo' its name is violated by the poetic, creative energy. 
Coleridge, in a letter to the younger James Gillman, of 24 
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October 1826, describes the mind as a kaleidoscope bringing 
20 
symmetry out of a chaos o~ shapes from the past·. As 
themselves poetic fragments the poems exemplify important 
romantic formulations concerning poetry. 21 The fragment both 
creates an impulse to reconstruct the intimated whole, and 
also, together with paradox, resists this hypothetical 
completeness since the poems' achievement is precisely in a 
challenging inachievement. Behind this sense of the 
paradoxical nature of existence lies, of course, the German 
romantic tradition of higher irony. 
In the poems, fragmentation and polarity operate at a 
number of levels. There are the basic polarities of theme -
time and eternity, darkness and light , the power of God and 
the weakness of man, heaven and hell. There are the polarities 
of language -positive Negation', 'positive of Night'. 
There is also - looking back to 'The Ancient Mariner' - a 
polarity in the artist as both controller and controlled, the 
critical spectator - artist. The poem is about the poem, 
through creative experience of which the divine is glimpsed 
and thereby more effectively perceived. The sight-blindness 
paradox of 'Limbo' and its companion-piece are employed as a 
means of escape both from 'Understanding's Phantom logic' and 
from Coleridge's earlier poetic process of externalizing 
subjective experiences in the description of natural objects. 
What is created then, is a purely symbolic work, wherein the 
images interrelate meaningfully through 'passion or universal 
22 logic' and not through 'the logic of grammar'. 
In the published form of 'Limbo', Coleridge begins his 
poem with a series of pronouns which lack any antecedent 
meaning. 
- 17 4 -
The sole true Something - Thist In Limbo's Den 
It frightens Ghosts, a~ here Ghosts frighten men. 
By line 19, 1This 1 is rediscovered transformed: 
But that is lovely - looks like Human Time. 
The immediate demonstrative pronoun has, in the poetic 
process, become distanced and set apart so that it may seem 
to have a form and aesthetic grace. But at least the poetry 
has endowed the terrifying blankness of the initial 1This 1 
with recognizable features - just as Limbo, though no place, 
is named so by the poem - so that it becomes a 'that' with 
which some relationship is possible. 
The blind old man, recognizably Coleridge himself, 
embodies both spiritual deprivation and potential spiritual 
fulfillment. Two letters, one of 1799 and the other of 1832, 
illustrate the development of this ambivalent sense of 
blindness as a metaphor. 
i. I have, at times, experienced such an extinction 
of Light in my mind, I have been so forsaken by 
all the forms and colourings of Existence, as if 
the organs of Life had been dried up; as if only 
simple BEING remained, blind and stagnant~ 
ii. ... in Christ only did he build a hope - yea, he 
blessed the emptiness, that made him capable of 
his Lord's Fullness, gloried in the Blind~3ss 
that was receptive.of his Haster 1 s Light. 
There is no serene spiritual vision enjoyed by the old man of 
the poem. All the language of perception is highly 
qualified. If that which is lovely merely looks like Human 
Time, so 1He seems to gaze at that which seems to gaze on 
him'. Accepting man's inability to know spiritual truth with 
certainty and acknowledging the limitations of poetic 
language, nevertheless the poet indicates through the 
blindness of the old man a possible willed means of finding 
God. Poetic creativity, from the very light that comes from 
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within man, provides intimations which reflect in themselves 
the divine splendour which, he surmizes, shines down upon 
our blindness. 
The contrast with Limbo is starkly projected: 
No such sweet sights doth Limbo den immure, 
Wall 1 d round, and. made a spirit-jail secure, 
By the mere horror of blank Nought-at-all. 
The manifest deity which, in 'Limbo', looks like man's true 
time, in linked in 1 Ne Plus Ultra' with the Lampads Seven 
wherein the fullness of being is contrasted with hellish 
negation. Again, it is an intimation of the divine splendour. 
The Larnpads are elsewhere referred to by Coleridge in 'Ode 
to the Departing Year', lines 76-7, and in the tenth of the 
Philosophical Lectures • 
. .. the Deity as manifests£, as expanding <in at> 
least <seven> ways, they Lthe Cabalist£.7 represented 
as the seven spirits or the seven Sephiroth. The last, 
which was to be the Messiah or the Shekinah, was to 
be the same as the second person of the triad, and to 
be in the Shekinah a concentration of all the seven 
spirits of the manifestation, a doctrine which must 
have been very early indeed in the Church, because we 
find a clea24reference to it in the beginning of the Apocalypse. 
This last quotation .links the concern for Christian 
doctrine with the poetic contribution to Coleridge's 
religious development. As poetry, reflective and self-
reflective, joins the interest of art and imagination to that 
of reality and perception, so the fragmentary nature of the 
poems prompt a fulfillment that is at once divine and on the 
edge of human experience. As Coleridge writes in the 
'Essays on the Principles of Method', 'there is method in the 
fragments 1 • 25 The paradoxical sensations which underlie the 
poetic discipline of 'Limbo' and 1Ne Plus Ultra' are 
expressed in a note of September 1808. 
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For Love, passionate in its deepest tranquillity, Love 
unutterable fills my whole Spirit, so that every fibre 
of my Heart, nay, of my whole frame seerr.s to tremble 
under its perpetual touch. and sweet pressure, like the 
string of a Lute - with a sense of vibratory Pain 
distinct from all other sensations, a Pain that seems 
to shiver and tremble on the threshhold of some Joy, 
that cannot be entered into while I am embodied - a 
pain of yearning which all the Pleasure on earth could 26 
not induce me to relinquish, even were it in my power -
The poems, true to Coleridge's principles of method, actually 
create and develop their own subject (which is themselves), 
and finally point beyond their own fragmentariness. Such a 
poetic method implies a 'progressive transition' which is the 
antithesis of 'mere dead arrangement•, 27 and continually 
undermines the static. tendencies of religious doctrinal form. 
But this is not to deny that such form has its part to play 
in the paradoxical quality of a confessed faith, and 
Coleridge had, indeed, composed his 1Confessio Fidei' on J 
November 1810. 28 Referring again to the Lampads Seven in 
1Ne Plus Ultra 1 , and their association with early Christian 
doctrine in the Philosophical Lectures, the concerns of 
doctrine and the poetic perception of reality seem to be 
linked in a comment which could almost stand as a moral of 
the poem. 
Without faith in the only begotten Son of God no 
rational 2~nviction of reality in any subject is 
possible. 
Coleridge's best later poetry does not confirm the 
suggestion that he was not at home emotionally in the 
abstract religious world into which he had thought himself. 
Rather it sustains the highly articulate and self-conscious 
emotional and spiritual development of Coleridge's theological 
and philosophical reflections. 
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2. 1 Constancy to an Ideal Ob,j ect 1 
The later poetry explores the creative process of 
thinking rather than thought and the paradoxes of reflection 
about a reality which demands self-reflection. In 'Constancy 
to an Ideal Object' (which may have been written as early as 
1805, or as late as 1828), the ideal object is not an entity, 
but an act - a consciousness which links subject and object 
in a joining of opposites which does not cancel them out. 
Such poetry enables us to 1 see 1 , to experience and think 
about the self and the world across the barriers of sense and 
finitude, for, as Coleridge defined it in The Statesman's 
Manual, Appendix E, an Idea 1is an educt of the Imagination 
actuated by the pure Reason, to which there neither is or can 
be an adequate correspondent in the world of the senses•. 30 
If the beloved Sara Hutchinson lies behind 'Constancy 
to an Ideal Obj~ct 1 , it is not the lady herself who is the 
ideal object. Coleridge's concern is not with Sara's physical 
presence, but with the thought of her, with love itself and 
not love's embodiment. In a letter, probably dating from 
November 1819, he describes the creative process by which 
emotion and experience are focussed and by which the poet 
comes to 'see'. 
,')For from my very childhood I have been accustomed to 
abstract and as it were unrealize whatever of more 
than common interest my eyes dwelt on; and then by 
a sort of transfusion and transmissi~n of my 
consciousness to identify myself with the Object -
... it was a pride and a place of Healing to lie, as 
in an Apostl~'s Shadow, within the Eclipse and deep 
substance-seeming Gloom of 'these dread 3imbassadors from Earth to Heaven, Great Hierarchs'! 
Love becomes objectless as the, creative poet, abandoning the 
stock rhetorical abstractions of the early verse, explores the 
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experience of relationship (finite/infinite: subject/object) 
in a poetry which is symbolic, partaking of the reality which 
it renders intelligible. 
1Constancy to an Ideal Object' contrasts two conditions 
as it addresses the 'loveliest friend'. Coleridge oscillated 
between them throughout his life. 
The peacefull 1 st cot, the moon shall shine upon, 
Lulled by the thrush. and wakened by the lark, 
Without thee were but a becalmed bark, 
Whose Helmsman on an ocean waste and wide 
Sits mute and pale his rnouldering helm beside. 
(lines 20-4) 
Rural domestic bliss is contrasted with the fate of the 
Ancient Mariner, and the Mariner, we recall, carne to experience 
love and loveliness precisely in things most hateful, the 
slimy sea-creatures. Similarly here the tone of the poem 
changes after its protracted lament that that which is most 
dear is an illusion. Now, as the Mariner accepted the water-
snakes, the poet accepts the illusion: 'And art thou nothing?' 
The ambiguity is explored in the phenomenon of the 
Bracken Spectre. It had haunted Coleridge since his ascent 
of the Bracken in the Harz mountains in May 179932 and he 
refers to it as late as 1825 in Aids to Reflection. In the 
rising or setting of the sun, when its rays are almost 
horizontal, a man's shadow may be thrown onto a bank of 
mountain mist, his head haloed with a ring of light or a 
1glory 1 : 
... as when 
The woodman winding westward up the glen 
At wintry dawn, where o 1 er the sheep-track's maze 
The viewless snow-mist weaves .a glist'ning haze, 
Sees full before him, gliding without tread, 
An image with a glory round its head; 
The enamoured rustic worships its fair hues, 
Nor knows he makes the shadow, he pursues~ 
(lines 25-32) 
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Boulger, who had dismissed the later poetry as emotionally 
distinct from the later abstract spirituality, dismisses 
also 'Constancy to an Ideal Object' as a recognition that 
the ideal object of the poet is but the 'self-generating 
illusion of the rustic•. 33 Yet the tone of the lines 
describing the Bracken Spectre contradicts Boulger 1 s reading. 
It is one of triumph and energy. The image of the Spectre 
is there for all to see ('sees full before him'). 1 Glory 1 
is a word descriptive of religious and spritual value, adding 
a richness to the image making for richness and worth. The 
rustic responds to the richness eagerly, and being 'enamoured', 
worships its beauty. The last word of the. poem, 1 pursues 1 , 
emphasizes his energy and vitality. 
Clearly something important is happening, not to be 
dismissed merely as a 'self-generating illusion'. Describing 
genius in Aids to Reflection, Coleridge remarks that 1 the 
beholder either recognizes it as a projected form of his own 
Being, that moves before him with a Glory round its head, or 
recoils from it as from a Spectre' •34 The ambiguity is all, 
while in the poem the ideal object, as an act of 
consciousness, is the uniting of the meditative mind and its 
object of meditation, opposites yet one in the poetic 
creation. Furthermore, to emphasise the polarity, the 
1 glory 1 on a Brocke.n spectre may be seen only by the person 
to whom it belongs, even. though the shadow of the figure may 
be seen by a11. 35 Thus, while the 'objectivity' is preserved, 
it remains uniquely personal. 
Coleridge's poem is about the nature of poetic 
perception and creativity. The poem, enabling us to 'see', 
is not merely descriptive, but creative and illuminative (if 
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we will allow it), enlightening our abstractions from what we 
perceive so that perception becomes a realisation of the 
eternal through and in the temporal, the divine illumination 
no vision but a 'state of consciousness' or an 'inward 
experience 1 .36 Paralleling the Ideal Object or 'Idea' of the 
poem with the description of 1 symbol' 'in The Statesman's 
Manual, it may be characterised as 'the living educt of the 
Imagination 1 , 1 incorporating the Reason in Images of the 
Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by 
the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason 1 • 37 
The Ideal Object as it has been explored in this late 
poem, a process and not a thing, forged in the poet's 
creative genius, is the 'visible tip of the ontological 
iceberg' . 38 The shadowy ambiguities of the Bracken Spectre 
reflect back to Plato's cave-myth which finds a reference in 
'The Destiny of Nations', begun by Coleridge as early as 1796. 
If there be no divinity or eternal, then the polarity and 
ambiguity ceases to be creative, the rustic pursues in vain 
and the glory becoQes an illusion indeed. And yet the energy 
and the glory remain, obstinately. Indeed they presuppose 
and render intelligible the Reality not as it appears but as 
it is. Referring to the chariots of Ezekiel, Coleridge wrote 
in The Statesman's Manual: 
The truths and the symbols that represent them move 
in conjunction and form the living chariot that 37 bears up (for us) the throne of the Divine Humanity. 
This final reference raises a problem to which Coleridge 
gave some attention in his later writings. From what has 
been suggested, it might be said that the creative 
imagination of the poet is equally with the Bible a source 
of 'revelation'. Swiatecka, indeed, while acknowledging 
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that Coleridge held the Bible in very high regard, believes 
that he never really tackled the problem of its parity with 
other works wherein inspiration may reveal 'symbols of Truth, 
1 n 
actual tho 1 dim perceptions of it' .~v Yet it must be 
recognized that Coleridge had described the Bible as 'the 
Best Guide to Political Skill and Foresight' in the subtitle 
to The Statesman's Manual, and confessed that 'in the Bible 
there is more that finds me than I have experienced in all 
other books together', in the posthumously published 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit (1840). 41 In what way, 
therefore, is the Bible a more valuable, or even a more 
certain, source of divine revelation and illumination of the 
relationship between God and man, the infinite and finite, 
than any poetic process whose end is not so much a poem (an 
artifact), but a new awareness of Being and an intuition of 
the spiritual in man? 
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VII THE LATER PROSE AND NOTEBOOKS 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit is Coleridge's 
principal attack upon Bibliolatry, that unthinking reverence 
for the Bible which offends the rights of reason and rejects 
interpretation by means of an external frame of reference. 
His devotion to Scripture arises from an appeal to the whole 
experience of man, the Bible received inasmuch as it finds 
him 'at greater depths' of his being, bringing with it 'an 
irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Holy 
Spirit' . 1 Revelation must be authenticated in man's human 
essence. 'Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you 
can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it. •2 The first 
part of this chapter will examine how, in the task of 
reflection and self-discovery, man necessarily employs his 
faculties of reason and will in responding to divine 
initiative. The authentication of revelation, therefore, is 
the assent in a new and objective form to that to which he 
is already subjectively related. 3 
Second, and to return to the question with which chapter 
5 concluded, did Coleridge, poet and writer of narrative, 
reject the structure of what M. H. Abrams calls the 
'circuitous journey' from paradise through the Fall, 
redemption and back to paradise in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition? Anne Mellor believes he did. 4 Abrams himself 
holds to the structure but in a purely secularized form. 5 
However, the present argument, while maintaining Abrams' 
anatomy of the Christian - or, more strictly, Biblical -
pattern of history, would suggest that it flourished in 
Coleridge's imagination in the context of that 'polarity' 
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which was his constant preoccupation, and that together they 
found their final expression in the Trinitarian profession of 
faith and the Polar Logic of his last years. 
The final section of the chapter will give some 
consideration to Coleridge's great work, so long planned and 
unfulfilled. On 12 September 1814, he wrote to Daniel 
Stuart: 
The Title is: Christianity the one true Philosophy - or 
5 Treatises on the Logos, or communicative Intelligence, 
Natural, Human, and Divine:- to which is prefixed a 
prefatory Essay on the Laws & Limits of Toleration & 
Liberality illustrated by fragments of Auto-biography 
The first Treatise - Logos propaideuticos - or the 
science of systematic Thinking in ordinary Life - the 
second, Logos architectonicus, or an attempt to apply 
the constructive, or mathematical, Process to 
Metaphysics & Natural Theology - the Jrd -
(the divine Logos incarnate) a full Commentary on the 
Gospel of St. John, in development of St. Paul's 
doctrine of preaching Christ alone., & him Crucified -
the 4th, on Spinoza with a Life of B. Spinoza - this 
entitled, Logos Agonistes. 5th and last, Logos alogos 
(i.e. logos illogicus) or on modern Unitarianism, it's 
causes & effects- ... The purpose of the whole is-
a philosophical Defence of the Articles Df the Churc~, 
as far as they respect Doctrine, or points of Faith. 
It is arguable that through the literary development of his 
theory of symbol and the imagination, Coleridge left no real 
place in his thinking for the historical elements of 
Christianity, or for the particularity of Jesus Christ. 7 
Coleridge, certainly, was well aware of this danger, 
expressing a hope, in 1805: 
that my mind may be made up as to the character of 
Jesus, and of historical Christianity, as clearly as 
it is of Ghri~t the Logos an§ intellectual or 
spiritual Christianity ..... 
It will be suggested that, by his Polar Logic, Coleridge 
recognized both the 1 ideal 1 and the historical element of 
Christianity, that revelation was neither wholly outward nor 
wholly inward,9 and that, like the poles of a magnet, these 
two elements suppose and require each other in the Christian 
profession. 
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l. Revelation and Radical Evil 
Coleridge's comments on revealed religion in Confessions 
of an Inquiring Spirit as 1 in its highest contemplation the 
unity, that is, the identity or co-inherence, of Subjective 
and Objective', have been briefly noted in chapter 5. 10 He 
described it further as 1at once inward life and Truth, and 
outward Fact and Luminary'. The second section of this 
chapter will be more concerned with this 'outward Fact and 
Luminary' of revealed religion, that is, Coleridge's views 
on the Trinity or the incarnation and its place in the scheme 
of redemption. For the present,~ attention will be given to 
the 'inward life and Truth', and more particularly to 
Coleridge's later understanding of an early preoccupation, 
original sin in man: also to the means, in man, by which it 
may be overcome and grace received. Comparison will be made 
between Coleridge's writings and the work of Kant in Die 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (1793) 
and, to a lesser extent, Fichte in Versuch einer Kritik aller 
Offenbarung (1792), which was first thought to have been the 
work of Kant. 11 In no sense is this intended to be an 
exhaustive examination of Coleridge's r~lationship with the 
Germans, but a specific and highly selective study of his 
thinking on revealed religion in one doctrinal area. 
As a poet, Coleridge kept distinguished company with 
others who, in various ways, had defended the authority of 
revelation. To this end, John Dryden, a convinced Roman 
Catholic, had composed The Hind and the Panther (1687). 
Blake, religiously idiosyncratic, declared that 'there is no 
natural religion• 12 and that revelation was not something 
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invented but given. This study has traced the continuous 
processes in Coleridge's poetry and prose which culminated in 
his later years in his clear affirmation of a Christian 
belief. His practice as a poet and literary critic may not 
be separated from his philosophical reading embracing Boehme, 
the Cambridge Platonists, David Hartley, and finally Kant and 
German idealism. It was on the foundations of a revised 
epistemology learned principally from Kant and Fichte, that 
Coleridge established his poetic defense of a revealed 
religion on a philosophical basis. However, what for him 
provided the confirmation of Christian b'e:lief, implied for 
these Germans the ultimate withering away of positive 
religion, for it was the requirements of rational morality 
which lay at the heart of their philosophy of religion. 
Epistemological considerations apart, however, there is clear 
evidence that Coleridge's experience of a life wrecked by 
opium, an ill-advised marriage and constitutional indecision, 
led him to a deep sympathy with Kant's assertion of radical 
evil in human nature, the innate tendency to depart from the 
maxims of morality, the 'Anti-type of a the (sic) moral Law' 
as Coleridge described this 1Kantian idea' . 13 It was a view 
which Kant himself explicitly connected with the traditional 
Christian sources of the doctrine of original sin. 14 Thus 
when Coleridge, in the 1Confessio Fidei' asserts that 1 1 
believe, and hold it as the fundamental article of 
Christianity, that I am a fallen creature', he is following 
Kant, and in a more veiled form Fichte, in their identification 
of moral evil as a necessary precondition of religion f 5 
Religion is essentially concerned with the problem of 
how man is to overcome the radical evil within him which 
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diverts him from fulfilling the moral law. In Biographia 
Literaria Coleridge drew heavily on Schelling's System des 
transcendentalen Idealismus (1800) in the philosophical 
demonstration of the saving lntuition which is reached, not 
by the processes characteristic of the 'understanding', but 
by a sudden revelation. Schelling had written: 
All misunderstanding of the transcendental philosophy 
is due, notLany unintelligibility in that philosophy, 
but to a lack of the organ by which it must be 
apprehended ..... Unless a man already brings the 
transcendental way of thinking with him, the 
transcendental philosophy must always be found 
unintelligible. It is therefore necessary that one 
insert oneself into this manner of 1~hinking at the 
outset, through an act of freedom. 
The operation of rescue from man's fallen state, which is 
the primary task of religion, is achieved in a manner 
parallel to the acquisition of philosophical apprehension, by 
an initial ~ct of freedom' through which the light of 
revelation shines. Coleridge is paraphrasing Schelling in 
Biographia when he writes: 
To an Esquimaux or New Zealander our most popular 
philosophy would be wholly unintelligible. The 
sense, the inward organ for it, is not yet born 
in him. So is there many a one among us, yes, and 
some who think themselves philosophers too, to whom 
the philosophic organ is entirely wanting. To such 
a man philosophy is a mere play of words and notions, 
like a theory of music to the dr7f, or like the 
geometry of light to the blind. 
This act of freedom by which man learns to receive what 
revelation presents is dealt with at length in Aids to 
Reflection (1825), where it is described as faith. Drawing 
upon Kant, modified by Friedrich Jacobi, 18 Coleridge 
distinguished between 1tinderstanding 1 and 'reason' to make 
the point that man's unassisted powers of understanding are 
inadequate, but that, drawn through this inadequacy, he may 
reach a faith in unseen realities. Repeatedly in Aids, 
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Coleridge asserts that faith is not reason 'per se', but 
reason acting together with the will. In the same way in 
1 Kubla Khan' the poetic vision must be structured by the will, 
the conscious, recollective act of the poet. Coleridge had 
also stated this long before in an early marginal note on 
Kant's Religion. 
The total Energy of II Will, the one act of the whole 
Being, which alike can produce thif9state, is Gospel Faith. By Faith we are justified. 
Faith, therefore, while dependent on divine initiative, 
employs man's total capability of reason and will. It is 
not indeed an inferior sort of knowledge, but rather a 
knowledge at first hand. A contemporary commentator on 
Jacobi described it succinctly. 
Of actual existence there are not two kinds of 
knowledge, an a priori and an a posteriori, but only 
one, the a posteriori, through sensation (Empfindung). 
And since all knowledge which does not arise a priori 
is faith, therefore all real knowledge depends upon 
faith, since things must first be given before one 2 ~s in a position to apprehend relations between them. 
Coleridge adopts precisely this position in The Friend 
(1818), where he asserts that religion 'through her sacred 
oracles' confirms that 'all effective faith pre-supposes 
k 1 d d • d • • d 1 . t • I 21 now e ge an ln lVl ua convlc lOn . Later in the same 
essays he refers to St. Paul for whom perfection is the 
'intuitive beholding of truth in its eternal and immutable 
source'. (p.l05). Since this intuitive beholding is also 
the necessary exercise of man's will and reason, Coleridge 
is drawn towards .the vision of the divine which both enhances 
and is conveyed by man's knowledge and controili of himself. 22 
As has already been noted, this image of reflection is 
elaborately explored in the poem 'Limbo', and implied in the 
double meaning of the title Aids to Reflection. 
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These remarks on St. Paul, which first appeared in The 
Friend No. 5, 14 September 1809, appear to have been drawn 
from a lengthy notebook entry entitled 'On Certainty', dating 
?1 
probably from August-September 1809.-/ Certainly, the 
condition of the true believer, which is the 'fixed and 
necessary Relation of Object to Subject', is established: 
... not merely from the logical completeness of my 
Intuitions, Notions, Judgements and Elementary 
Positions in themselves and in their relation to my 
particular conviction, but far more from the degree 
of my confidence in their absolute truth, in their 
independence on choice and chance and individual 
temperament, that my conduct is determined. 
Faith which is inspired by certainty, as Coleridge remarked 
in a letter to De Quincey, is 'intuitively distinguished from 
a mere d l . f 1 . f p . . I 24 e USlVe ee ~ng o os~t~veness . It is a gathering 
of the intelligence and faculties in a willed response to 
that which is given and ultimately determines the conduct of 
life. \1/hile intuition plays an essential role in the 
establishment of certainty, Coleridge clearly affirms that 
such faith is the response of 'a well-disciplined mind', and, 
as has already been suggested, such a willing suspension of 
disbelief is central to his literary theory. 25 In the 
experience of dramatic performance, as in the reception of 
revealed religion, there is no mere falling into ~dl~ 
delusion, but a conscious and intelligent respect for 
intuition, 1 a voluntary Lending of the Will to this 
. f f . t I t • I 26 su spens lOll o one o 1 s own opera- 1ons . Some sixty 
years after Coleridge wrote The Friend, Cardinal Newman in 
the Grammar of Assent (1870) was expounding the role of the 
'illative sense', that is the faculty of judging from given 
facts by processes outside the limits of strict logic, in 
reaching religious certitude. Newman was well acquainted 
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with Coleridge's writing and aware of its importance. 27 
Considering, therefore, Coleridge's aesthetic and literary 
concerns in his developing notions of faith and certainty, it 
may be worth noting that in the early drafts of the Grammar 
of Assent, what became the distinction between notional and 
real assent, had been between notional and imaginative 
28 
assent. In a manner in which Coleridge would undoubtedly 
have approved, Newman describes the act of real assent as 
'imaginative' because it is a creative act by which the 
fulness of personal identity is achieved. Such a completed 
personality, by drawing many things into one, becomes 'a 
whole complete in itself 12 9 and is given an absolute value. 
Faith is the result of a combination of intelligence 
receptive to a given revelation. Returning to the essay in 
The Friend (1818) with its suggestion of St. Paul as a mystic, 
Coleridge is careful to maintain a balance between intellect 
and intuitive response in religious matters. 
Not that knowledge can of itself do all! That light 
of religion is not that of the moon, light without 
heat; but neither is its warmth that of the stove, 
warmth without light. 
The same point had been made in a notebook entry as early as 
the late summer of l802.30 
Having examined that faith whereby man may achieve the 
fulness of being of which he is deprived by inherent evil, 
the value to Coleridge of Kant and Fichte in the formulation 
of his theological response to sin and evil must now be 
demonstrated. The principal texts for this are The Friend 
in the 1rifacimento 1 of 1818 and the Philosophical Lectures 
delivered in 1818-19. In The Friend Coleridge regards the 
act of commitment to religion as a balance of faculti~s 
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involving two poles. The Sun, indeed, 'makes all objects 
glorious on which it looks', (they reflect its glor0, while 
faith 'presupposes knowledge and individual conviction'. 
Indeed as 1 in every work of art there is a reconcilement of 
the external with the internal' , 31 the historical assurance 
received from revelation must be fused with the individual as 
a moral and responsible person. Later in The Friend, in the 
'Essays on the Principles of Method', faith as affirming and 
affirmed, is described as 
an eternal and infinite self-rejoicing, self-loving, 
with a joy unfathomable, with a love all comprehensive. 
It is absolute; and the absolute is neither singly 
that which affirms, nor that which is a5~irmed; but 
the identity and living copula of both. 
Thus the 'Law of Polarity' is established as an important 
philosophical foundation for both The Friend and the 
Philosophical Lectures. In the posthumously published 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit its centrality in the 
matter of religion is reaffirmed, inasmuch as Religion has 
1 its objective, or historic and ecclesiastical pole, and its 
subjective, or spiritual and individual pole', in a 'harmony 
of correspondent Opposites' . 33 
I Th F d d th P 3 4 G . d n e rien an e hilosophical Lectures lor ano 
Bruno is credited with the promotion and application of the 
law of polarity to 'Logic', 'Physics' and 1 Netaphysics 1 • 
Coleridge expands the basic definition that 'all oppositi0n 
is a tendency to re-union'. 
The Principle may be thus expressed. The Identity 
of Thesis and Antithesis is the substan~e of all 
Being; their Opposition is the condition of all 
Existence, or Being manifested; and every Thing or 
Phaenomenon is the Exponent of a Synthesis as long 
as the opposite energies are retained in that Synthesis. 35 
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'Polar logic' links the many facets of Coleridge's thinking 
and practice. The characterisation of symbol in the 
Scriptures in The Statesman's Manual as the 'translucence 
of ... the General in the Especial' closely resembles the 
description in The Friend of Shakespeare's genius for 
portraying utterly individual characters springing from a 
firm foundation in the universa1. 36 It hints at what, in a 
letter of 1817, is promised for the third volume of The 
Friend - that is a discussion of 'the great results of this 
Philosophy Lof the law of polarit~7 in it's relation to 
Ethics and Theology' . 37 In The Friend it is barely dealt 
with, and hardly alluded to in the Philosophical Lectures. 
The promise comes closest to fulfilment in the elusive, 
deeply religious and prayerful later notebooks, at present 
still only available in manuscript form in the British 
Library. 
In the Philosophical Lectures Coleridge is reported to 
have affirmed that 'there is through all nature, and we must 
assume it as a ground of all reasoning, a perpetual tendency 
at once to individualize and yet to universalize' . 38 This 
~e~ 
state1 was expanded into his 'trichotomous logic' in the 
context of Christian doctrine in 1 0n the Philosophic Import 
of the Words Object and Subject' (Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine LVI (1821) 246-52), and at more length in the still 
unpublished Notebook 26 which also dates from the early 
1820 1 s. The two poles of the act of commitment, the universal 
assurance from revelation and the moral and intelligent 
response of the individual, raise the question of the will 
and the relationship between the individual and the Absolute 
Will, and further how free the individual is to fall into 
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sin or choose the way of salvation. The logical figure 
drawn in the notebook introduces the mesothesis of the Self 
as 1 the point of indifference' between the positive pole of 
'actual good' and the negative pole of 1 potential evil'. 
Man finds himself in this neutral position as a result of 
the Fall. There was a time when 'the individual will in 
harmony with the Acrsolute Will was in positive potency'. 
Th~n indeed, the individual discovered himself most fully, 
and realized his potential in the universal. For such a 
state man still yearns. 'Negative potency', however, lies 
in the individual will 'willing itself individual' and 
forsaking its sense of harmony with the Absolute and the 
universal. Thus it falls 'into apostasy and Original Sin 1 • 39 
Such is man's position. Why, epistemologically, was 
Kant so attractive as Coleridge moved towards a Christian 
response to the problem? Coleridge recognized in him a 
means of reconciling two hitherto opposing epistemological 
schools, the empiricist and the rationalist. For the former, 
truth was to be elicited only from experience; for the 
1 tt 1 b d d t . f . . . . 1 40 a er, on y y e uc 1on rom a pr~or~ pr1nc1p es. For 
Kant, experience was, indeed governed by the a priori 
functions of the mind. Thus he preserved the polarity of 
the individual and the universal, and retained the possibility 
of harmony with the Absolute, with the corresponding escape 
from wilful individualism. Kant and Coleridge rejected the 
assumption that the mind of man was passive, a tabula rasa. 
For Kant, the mind generates things which in thinking, a 
priori, are logicallj presupposed by experience though 
not necessarily temporally antecedent.41 Coleridge's 
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annotations of the relevent passages in the Kritik der 
Urtheilskraft (1790) eventually appeared in the 'Essays on 
the Principl~s of Method'. 
Nay, it must not be overlooked, that the assumption of 
the nexus effectivus itself originates in the mind, as 
one of the laws under which alone it can reduce the 
manifold of the impression from witho~2 into unity, 
and thus contemplate it as one thing. 
Be~ Kant and Coleridge, therefore, derive their position 
from Leibniz 1 s completion of the empiricist maxim, 'there is 
nothing in the mind that does not come through the senses' -
1 excipe, nisi intellectus ipse' (except the mind itself.) 43 
In his analysis of the knowing process in the Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft (rev. ed. 1787), Kant provided a ladder 
for Coleridge to. rebuild a theology after the destructive 
processes of David Hume and the empiricists. It was possible 
now to gather together the treasures of Ralph Cudworth (1617-
88) and the Cambridge Pla~tonists who, like Coleridge and 
Kant, had also believed in the activity of the mind. 
Coleridge was also familiar with James Beattie (1735-1803) 
and the Scottish schonl of philosophers who were opposing 
Hume. Beattie, in his once-celebrated Essays on the Nature 
and Immutability of Truth (1776) had written: 
The argument a priori might be comprehended in the 
following works. If there be any creatures in human 
shape, who deny the distinction between truth and 
falsehood, or who are unconscious of that distinction, 
they are far beyond the reach, and below the notice 
of, philosophy, and therefore have no concern in this 
inquiry. Whoever is sensible of that distinction, 
and is willing to acknowledge it, must confess that 
truth is something fixed and determinate, depending 
not upon man, but upon the Author of nature. The 
fundamental principles of truth must therefore rest 
upon their own evi~~nce, perceived intuitively by 
the understanding. 
Beattie, like Coleridge later, was arguing from a 
position of Christian profession~ but this fundamentally 
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moral concern to establish an absolute distinction between 
right and wrong lay at the root of the pervasive influence of 
Fichte 1 s more tangentially Christian Versuch einer Kritik 
aller Offenbarung on The Friend. Coleridge commended Fichte 
in Biographia for ~ommencing with an act, instead of a thing 
or substance' and thus supplying 'the idea of a system truly 
metaphysical, and of a metaphysique truly systematic: (i.e. 
having its spring and principle within itself.) • 45 This 
provided a foundation stone for the 'Essays on the Principles 
of Method'. According to Fichte: 
The essential element of revelation in general is the 
proclamation of God as moral lawgiver thro~gh a 
supernatural effect in the world of sense. 
By setting up moral examples, revelation can 'clothe its 
morality in narratives, and it only meets the needs of man 
all the better when it does so' .47 Coleridge and Fichte 
believed that the matter of religion and Christian doctrine, 
'such, for instance, as the tenets of original sin and of 
redemption, those fundamental articles of every known 
religion professing to have been revealed' , 48 had a practical 
and moral application in the nature of things and in the 
necessities of human nature. Coleridge required practical 
assistance to enable him to face the tragedy of his life. 
Belief was a necessity of life, not of speculation, and 
Fichte's strong moral emphasis in his examination of 
revelation was suitably practical. Unfortunately he sees 
religion, in the end, simply as that which brings clarity to 
morality, a kind of supplementary moral incentive which may 
not even be universally required. 49 For Coleridge, on the 
other hand, the 'mysteries of faith' are fundamental to man's 
moral salvation.5° 
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Kant, like Fichte, was limited for Coleridge's purposes, 
for while he may have recognized the claims of psychology, 
his work is not open to psychological interpretation. 
Coleridge, however, was a continuous and acute psychological 
observer, and from his observations and reflections emerge 
his need for religious assurance. It is true that throughout 
The Friend, in Biographia Literaria and in Omniana (1812), 
Coleridge specifically praises the Kantian a priori. 51 But 
his reading of Kant, as has already been remarked, was 
modified by Jacobi who had gone so far as to call reason 
faith, a definition w~th which Coleridge would have concurred 
had Jacobi added to reason the element of the will, making 
it, in short, reason in active operation. The Kantian a 
priori, with the notion of 'ideas' , 52 were for Coleridge 
matters of deep religious concern in the life of man. It is 
clear that by 1820 he was developing what he had learnt from 
Kant beyond the position of the master. What is begun in the 
MS Logic (?1822-3) as a discussion of 'the reason ... as the 
source of principles' , 53 is continued in the three volumes of 
papers dating from Coleridge's last years, housed in the 
library of Victoria College, Toronto, and now described as 
the Opus Maximum. There, in an extensive philosophical 
demonstration of the truths of Christianity, Coleridge refers 
to the un-Christian elements in Kant. While for Kant 'moral 
law' is primary, for Coleridge it is 'good will'. The 
passage, with its rejection of Kant's rigorism, is anticipated 
in a letter to J. H. Green of 13 December 1817. 
I reject Kant's stoic principle, as false, unnatural, 
and even immoral, where in his Critik der Practischen 
VernunL-f 7t he treats the affections as indifferent 
( ~~l~~op~-) in ethics, -and would persuade us that a 
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man who disliking, and without any feeling of Love 
for, Virtue yet acted virtuously, be~ause and only 
because it was his Duty, is more worthy of our 
esteem, than the man whose affections were a±dant 
to, and congruous with, his Conscience. For it would 
imply little less than that things not the Objects 
of the moral Will or under it's controul were yet 
indispensable to it's due practical direction. In 
other words, it would subvert his own System. -
Likewise, his re~~rks on PRAYER in his RELIGION 
innerhalb d.r.V. are crass, nay vulgar; and as 
superficial even in psychology as they are low in 
taste. - But with these exceptions I rever5~ce 
Immanuel Kant with my whole heart and soul. 
What, then, may be said of the relationship of Coleridge's 
notion of original sin to Kant's and Fichte 1 s of radical 
evil? The linkage in Coleridge between his 'trichotomous 
logic' and the doctrine of the Fall with its evil 
consequences has already been noted. Furthermore in The 
Friend, the Philosophical Lectures and the Logic he locates 
the origin of this logic in Heraclitus, Giordano Bruno and 
the English divine Richard Baxter (1615-91). Whether or not 
his location is correct, 56 Coleridge is at pains to 
dissociate the trichotomy which is so central to his own 
thought from Kant and apply it to the Christian Baxter. 57 
The pivot of the Coleridgean doctrine is the degree of 
freedom in the individual to fall into sin or to choose the 
way of salvation. It was noted in chapter 5 that in the 
Biographia, and following Schelling, Coleridge writes of 
despatialized time or 'time per se 1 , which is not 'extended' 
but concentrated into one moment or compresent. The true 
'self' experiences everything simultaneously. He concludes 
that 
it would require only a different and appropriate 
organization - the body celestial instead of the body 
terrestrial - to bring before every human soul the 
collective experience of its whole past existence ..... 
Yea, in the very nature of a living spirit, it may be 
more possible that heaven and earth should pass away, 
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than that a single act, a single thought, should be 
loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, 
with all the links of which, conscious or unconscious, 
the free will, ~Mr only absolute Self, is co-extensive 
and co-present. 
For Coleridge, therefore, the 1free will 1 or 1absolute Self 1 
was supratemporal. Kant's Religion was an attempt to give a 
philosophical justification for moral freedom. Rather like 
Coleridge, Kant denied that true freedom could exist in the 
spatia-temporal world since there subjection to the laws of 
causality would make wery action dependent on its antecedent. 
Freedom presupposes something in the individual which is 
absolutely uncaused, 59 and must be attributed to a 'noumenal 
Ego 1 • (Coleridge in his marginalia on Kant distinguishes at 
length between the 'Homo Novp-t.""V0"\1 1 and the 'Homo 
~~~yor£voY '. 60 ) Yet this freedom manifests itself in man's 
temporal behaviour as a whole, without interfering with the 
activity of antecedent causes in the determination of that 
behaviour. 
Although in his discussion of radical evil Kant more 
61 than once refers to the biblical account of the Fall, the 
connection between 'radical evil' and 'original sin' must not 
be regarded as identification. Emil L. Fackenheim neatly 
summarizes Kant's position. 
\) 
Original sin is a state in which I am obligated to a 
law which I am nevertheless unable to obey. It is a 
paradoxical condition. Man can recognize but not 
overcome this condition; to overcome it requires an 
act of divine grace. To Kant the state of original 
sin is a moral and metaphysical impossibility. For 
he categorically den~es the possibility of a 
situation in which there is a moral ob~~gation 
without a corresponding moral freedom. 
Above all Kant is concerned to preserve man's moral freedom. 
A religious doctrine which assumed a sinfulness inherited 
from Adam and a restoration effected ultimately only by the 
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unmerited grace of God, was to him intolerable. Moral action 
lies at the core of the religious life, and anything other 
than good conduct done to please God is mere 'pseudo-service' . 63 
For Fichte, the task of revelation is to bring morality to 
the soul, 64 and in the end religion merely provides a 
supplementary incentive to moral obedience, while for Kant it 
serves also the purpose of clarifying the final aims of 
morality. What is clear is that for both men, redemption is 
seen primarily in moral terms and is an act of self-redemption, 
although Kant does hint at a doctrine of divine grace. 65 
However, the original perversion toward evil and the act of 
self-conversion in its rejection are both undeniably 
unintelligible, actions ex nihilo, yet, Kant maintains: 
A man (can) reverse ... by a single unchangeable 
decision, that highest ground of his maxims where~~ 
he was an evil man (and thus put on the new man). 
This chilling conclusion, wherein man is burdened with 
a lonely responsibility to choose between good and evil, could 
hardly be expected to satisfy Coleridge, deeply sensible as 
he was of himself as a miserable sinner. Indeed, in his 
treatment of depravity and the sinner who actively wills evil 
he is in basic disagreement with the sentimentalism of the 
eighteenth century moralists - Shaftesbury, Hartley, Price, 
Priestley, Paley and Godwin - for whom innate evil is little 
more than weakness. It is true that Kant himself in the 
Kritik der praktischen Vernvnft (1788) had proposed an 
account of moral freedom in which man's propensity to evil 
was due not so much to an act of will as to a lack of will, 
k th th . 11 . 67 Th. . h 1 t a wea ness ra er an a vl alny. lS vlew e a er 
rejects in the Religion since it does not account for a 
genuine freedom and responsibility to choose betweengood and 
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evil. Coleridge, taking his cue from the distinction between 
reason and understanding, adopted Kant's placement of 
radical evil in the noumenal Ego, problematically related to 
the sequence of natural events. But here, where Kant's 
purpose was to give an adequate philosophical justification 
of moral freedom, Coleridge parts company with him inasmuch 
as for him the traditional religious notion of original sin 
is upheld. His purpose was certainly not the philosophical 
demonstration of individual freedom, for at variance with this 
freedom were his acceptance of the Augustinian doctrine of 
creation (and therefore of the Fall) and his sense of the 
d . . . 68 lVlne omnlpresence. His real concerns are hinted at in 
the marginal note on Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten (1785). 
If I say, I doubt this independence of Love on the Will, 
and doubt even Love's being in it's essence merely eine 
Sache der Empfindung, a mere matter of feeling, i.e. a 
somewhat found in us which is not of and from us (Emp 
(= in sich) - Findung, I mean only that my Thoughts are 
not distinct much less adequate on the subject - and I 
am not able to Lcoglvey any ground of my Belief of the 
contrary. But the c.ontrary I do believe. What Kant // 
affirms of Man in the state of.Adam, an ineffable act 
of the will choosing evil & which is underneath or 
within the consciousness tho' incarnate in the conscience, 
inasmuch as it must be conceived as taking place in the 
Homo Nov~Evov , not the Homo c\:>o(t-vo\;kE-o.fo-v - something 
like this 6 ~ conceive of Love - in that highest sense of the Word. 
Coleridge is at pains to deny that he is pursuing a 
philosophical argument. 'Love' is found in us yet not of or 
from us and should best be equated with divine grace acting 
independently on the will in contradiction to the ineffable 
operations of original sin. Thus Coleridge deduces from the 
presence of radical evil in man the necessity for a 
supernatural and vicarious means of redemption which is 
communicated by divine revelation. His Christian conclusion 
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is summed up in the 'Confessio Fidei'. 
I receive with full and grateful Faith the assurance 
of Revelation, that the Word which is from all 
eternity with God and is God, assumed our human 
nature in order to redeem me and all mankind from 
this our connate Corruption. My reason convinces 
me, that no other mode of redemption is conceivable, 
and, as did Socrates, would have yearned after the 
Redeemer, tho' it would not dare expe~t so wonderful 
an Act of Divine Love, except only as an effort of 
my mind to conceive the7etmost of the infinite greatness of that Love! 
Elinor Shaffer has suggested that in Aifis to RefLect~of\ 
Coleridge was arguing specifically against Kant in Die 
71 Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. 
Basing himself on Kantian epistemology, Coleridge's task was 
to develop and justify a mode of thought which was religious, 
aesthetic,and moral without sacrificing rationality. The 
present argument assumes, as does Dr. Shaffer, the legitimacy 
of Coleridge's tendency to read Kant as a cold rationalist, 
while aware that such a reading is, to say the least, 
questionable. 72 The argument in Aids focusses upon the 
problem of radical evil in man and the means of dealing with 
it. For Coleridge, the belief in freedom through self-
determination is merely an assertion of the finite will. 
True freedom is only to be found as the individual will draws 
nearer and becomes one with the Absolute Will. Thus the 
paradoxes that 'service is perfect freedom' and 'in his will 
is our peace' were endlessly fascinating to Coleridge. 
Coleridge certainly does not want to exclude speculative 
reason from theology, 73 nor would he see any contrariety 
between Revelation and Understanding. 7 4 But this is not to 
deny the intuitive and unfinished nature of religious 
experience and that 'Christianity is not a Theory, or a 
Speculation; but a Life; not a Philosophy of Life, but a Life 
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and a living Process' . 75 The willing and thinking individual 
is a pilgrim on a road which, ultimately, must exclude Kant's 
pride of reason, and wherein grace, which for Kant may not 
have been impossible but was certainly unprovable, was 
divinely offered to be received with humility76 and not as 
man makes himself morally able to receive it. Dr. Shaffer 
links Coleridge's position with Erasmus' delicate humanism 
which Luther denied. This allowed room for the exercise of 
the free will in the context of unmerited divine grace, 
leaving, indeed, an important task for human endeavour and 
merit while avoiding 'the self~defeating presumption of 
Kant's religion of reason' . 77 
Let Coleridge himself have the final word in an entry in 
his final notebook, dated March 1834, some four months 
before his death. 
0 grace of God! if only a believing mind were 
thoroughly purged from the refracting film of 
nominalism; if it could indeed be possessed by and 
possess, the full Idea of th~ Reality of the 
Absolut~ State, the_Good. LTh~7 yet hi~her shall 
I see Lo~7 deeper Lthi~7 reality, the LState(?l7 
as the ground essentially causative of all real 
Being, and th~refore essentially of it 1 s own 
Being - the Lstat~7 super-personal, and transcenQ.in~ 
all relations, and by an eternal act affi~min~ Lit~/ 
own Being, eternally self-personal, the LI AM/ and 
by the adjunct of personeity & the absolute Good 
with the HQly I AM - as the Good absolutely 
begotten Lhi~l adeq~~te Image in the Tr'-le, the 
supreme Reason ..••• 
2. 1 0 mystery of loving-kindness! 1 Polar Logic in the Late 
Notebooks 
According to Abrams the Biblical pattern of history has 
~ive distinctive attributes. 79 First it is finite, 
representing events happening once for all and uniquely, as 
opposed to the doctrine that history simply repeats itself. 
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In Coleridge's own narrative poetry it is the arbitrariness 
and uniqueness of events which is stressed; the shooting of 
the albatross, or Christabel 1 s discovery of Geraldine. 
Second, the design of Biblical history is a well-formed plot 
carried through by a clear sequence of dramatic events. The 
sequence of fall, restoration and reintegration shapes both 
'The Ancient Mariner' and the 'Confessio Fidei,'. Third, 
behind the Biblical history is a hidden author, its director 
and the guarantor of the future. Again, such is implied in 
the counter-pointing of narrative levels in 'The Ancient 
Mariner' or the blurring in 1 Kubla Khan' of the poet's 
conscious creative act with the infinite mystery of his 
vision. Fourth, the key events of the Biblical narrative 
are abrupt and precipitous. Suddenly, out of nothing the 
world is created by divine fiat. Abruptly, the reader is 
thrown into the middle of the great narrative poems: 'It is 
an ancient Mariner': 'Tis the middle of night by the castle 
clock'. ( 1Christabel 1 ). Finally, the Biblical scheme is 
sym~etrical, concluding where it began in 1 a new Earth and 
new Heaven'. And if the beginning is retrospective, the end 
is infinitely prospective, stretching out to embrace a 
universal vision, ever fulfilled and ever waiting to be 
fulfilled anew. 
As will be seen, in his last writings - copious notes 
on the Pentateuch, the Pauline epistles, the Acts of the 
Apostles and the Fourth Gospel - Coleridge returned to his 
life-long study of the Scriptures which, above all other 
writings, illuminate human experience and the highest demands 
of our moral nature. It was the design of Biblical history 
in the Old and New Testaments which nourished his most 
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creative poetry, and it was from his experience as a poet 
that, as critic, philosopher and theologian, Coleridge began 
to articulate his Polar Logic. This, in turn, provides the 
foundation for the Trinitarian faith of the late notebooks, 
which is expounded with such passion and prayerfulness. 
The origins and pattern of Polar Logic have been well-
rehearsed, and it lies outside the purposes of the present 
study to repeat them at length. Owen Barfield, in a book 
whose purpose might be described as the demonstration that 
polarity is at the root of what Coleridge thought, argues 
from that, that the content of self-consciousness is always 
t . 80 rl-une. In Polar Logic, the 'higher third' or the 
Identity is the point of reconciliation of the two poles, and 
in the notebooks, Christ is repeatedly described as the 
Identity of the divine tri-unity. Coleridge's progress 
towards Trinitarian orthodoxy by the metaphysical path of 
Polar Logic is first fully exemplified as early as October 
1806, in a letter to Thomas Clarkson. 
God is the sole self-comprehending Being, i.e. he has 
an Idea of himself, and that Idea is consummately 
adequate, & superlatively real- ..... This Idea 
therefore from all eternity co-existing with, & yet 
filiated, by the absolute Being .•. is the same, as 
the Father in all things, but the impossible one, 
of self-origination. He is the substantial Image 
of God, in whom the Father beholds well-pleased his 
whole Being - and being substantial ( o\1-oo:\.Jo-,os ) he 
of divine and permanent Will, and a necessity which 
is the absolute opposition of compulsion, as 
delightedly & with as intense LOVE contemplates the 
Father in the Father, and the Father in himself, and 
himself in the Father. But all the actions ... 
proceed co-eternally both from the Father and the 
Son - & neither of these Three can be c6nceived 
apart, nor confusedly - so th~I the Idea of God 
involves that of a Tri-unity. 
Both Owen Barfield and David Newsome have examined in some 
detail the origins of Coleridge's Polar Logic, whether 
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Giordano Bruno (as Coleridge claims in Biographia Literaria 82 ), 
Richard Baxter, Schelling or the Pythagorean tetractys. 83 
Whatever the truth, Newsome warns of the difficulty of 
following Coleridge through the various figures which he 
employs in the description of polarity, for he 'frequently 
employed more figures than three, sometimes setting out his 
position as a pentad, occasionally as a heptad, and based them 
all on the mystical Pythagorean symbol of the tetractys, a 
triangular figure of ten points, rising from a base of four, 
the whole representing the Supreme Being' . 84 
The commonest of these figures is the Noetic Pentad, 
already described in chapter 5. 85 Newsome, Boulger and J. 
Robert Barth in Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Harvard, 
1969) have variously described the importance of the Noetic 
Pentad, or dialectical triad in the final development of 
Coleridge's interpretation of Christian doctrine. Only 
David Pym, in The Religious Thought of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge (1978) would dissociate the Trinity of the Coleridge 
of faith from that of the philosopher, from 'the over-
ambitious side of Coleridge's mind, the weakness in indulging 
in idle speculation•. 86 
In fact, Coleridge's late notebooks are a remarkable 
example of a wholeness of being, and the creation of unity 
out of diversity which characterizes all his work. Philosophy, 
theology, imagination and faith are drawn together with 
intellectual and scholarly humility. A valuable introduction 
to them might be the description of The Pentad of Operative 
Christianity with which he prefaces Confessions of an 
Inquiring Spirit. 
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The Scriptures, the Spirit, and the Church, are co-
ordinate; the indispensable conditions and the 
working causes of the perpetuity, and continued. 
renascence and spiritual life of Christ still 
militant. The Eternal Word, Christ from everlasting, 
is the Prothesis, or identity; - the Scriptures and 
the Church are the two poles, or Thesis and 
Antithesis; and the Preacher in direct line under 
the Spirit, but likewise the point of junction of 
the Written Word and the Church, is t~7 Synthesis. 
This is God's Hand in the World. 
Page after page of Coleridge's last notebook consist of an 
extended meditation on this figure, in a tone of rapt 
devotion. They focus upon the mystery of Jesus Christ, the 
Prothesis or Identity, which gives coherence to all polarity; 
the self (Ipseity) and the other (Alterity), the subjective 
and objective, the individual and ecclesiastical, the 
historical and the 'ideal'. 
Unity and Disunity in the Alterity of the Infinite 
in essence a Finite in form - a thus absolute - and 
in the Identity in the Ipseity begets itself as 
Ipseity in the Alterity, yet still as Alterity - and 
hence the [adoration definitely7 in unity of the 
absolute < > and the Universal, of the Center and 
the Sphere - o how with inspired wi~dom and 
eloquence set f~8th in the first chapter of St. 
John's Gospel-
The Biblical commentaries which form such a large part of 
these later notebooks are no dry, academic exercises. 
Coleridge distinguishes between the 1historico-critical 
intellective study' of Scripture, and 'the praying of the 
same 1 , the latter being 1 in the spirit of appreciation to our 
own wants and troubles 1 • 89 
The same Notebook 41 is given over almost entirely to a 
consideration of the Pauline epistles and to 'the establishing 
of sound principles of interpretation•. 90 In Notebook 42, 
Coleridge embarks on the Pentate~ch, first endeavouring to 
define the 'Christian philosopher'. He is: 
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... a Man of Science, a Physiologist, Naturalist, well 
studied in Geology and Oryctognosy - Lastly, he is a 
sound Biblical critic, who prizes ~~d reverences the 
Bible tho 1 not a Bibliolater ..... 
Throughout these commentaries, Coleridge applies a 'philosophic 
imagination' ,92 a combination. of poetic insight and academic 
rigour in an over-arching context of prayer, thanksgiving 
and a sense that sin is a universal condition requiring the 
action of divine grace. 93 Notebook 46 contains a commentary 
on Numbers 36, Psalms 107 and 91. Coleridge's reflections on 
the psalms give rise to a comment on the 'two laws of the 
imagination': 
... first, that we recollect co-incidents, rather than 
incidents without any co-incident - a second, that a 
part being given~4 the excited imagination tends to produce a whole. 
Scripture, like many other works of literature, is a product 
of the imagination, both as insight and creative power, 
authoritative inasmuch as it provides the basic design for 
subsequent narrative and because, even in the fallible 
record of the Bible, 'whatever finds me, bears witness for 
itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit' . 95 This 
reference to the imagination leads into Coleridge's final 
note on the psalms, which is a return to the figure of the 
tetractys, combining man's imaginative creativity and 
religious aspirations. 
In each form of the Tetractys we find a distinct 
object of aspiration -
l - The Absolute Subject 
2 - The I AM 
3 - The Word 
4 - The Spirit 
- the Good 
- Duty 
- Light 96 Life. 
Through Coleridge's Polar Logic and its derivatives, the 
Pentad and the tetractys,man aspires to gaze upon eternity 
which is given focus in the Identity, transcending both 
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thesis and antithesis,and that One in which polar forces are 
discovered to be necessarily unius generis. It is in the 
Fourth Gospel that Coleridge perceives most clearly that 
Christ, the Word is this Identity or Prothesis, and it is 
this which confirms this Gospel as his final principle 
subject of attention. 
One momentous point of superiority in John is his 
clear insight into the identity of the Word and the 
Universal Light, or the substantiality and 
personeity of Reason ..... 
The 3 first Gospels seem rather to contain the 
prefatory truths, the moral principles necessary in 
order for Christianity, and the Epistles have all 
the appearance of occasional writings, presupposing 
a previous communication of the scheme, and the 
const~t~ent 9,rticles of faith, that formed it's expos1t1on. . 
I 
In a sense, all these notebooks of 18q-34 are the prayer 
of a man who is tragically aware of his own inadequacies, and 
whose desparately won faith in the Divine mystery was the 
culmination of a life-long intellectual struggle. 
Before God I prostrate myself in the dust, thankfully 
confessing that my sufferings have been in no proportion 
to my demerits, and that the Graces ~ Comforts, that 
have been vouchsafed me, have been beyond all utterance 
His free and sovereign Goodness - without a pretence of 
claim on my part - coals of fire heaped on my unworthy 
will to melt it down by gracious force i~go - what? 
0 marvel! 0 mystery of loving-kindness! 
]. Christianity the One true Philosophy 
I therefore go, and join head, heart and hand, 
Active and firm, to fight the bloodless fight 99 Of Science, Freedom, and the Truth in Christ. 
The purpose so boldly expressed in 1796 was to remain with 
Coleridge throughout his life, until its unfulfilment was 
finally recognized in the last, sad comment of the Table Talk, 
dated 10 July 1834, only two weeks before his death: 
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- so I own I wish life and strength had been spared to 
me to complete my Philosophy. For, as God hears me, 
the originating, continuing, and sustaining wish and 
design in my heart were to exalt the glory of his 
name; and, which is the same thing in other words, to 
promote the improvement of 1 5~nkind. But visum aliter 
Deo, and his will be done.~ v 
The three manuscript volumes in the Library of Victoria 
University in Toronto are the fragmentary remains of 
Coleridge's 'Great Work', called by ~m variously the 
Logosophia, Eidoloclastes, Assertion of Religion, 
and Opus Maximum. 101 These, with other fragments, 
magnum opus 
are now 
being edited by Thomas McFarland for the Collected Works. 
But, as has already been noted, Biographia Literaria seems 
to have been originally envisaged as a prelude to the main 
work. 102 Arguably, the same is true of Aids to Reflection, 
Logic and Theory of Life. 103 All, indeed, of Coleridge's 
major work is subsidiary to the great, uncompleted fragment. 
Coleridge's task may, indeed, have been, in the end, 
impossible; or perhaps the Opus Maximum should be placed 
beside 1 Kubla Khan' and 1Christabel 1 , as a fragment which is 
a Romantic form and a part of a whole which can only be 
intimated in the fragment. The critical history of the work 
seems to suggest that it is extremely difficult to resist the 
impulse to reconstruct the whole, and to supply the missing 
stairs in the winding steps of the old ruined tower. 104 Sam 
Barnes, who suggests that the Theory of Life is, perhaps 
unintentionally, Coleridge's nearest approach to accomplishing 
his projected work, admits that he finally falters when he 
approaches the projected conclusion, the 'truth in Christ' 
that man, as the highest form of individuation in Nature, was 
to return to God. 
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Thus, then, Life itself is not a thing - a self-
subsistent hypostasis - but an act and process; 
which, pitiable as the prejudice will appear to the 
forts esprits, is a great deal more than either my 
reason would authorize or my conscience allow me 
to assert - concerning the Sou1~5 as the principle both of Reason and Conscience. 
In the end, therefore, the Opus Maximum must, almost by 
definition, remain.a fragment, enunciating the whole of which 
it is the representative. 
Coleridge 1 s 'letter of September 1814 to Daniel Stuart, 
which outlines in details his plans for the great work has 
already been noted. There are, scattered through the letters 
and notebooks, numerous similar sketches, dividing the 
. t . 1 . t f f. . t. l06 proJeC var1ous y 1n o our, 1ve or s1x sec 1ons. In a 
note, dated by Professor Cobu~n as 1815-16, Coleridge remarks 
on his 1 6 Discourses on the Logos', establishing a rough 
system for collecting and organizing material for the work. 107 
What is noteworthy is the devotional tone of the comments, 
which are directed against institutional Christianity and its 
abuses. His purpose is: 
In the "Logos" to reperuse Taylor 1 s Works, especially 
his sermons, in order to expose the errors and the 
sources of the errors, of Judaizing Christianity - or 
the return to the beggarly Elements. - Till the Light 
of Immortality was brought by Christ. 
In some ways the task was done many years later in Aids to 
Reflection which is, essentially, the fresh perusal of 
another seventeenth century divine, Archbishop Leighton. In 
fact, Aids is linked to the Opus Maximum on a number of 
occasions by Coleridge. On 12 April 1824, he wrote to 
Wordsworth that he was working hard on his 'Leighton' and his 
'Logic' as a preparation for the greater work which was to 
108 follow. A year later he wrote to his nephew, John Taylor 
Coleridge, that his principal concerns in both Aids and the 
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projected work is the Trinity, but that Aids is merely a 
preparatory stage. 
In the 'Aids to Reflection' I have touched on the 
Mystery of the Trinity only in a negative way. That 
is, I have shewn the hollowness of the arguments by 
which it has been assailed- ... But the positive 
establishment of the Doctrine as involved in the 
Idea, God - together with the Origin of EVIL, as 
distinguished from Original Sin ... and the Creation 
of the iisible World - THESE as absolutely requiring 
the habit of abstraction, and sev~V~ Thinking, I 
have reserved for my larger Work. 
As early as 1806, Coleridge had described his purpose of 
articulating a 'vital head-and-heart FAITH' which was 
Trinitarian and practical inasmuch as it effected redemption 
110 by the 'necessary assumption of humanity by the Word'. 
In the same letter to George Fricker, he had vowed that his 
work would contradict the mode of defending Christianity 
adopted by the Dutch theologian Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and 
by Paley, which encouraged men to look out of themselves and 
of their nature instead of looking into their own souls. 
The demand for 'evidences' -rejected so impatiently in Aids 
- was to be a major point of attack in the Opus Maximum, and 
in 1827, Coleridge continued to refer to his purpose of 
undermining the 1 Grotian and Paleyan defences' of 'the 
h 'l h d h. t f Ch . t. . t I 111 p 1 osop y an lS ory o r1s 1an1 y . 
For at least thirty years, theri, Coleridge displays a 
remarkable consistency in his plans for the great work. 
Towards the end of his life, the devotional note which is 
heard in the notebook entry of 1815-16, becomes clearer. In 
1827 he 1:1rote to J. Blanco White, in despair· of ever 
bringing the chaos of his thoughts into order. Yet the 
fervour which the growing sense of his own inadequacies 
engenders may be for the best. 
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I have but a few hours back announced myself to my 
friend, as the author of a SYSTEM of Philosophy on 
Nature, History, Reason, Revelation; on the Eternal, 
and on the Generations of the Heaven and the Earth, 
and I am unable to solve the problem of my own 
Dreams! ... Well for me if these vexations of the 
Night increase the dread of being suffered to fall 
back upon the wild activities and restless chaos 
of my own corrupt Nature! Well, if they increase 
the fervency with which 112pray, Thy kingdom come! in the world within me! 
Four months later, a letter to George Skinner, a fellow of 
Jesus College, Cambridge, locates Coleridge's final labours 
on the Opus Maximum firmly within the devotional, almost 
enraptured, mood of the later notebooks. 
I have been for some time past swallowed up in the one 
anxiety of arranging and increasing my huge pile of 
Manuscripts, so that the substance at least of the 
results of my logical, physiological, philosophical, 
theological, biblical, and I hope I am entitled to 
add religious and Christian studies and meditations 
for the last 20 years of my life might be found in a 
state capable of being published by my dear Friend 
Mr Green ... I thank God that this is so far effected 
that should He call me tomorrow, I shall leave the 
world in the humble trust that my daily morning and 
evening supplications offered in the very words of 
the Psalmist (Psalm 7lst.) had been heard, ... and 
that the power & life of Christ our Redemrner will so 
precipitate the remaining evil of my corrupt nature 
as that cleansed by his spiritual blood my spirit 
may rise a pure capacity of him, blind to be 
irradiated with his light, empty to be filled from 
his fullness, and naked to be clothed with his 
Righteousness - in him & thro' him to be united with 
the Eternal 0~1~ the Author of my Being and its 
u 1 t i rna t e En d • 
The religious fervour, however, did not mean the abandonment 
of intellectual rigour. In a very business-like letter to 
J. H. Green of 1829, which quotes Eichhorn and refers to a 
careful study of the Greek of the New Testament, Coleridge 
outlines in detail the biblical studies which form the 
substance of his last notebooks, studies well-versed in 
114 
contemporary biblical criticism, and deeply devotional. 
The point of stressing the devotional and prayerful 
qualities which are increasingly apparent in the last years 
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of Coleridge's writings and his growing sense of the religious 
purpose of the Opus Maximum, is not merely to suggest that 
as an old man he became a more devout Christian. Rather~ the 
energies involved reflect his life as a poet and critic of 
the imagination. It has been suggested that his preoccupation 
with the Opus Maximum tended.to draw off his poetic energies, 
resulting in a drying up of the poetry, 115 and it is true 
that at one stage, at least, Coleridge's anxiety to proceed 
with his 'great philosophical work' led him to feel that 
'poetry is out of the question' . 116 
However, Coleridge continued to write poetry which in 
both form and image continued to reflect and explore his 
philosophical and theological preoccupations, and to warm 
them with a shaping spirit of imagination. It was as a poet, 
uniting head and heart, that Coleridge continued to feel the 
need for Christianity, the one true philosophy. An example 
of the cross-currents between the later poems and the later 
religious verse is the image of himself as 1blind to be 
irradiated with his light' in the letter to George Skinner in 
1828. It is found again, explored more fully in the 'old 
Man with a steady Look sublime' in 1 Limbo 1 • 117 Blind, the 
old man gazes and irradiates the light of some divine inward 
experience, and so, by reflection he appears to contemplate 
the Divine - 1He seems to gaze at that which seems to gaze on 
Him! 1 (1.30). Or again, the rustic who experiences the 
Bracken Spectre in 'Constancy to an Ideal Object' might be 
Coleridge himself in his last. years, 1 enamoured 1 of the great 
truths which he 'pursues' in the illumination of his 
consciousness and reflections. 
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Perhaps most significant, however, is a long and complex 
discussion of the Opus Maximum in a letter to J. H. Green 
written on 12 August 1829. In essence it follows the 
pattern and themes of the many other plans for the work. It 
is religious in its concern with God and the Spirit. It also 
develops the discussion at length in terms of polarity and 
the tetractys. But it is all shifted into the sphere of 
aesthetics, the beautiful and 'a complete Theory of the Fine 
Arts'. Coleridge's concern is the Idea of the Beautiful. 
The only thought indeed that I can recollect which 
possibly might have led me to the true Idea ... was 
an anticipation and half perception that in the 
distinctities of the Godhead the Beautiful or Essential 
Beauty belonged to the SPIRIT, or the Indifference 
(Mesothesis) of Will and Mind in the form of celestial 
Life, and in accordance with this and no less a 
consequence or corollary of your view, 1. the Good 
(= the Holy one, the abysmal Will) is the Absolute 
Subject - 2. the Father, = I am, the Subjective: 
J. the word or Reason (o !£)\"1e~5 ) the Objective: 
4, the Spirit, or Life = Love, the Subjective 
Objective ..... 
... the Beautiful is an Idea -the spirit of this 
or that object - but not the object in toto - as Beauty 
adequately realized. As you truly observed, it is 
the subjective in the form of the objective - a 
fortioPi, not the objective in contradistinction 
from the Subjective. We behold our own light reflected 
from the object as light bestowed by it. The Beauty 118 
of the object consists in its fitness to reflect it. 
Once again Coleridge meditates upon the theme of the blind 
old man in 'Limbo', the reflection of light between observer 
and observed, subject and object. An Idea, whether of the 
Beautiful, or of God, Self or Freedom, 119 is that 'which is 
given by the knowledge of its ultimate aim', may be true 
without ever having been realized as a historical 'fact', and 
1 b l . d t . f . . t 12 O Th B t . f 1 may on y e rea 1ze a 1n 1n1 y. e eau 1 u as an 
Idea involves in some way a resolution between the terms 
subjective andj>bjective. Here, therefore, in the realm of 
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art and aesthetics, linked with an underlying discussion of 
the Divine as Trinity, Coleridge is discussing what is the 
essential purpose of the Opus Maximum, which is a 'hope of 
achieving a systematic reconciliation of the 'I am' and the 
'it is' . 121 And if this purpose of the great work is finally 
theological, its crown to be 'a detailed commentary on the 
Gospel of St. John' , 122 Coleridge's language in his 
preparatory discussions, as in the letter to J. H. Green, is 
closely related also to his most important discussion on the 
nature of the primary and secondary imagination in Biographia 
Literaria ('the Father= I am, the Subjective': 'a repetition 
in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM.'). 
Another, slightly later, letter to Green develops the 
discussion of subjective/objective into the realm of the 
doctrine of revelation. 
My principle has ever been that Reason is subjective 
Revelation, Revelation objective Reason - and that 
our business is not to derive Authority from the 
mythoi of the Jews & the first Jew-Christians (i.e. 
the 0. and N. Testament) but to give it to them -
never to assume their stories as facts, any more than 
you would Quack Doctors' affidavits on oath before 
the Lord Mayor - and very in point of the old Bailey 
Evidence this is a flattering representation of the 
Paleyan Evidence - but by science to confirm the 
Facit, kindly afforded to beginners in Arithmetic. 
If I lose my faith in Reason, as the perpetual 
revelation, I lose my faith altogether. I must 
deduce the objective from the subjective Revelation, 
or it is no longer a rl~Jlation for me, but a beastly 
fear and superstition. 
Where the eighteenth century demanded external evidence and 
124 proof rather than reason which is its own evidence, 
Coleridge's appeal was to experience and the developing self-
consciousness of the human subject. While for his 
predecessors an image might be merely the work of the fancy, 
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recreated from what is simply remembered, its use perhaps only 
decorative, for Coleridge the image or symbol could be the 
product of the creative imagination, pointing beyond itself 
to a scarcely perceived whole or absolute. Finally, where 
religion had been shrivelled by a dry eighteenth century 
rationalism with its basis in Locke's epistemology, and 
which 'failed to state the rightful place of the imagination 
in human experience' , 125 Coleridge re-founded the authority 
of the Bible in the reflective experience of man and human 
subjectivi-t-y. Belief was thus reasonable, aesthetic and 
ethical. In the Opus Maximum, above all, would this coherence 
be demonstrated, for there, in Stephen Happel's words, 
... he would be able to show a doctrine of God and 
all things in relation to the Divine as the infinite 
coherence of subjectivity and self-objectification -
an infinite "I AM" - the Absolutely Adequate, Self-
revising Subject, upon which, 1~grough which, and in 
which all take their meaning. 
Thus the reader of a book which is largely about poetry, the 
Biographia Literaria, is prepared by Coleridge's deliberate 
enhancement of the consciousness of the reading process for 
a deeper understanding of the doctrine of revelation and of 
the Divine. 
Laurence Lockridge in his book, Coleridge the Moralist 
(1977), criticizes the Opus Maximum manuscripts and suggests 
that in his moral writings Coleridge tends to be personal and 
to avoid abstractions. His concern, in other words, is the 
practical one of enabling people to overcome the problems 
facing them in their human nature and, by realizing their 
capacity to intuit and create, to excite them to a 'sense of 
their individuality•. 127 In a letter of 1819, two of the 
'Postulates' Coleridge establishes for his great work are that 
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it should be 1 grounded 1 and that it should not be grounded in 
b . 128 an a stract~on. At the root of this practical purpose 
behind his most important work is his old sense of failure and 
personal inadequacy, and his need for a Redeemer. He had 
written to his brother George in 1802, that he clung to his 
faith: 
not because I understand it; but because I feel, that 
it is not only suitable to, but needful for, my 12 
nature and because I find it clearly revealed ..... 9 
In March 1830, notebook 43 opens with a long 'prayer to the 
Redeemer' . 130 
Although in the 1825 letter to his nephew, which is 
quoted above (p.112 ), Coleridge suggests a distinction between 
the origin of evil and original sin, his extended discussion 
of the subject in Aids to Reflection fails to make this 
distinction clear. What is clear from Aids is that neither 
evil nor moral guilt are begotten of God, for if they were, 
they would be co-eternal with him. 131 The Fall is defined as 
willing actuality in the self, rather than God, and sin is 
the enslavement of the will by the rejection of its own law 
(for it is ultimately coincident with the will of God) in 
favour of mere natural inclination. The task of the Redeemer 
is to enable the resumption of this law, and the nature of 
the Redeemer is the final point of focus of Polar Logic and 
the Opus Maximum. 
And I believe in the descension and condescension of 
the Divine Spirit, Word, Father, and Incomprehensible 
Ground of all - and that he is a God who seeketh that 
which was lost, and that the whole world of Phaenomena 
is a revelation of the Redemptive Process, of the Deus 
Patiens, or Deitas Objectiva beginning in the 
separation of Life from Hades, which under the control 
of the Law= Logos= Unity- becomes Nature, i.e., th~t 
which never is but natura est, is to be, from the brute 
Multeity, and Indistinction, a~~2 is to end with the 
union with God in the Pleroma. 
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The means of achieving this ultimate aim of union with God 
in the Pleroma is clarified by a marginal note which Coleridge 
made in Derwent Coleridge's copy of the 1818 Friend. Christ 
is described as 1 the Logos, Deitas objectiva, centered 
Humanity (always pre-existing in the Pleroma) 1 • 133 He alone 
is capable of bringing about man's union, in the Pleroma, 
with God. The Incarnation is the manifestation in time of 
an eternal, or timeless act, and here it is necessary to 
recall that Coleridge's 'free will' or 1 absoJute self 1 is 
supratemporal, that is 'co-extensive and co-present' ; 134 that 
'time per se 1 is compresent in one moment which is also 
eternal. By his Life, manifested in time, Christ becomes 
'the Light =Reason, of mankind'. Coleridge concludes his 
marginal note that Christ 
Lwas made flesh: John 1.1_4.7 - & dwelt 
among men, an individual Man, in order that he might 
dwell in all his ~~3ct, as the Root of the divine 
Humanity in time. 
Coleridge is well aware of the necessary paradox of the 
Incarnation that it is in history and particular, yet also an 
ideal and of eternity. It is simply not true that, as David 
Pym argues, 1 so eager was he to view revelation in terms of 
the "existential now", expressed in the language of a Platonist 
metaphysic, that he stated the Incarnation as a union of the 
Logos with 'ideal man' and lost the essential New Testament, 
and especially Pauline, teaching of the 11 once-for-allness 11 
of the Christ event, as an occurrence in space and time' . 136 
This argument fails to perceive that Coleridge changed his 
views on St. Paul and developed a much more sophisticated 
approach to his Epistles than Pym supposes. In notebook 39 
(1829), Coleridge admits that, as opposed to the Fourth 
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Gospel, Paul did indeed contemplate 'the Protogenes only as 
a Person, subjectively' . 137 As his commentary on Romans 
developed, however, he admitted that this was an inadequate 
appraisal. Later in 1829 he wrote: 
I think now I understand this 5th Chapter. The 
Apostle's purpose was to prepare the minds of the 
converts for that more spiritual character of Our 
Lord by which he dwells in the Faithful,that he who 
dwelt among m1~ 8for a short time dwelleth in the 
elect always. 
After his early 'rage for metaphysics', Coleridge, with 
increasing insistence, emphasizes the need to establish the 
historical basis of Christianity, with its focus in the 
character of Jesus, and the necessary assumption of human 
nature by the Logos. If, indeed, the Opus Maximum was to 
achieve the reconciliation of the 'I am' and the 'it is 1 , 
these poles were to be represented by the Fourth Gospel and 
the pantheistic Spinoza, and, 139 reflecting upon his early 
philosophical years, Coleridge admitted that 'my head was with 
Spinoza 1 while 'my whole heart remained with Paul and John 1 • 14° 
Paul and John, then, were drawn together in Christ the 
1
./_\_Gyo) 8E~-vGf>l.YIT~ 1 • The historical, human Jesus requires 
the ideal Christ; Polar Logic ensures their homogeneity, and 
that they are unius generis. In the Pentad of Operative 
Christianity, Christ, the Word is the prothesis, the identity 
of thesis and antithesis and the one of which the many are 
parts. Furthermore, like the symbol as it is defined in The 
Statesman's Manual, Christ's individuality in history is the 
necessary particular through which the universal is perceived, 
his temporality a reflection on eternity. In Christ 'that 
union and interpenetration of the universal and the 
particular' point to an infinity, and the figure in history 
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acts as a mirror to God's enlightenment.l4l The drawing 
together of all human energies in a faith which culminates in 
the meeting of God and man, is finally described in the 'Essay 
on Faith' which was first published ln The Literary Remains 
(1838-9), possibly as a part of the uncompleted 'Supplementary 
volume' which Coleridge refers to in Aids to Reflection. 
- Faith must be a Light originating in the Logos, 
or the substantial Reason, which is co-eternal and 
one with the Holy Will, and which Light is at the 
same time the Life of men. Now, as Life is here 
the sum or collective of all moral and spiritual 
acts, in suffering, doing, and being, so is Faith 
the source and the sum, the energy and the principle 
of the fidelity of Man to God, by the subordination 
of his human Will, in all provinces of his nature, 
to his Reason, as the sum of spiritual Truth, 1 2 
representing and manifesting the Will Divine. 4 
Christ, the Logos, is the sum of spiritual Truth -
Christianity the one true philosophy. 
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VIII CONCLUSION. INSPIRATION AND REVEtATION 
If religion is concerned with the relat.ion between man 
and nature, or between man and God. if it must explore 
the difference between time and eternity, between 
goodness and badness, between the helplessness and the 
power of human beings, between their deep solitude and 
their superficial sociability, then knowledge of such 
things must come from the significance we find in our 1 
sensory experience, in what we actually see and hear. 
Thus wrote Mary Warnock in an article published in Theology 
in November 1980, entitled 'Imagination- Aesthetic and 
Religious'. This study has sought to trace in Coleridge's 
writings his endeavours to perceive the nature of divine 
revelation in his experience of poetic inspiration and 
creativity. His habits of self-reflection prompted his 
insights into the psychology of belief, and his concern for 
languate as a poet led him to a concern for the nature of 
'God-language' in theology and religious discourse. This 
final chapter is not so much a conclusion in a formal sense, 
as it does not attempt to draw together and sum up the 
arguments of those which precede it. Rather, it seeks to 
illustrate the continuing importance of those matters which 
concerned Coleridge, as a Christian thinker who worked 
primarily through the categories of literature and poetry. 
Its approach is not historical, nor does it attempt to 
describe writers and theologians who have, in some way, been 
.2.. 
directly influenced by Coleridge, not least because, invariably, 
Coleridge is greater than any ex~mple given, slipping through 
'3 
its confines with an elusive abundance of creativity. 
Austin Farrer's work in our own century may be regarded 
as the practical working out, in a deeply literary theologian, 
of Coleridge's notion of Polar Logic. There is little direct 
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evidence of Coleridge's influence on Farrer, and he is chosen, 
in part, to illustrate the universality of Coleridge's 
concerns. Farrer was fascinated by the analogy between divine 
!. 
self·"disclosure and human self-disclosure,__,. and by the 
processes of reflection upon the self as made in God's image. 
He recognized the similarity in the processes of poetry and 
divine inspiration and the importance of perceiving that 
while they are ultimately necessarily different, they also 
require and suppose each other. Farrer was a theologian who 
read the Bible as a work of literature and whose faith and 
theology was profoundly affected as a result. Coleridge, in 
his own day, was a p-oet who discovered in the literature and 
poetry of the Bible an enlightening mystery which uniquely 
illuminated the religious matter of the relationship between 
man and God, the finite and the infinite. 
l. Metaphysical philosophy, scriptural reveJation and poetry. 
Austin Farrer's The Glass of Vision (1948) 
The lectures which follow are no more than a modest 
attempt to state what I do, in fact, think about 
the relation borne to one another by three things -
the sense of metaphysical philosophy, the sense of 
scriptural revelation, and the sense of poetry ..... 
These three things rubbing against one another in 
my mind, seem to kindle one an~ther, and so I am 
moved to ask how this happens. 
These opening words of Austin Farrer's Bampton Lectures for 
1948, The Glass of Vision immediately link it with the themes 
of the present study of Coleridge. There were two major 
critical attacks on The Glass of Vision in the 1950's, one 
theological by H. D. Lewis in his book, Our Experience of 
God (1959), one literary by Dame Helen Gardner in her Riddell 
Memorial Lectures, The Limits of Literary Criticism (1956). 
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Farrer defended himself against both his critics in his paper 
'Inspiration: Poetical and Divine.' (1963). But the debate 
has not ended there, for it has been renewed in the recent 
exchanges between Professor Frank Kermode, whose book The 
Genesis of Secrecy (1979) rests heavily on Farrer's work on 
St. Mark's Gospel, and again Helen Gardner, in her latest 
book In Defence of the Imagination (1982). This argument 
involves now a conservative defending herself against a 
structuralist criticism - and it is the structuralist who 
looks back to Farrer. 
But first the earlier debate should be considered in 
outline. Professor Lewis first turns his attention to 
Farrer's statements about the authority of certain images 
whose terms 'are taken from our finite experience but which 
have a reference beyond that experience' . 6 Farrer's point in 
The Glass of Vision had been quite clear: 'The choice, use 
and combination of images made by Christ and the Spirit must 
be simply a supernatural work ..... The images are 
supernaturally formed, and supernaturally made intelligible 
to faith. • 7 Lewis respects Farrer's development of his 
position, that a religious image may be capable of accretions 
of meaning in new contexts and almost a life of its own. But 
his questionings begin with what he regards as Farrer's 
inability to distinguish between these regulative religious 
images and other images. 8 Lewis' criticism can readily be 
illustrated from The Glass of Vision. Does it help to make 
the required distinction, for example, when Farrer asserts 
that 'within the field of revealed truth, the principal 
images provide a canon to the lesser images'? (p.lll). Or 
again, that natural theology may provide a rule of 1 a highly 
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general kind', affording analogies for supernaturally formed 
images and 1a rule by which to regulate our intuition of what 
they mean'? (p.llO). 
Lewis does, however, admit the role which natural 
theology must play. Presumably he would not quibble with 
Farrer's suggestion that: 
The apostles were not, indeed, philosophers: but the 
philosophy of natural knowledge presupposes the 
knowledge it analyses and refines, and that natural 
knowledge, in abundant measure, the apostles had. 
What God bestowed on them through Christ was revelation 
of God's particular action. They had not known before 
that God would send his Son for us men and our 
salvation, but they had known that God was God; and 
what they now learnt was not that some superhuman 
Father had sent his Son, but that God had done so. 
Natural theology, the~ provides a canon of interpretation 
which stands outside the particular matter of revealed 
truth. 
(pp.ll0-11) 
This reflects almost exactly, Coleridge's position in the 
1Confessio Fidei'. Lewis follows Farrer thus far, but as 
soon as he moves into the realm of particularity he begins to 
ask questions. Lewis points out that if the course of God's 
particular action can simply be educed out of the idea or 
knowledge of his being, then revelation is barely necessary. 
The question must be asked again, what principle of 
selection is to be applied to distinguish between the 
'principal' and the 'lesser' images? 
Lewis criticizes the ambiguity of Farrer's account of 
religion as the 1 supernaturalizing of events in the existing 
world' ,9 since Farrer appears to want it both ways- that an 
event be supernaturalized and also retain the fullness of its 
independent natural character. It is at this point that he 
begins to write in terms of 'a double personal agency in our 
one activity' (p.3J), that is of seeing happenings in the 
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world as acts both of God and of man. This concept of double 
agency rests upon something very like Coleridge's Polar Logic, 
'opposite, not contrary powers', and seeing the universal in 
the particular and the particular necessarily requiring the 
universal. Farrer, in his way, was a poet - and Professor 
Lewis does not seem to respond readily to what is poetic. 
Farrer lays the primacy firmly upon the images, and 
revelation presents 'the extreme example of irreducible 
imagery' 10 Lewis seems to assume that, if this is the 
case, such images must necessarily be self-authenticating. 
But for Farrer, as for Coleridge of Biblical revelation, 11 
this need not be so. For Farrer certainly does not subscribe 
to what naturally follows from this, that we take the 
substance of the Bible and Biblical imagery, ab initio, as 
ultimate and beyond question. Images, rather, are to be 
tested by experience and must answer to the deepest demands 
of man's spirit. Lewis himself believes that God works 
primarily in the world through 'the very substance of living' 
rather than 1given images' . 12 Images, therefore, are 
generated in the context of human activity. Farrer - content 
again to live with paradox - suggests that particular 'given 
images', when tested in universal experience, will be 
discovered to characterize man as he properly is, made in 
God's image. Revelation must be found .in both image and 
experience, and not simply experience untreated by a 
necessary and 'irreducible imagery'. 
Lewis' final criticism of The Glass of Vision is in the 
context of his discussion of art and religion. He refers 
particularly to Farrer's distinction between poetry and 
prophecy, and, once again, he has a one-sided view. For 
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Lewis, poetry and prophecy are ultimately one and the same, 
so that poetry and religion will, in the end, merge into one 
another. 13 But he fails to perceive the delicacy of Farrer's 
di~tinction. The prophetJ certainly, is not necessarily the 
poet, and of the prophet Farrer writes that 
What he has got to say is determinate and particular, 
it is what the Lord God declares and requires on the 
day which he speaks. It is designed to evoke not an 
exquisite and contemplative realization of human 1 
existence, but particular practical responses to God. 4 
Nevertheless, Farrer continues, 1 the poetical character of 
the prophetic utterance' is nat immaterial, since 'poetry, 
for the prophet, is a technique of divination, in the poetic 
process he gets his message' (p.l28). Thus, what the prophet 
and poet share is the technique of inspiration. B~~~ writes 
Farrer, 1 mo~e an incantation of images under a control' 
(p.l29). But all poetry is not therefore prophetic or 
religious. Literature and its insights may indeed irrigate 
the religious imagination, at the heart of which remains the 
irreducible mystery. Farrer might even go so far as to 
suggest that as the controlling images are tested in 
experience, so divine illumination is not so much a vision, 
but, as Coleridge expressed it, a 'state of consciousness' 
or an 'inward experience' . 15 Yet it has a particularity 
perceived in the common experience - again the Polar Logic: 
poetry and religion, necessarily different while supposing 
and requiring each other. 
In The Limits of Literary Criticism, subtitled 
'Reflections on the Interpretation of Poetry and Scripture', 
Helen Gardner criticized The Glass of Vision in her role as 
literary critic. She concentrated upon one point only, 
Farrer's discussion of the ending of St. Mark's Gospel, and 
writes: 
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He approaches the literary criticism of the New 
Testament with a mind st~ped in secular literature 
both ancient and modern, and he sh,ows himself fully 
aware of the parallels between what he is doing and 
what is being done by modern cr.itics of poetry. How 
whole-heartedly he had adopted the methods of modern 
literary criti~ism can be ~een from his handling in 
The Glass of Vi~ion ... of a classic problem in the 
New Testament. 
Farrer treats the abrupt ending of St. Mark, the words 
, as a literary question, examining parallels 
and structures, or what he calls the 'formal recurrences of 
St. Mark's poetical magic 1 • 17 The Gospel then demands that 
we see it as an overall pattern, 'all cohering in a 
t t f . I 18 s rue ure o mean1ng Farrer parallels the Marean 
narrative with the Old Testament story of Joseph, the last 
words of the Gospel echoing the Septuagint version of the 
reaction of Joseph's brnthers when his true identity in 
) ~ / 
Egypt is revealed, - 'E<\x:>~o,.JvTo yo(~ 1 
- 'for they were 
afraid 1 • 
Miss Gardner's criticism is primarily historical. In 
all these literary parallels and structures, what we see, 
she says, is not the 'mind and imagination of St. Mark, but 
the 'lively and fertile mind and ... profoundly poetic and 
Christian imagination' of Dr. Farrer 1 • 19 True, she admits 
that Farrer does say that 'the principal importance of St. 
Mark's Gospel lies in its historical content', yet 
nevertheless his 'method is often oblivious of, and impatient 
~ith, the historical' (p.36). Coleridge, similarly has been 
criticized inasmuch as 'he failed to conceive of {Jesus 
~f\ 
Chris.!:_.! as being a particularlwith his own peculiar 
characteristics' . 20 Miss Gardner, however, concludes with 
some curious remarks. 
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It is surely an odd phrase to speak of St. Mark's 
imagination being 1 controlled 1 by facts. If we 
believe that what he is recording are facts - and 
that is the crux of the matter between Christian 
and non-Christian - then it is surely filled by 
the wonder of those facts, and not merely respectful 
to them. It is curious that the study of images, 
which began from a high theory of thB imagination's 
power to apprehend the truth and value of experience, 
and to express its apprehension of the world, has 
led only too often in practice to an ignoring of 
the primary imagination, which degrades the secondary, 
or creative, imagination into an instrument for 
perceiving analogies and making connexions. (p.37) 
It is strange that her criticism of Farrer should conclude by 
calling up Coleridge on the primary and secondary 
imagination, since Farrer in many ways might have been 
schooled by Coleridge. For Helen Gardner, history is 
composed of irrefutable facts, and Christianity must stick 
to them. But she does not seem to be aware of the problem 
and paradox of the incarnation as the a-historical and 
a-temporal breaking into history. The particularity of 
Christianity is always a problem for the poet, and Helen 
Gardner, like Professor Lewis, fails to see that image anG 
imagination plays upon the historical, seeing the eternal 
through the temporal and the universal through the 
particular. 
Farrer replied to Lewis and Gardner in his paper 
'Inspiration: Poetical and Divine 1 • 21 He was unrepentant and 
vigorous in his defence of The Glass of Vision. Once again, 
he draws close parallels between the processes of 'religious 
seers and secular poets'. But, he continues: 
... it is most necessary to emphasize the limitations 
attaching to the parallel. Religious seers and 
secular poets may be led to seek inspiration in these 
similar ways; but the fact casts no light whatsoever 
on the fundamental mystery of divine inspiration. 
Shelley uses certain methods to set his imagination 
acting; and this gives his imagination scope to act. 
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St. John uses similar methods; and this gives the 
Holy Ghost scope to move his imagination . 
... Belief in inspiration is a metaphysical belief; 
it is the belief that the Creator everywhere underlies 
the creature, with the added faith that at certain 
points he acts in, as, and through the creature's 
mind. We have argued that if this really happens a 
part will be played by the imagination. Imagination, 
in such an employment, will be suppled and made 
responsive or creative; there will surely be an 
analogy here to the workings of the poetic mind. 
But that which obtains expression in the two sorts 
of case will be widely different~ 2and so will be the significance of the product. 
This is both disturbing and yet, somehow, right and adequate. 
No doubt Lewis and Gardner will continue to say that he wants 
to have it both ways, and, in the end, how can we tell the 
difference between the religious seer and the secular poet? 
Certainly a common criticism levelled against Coleridge, 
despite his many writings on the Bible, is that Scripture, 
Nature and almost all literary and artistic products of the 
imagination are equally sources of 1 revelation 1 • 23 Is 'The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner' a religious poem, or not? 
Coleridge's answer is no less unsatisfactory and no less 
true than Farrer's; try it, and see! In literature, the 
Bible, he claimed, 'finds me at a greater depth of my being 
Ltha£7 all other books put together' . 24 The difference, 
however, is one of degree. Where the principal images work 
with the Spirit within the poetic imagination they will work 
in a unique and unmistak_able way upon man's spiritual 
constitution and needs. 
But all this needs disinfecting with a strong dose of 
hard-headed criticism. It is supplied in the renewed debate 
in which Helen Gardner is engaged, on almost exactly the 
same ground, with Professor Frank Kermode. In 1969, Kermode 
published a paper in the journal Modern Language Notes 
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entitled 'The Structures of Fiction' . 25 He begins thus. 
The question is whether there is a chance that some 
mode of structural analysis can satisfy the 
requirements of criticism, if we take those to be: 
first, that there should be available for any work 
we take to be worthy of preservation and of public 
interest some fairly systematic account which is 
itself acceptable to an informed public; and 
secondly that this account should try tc tell the 
truth and know how much of the truth it can tell. 
Kermode takes his criticism into the world of structuralism26 
and uses as one of his examples of the determination of 
structure and meaning, Farrer on St. Mark's Gospel in The 
Glass of Vision and A Study of St. Mark (1951). His concern 
is with typological structure and pattern, precisely those 
things which were regarded with such suspicion by Miss 
Gardner. Certainly he is very well aware of her fears that 
the study of the Gospel by structural analysis (and Kermode 
groups Farrer with Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes as a 
'structuralist') disastrously reduces the historical actuality 
and immediacy which most Christians seek in it. However, 
Kermode 1 s contention is that the Gospel writer is dealing 
with a story in which nothing is merely historisch, all is 
geschichtlich. 27 The universal importance of the literal 
truth of the story is evoked by a deliberate and sometimes, 
indeed, artificial patterning and structuring which establishes 
necessarily (and not randomly, as in purely fictional 
narrative) the authority of the 'principal images, those 
peculiar to divine revelation. Thus the Gospel rests upon, 
and yet moves beyond, the plain facts, for, says Kermode: 
If Farrer is to be believed, a narrative which we 
should regard as of the highest historical importance 
merely as a plain account of what happened, is yet 
at the same time very elaborately structured. 
(p.905) 
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It is precisely in this deep structure that the irreduceable 
mystery which always eludes description is said to lie (p.915). 
Here Helen Gardner returns to the lists, and her 
complaints against Kermode in her latest book, In Defence of 
the Imagination (1982), are an almost exact repetition of 
her complaints against The Glass of Vision in 1956, that the 
author of St. Mark's Gospel is reduced to 1 a mere exemplar of 
timeless laws governing the development of narrative of all 
d k . d' 28 an every ln . Kermode had elaborated his defence of 
Farrer in an earlier series of Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, 
published in 1979 as The Genesis of Secrecy. The issues 
remain the same . 'As to Farrer', Kermode sadly remarks, 
... his work was rejected by the establishment, and 
eventually by himself, largely because it was so 
literary. The institution knew intuitively that 
such literary elaboration, such emphasis on elements 
that must be called fictive, was unacceptable because 
damaging to what remained of the idea that the gospel 
narratives were still, in some measure, transparent 
upon history ... [Farre~7 assumes that there is an 29 
enigmatic narrative concealed in the manifest one. 
According to Helen Gardner, Farrer and Kermode offer a Jesus 
who is simply a mirror image of our contemporary selves, and 
the Gospel is merely a set of puzzles or diagrams, there to 
be decoded. 
Indeed, for Kermode it would be true to say that the 
narrative possesses significance, not meaning, and that 
criticism must attend only to how what is said is written and 
not to what it is written about. It is in the intense 
thematic opposition of one puzzle after another that we are 
drawn back, inevitably, to those irreducible,.primary images 
which so troubled Professor Lewis. For this opposition -
Polar Logic again - keeps its meaning 'secret' by producing 
what is, precisely, irreducible - a secrecy which is to be 
perpetually reinterpreted. 
- 240 -
Helen Gardner, on the other hand, demands of criticism 
the elucidation of meaning rather than significance, and 
wishes to safeguard as normative the 1 main 1 or 'literal' 
sense. A narrative, for her, is not a source of 
inexhaustible meanings, although she admits that. great books 
may be almost inexhaustibly fertile. The debate can almost 
be defined in terms of the biblical fundamentalist who holds 
to the primacy of the literal sense of scripture against the 
structuralist, bred upon the structured typology of Farrer's 
analysis of St. Mark. Dr. John Coulson, in his review of 
Miss Gardner's book concludes that 
The underlying question is how we gain meaning when 
the form in which it is contained is the highly 
ambiguou~ one of metaphor, symbol or story. If the 
symbol Lor imag~7 gives rise to thou~et, who verifies 
that_thought, and by what authority? 
Here is a return to the old question. Kermode, now the 
secular critic, side-steps the issue and refers, elusively, 
to 'control by an institution', whatever that means. Farrer 
and Gardner, therefore, are left facing each other once 
again. For Farrer the problem must be, by what authority are 
these particular images confirmed if the literal sense of 
.scripture is continually disturbed by a shifting pattern of 
parallels and types? At base, the problem is one of faith, 
or rather, the nature of the connexion between what we bold 
in the language of faith and what we explain in the derived 
and second-order language of belief. The simple structuralist 
denies the connexion; the biblical fundamentalist denies the 
distinction. Farrer lies somewhere between these extremes, 
the mystery threatened by reductionism on either side, to 
pattern or single meaning. 'Pattern and meaning', writes 
Coulson, 'are dependent upon each other and are separable 
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only for purposes of comprehension'. Once again it is Polar 
Logic, 1both ..• and', not 'either ... or'. 
Literature certainly can never be merely a pattern, but 
yet a pattern demanding perpetual reinterpretation is necessary 
to preserve narrative from the trap of a simple literalism 
or the fetters of normative meaning. Imagination given play 
over certain images which are rooted in a 'given' set of 
historical circumstances, obtains a release from a simple 
adhesion to fact, which is rediscovered afresh in an eternity 
of new circumstances. The mystery is recognized anew, not in 
propositional faith or an assent to metaphysical assertions 
elicited from the primary, literal meaning of scripture, but 
in the perpetual demand of the structure for re-examination 
in the light of experience. Terence Hawkes sums up 
structuralist thinking in this way: 
At its simplest, it claims that the nature of every 
element in any given situation has no significance 
by itself, and in fact is determined by its 
relationship to all the other elements involved in 
that situation. In short, the full significance of 
any entity or experience cannot be perceived unless 
and until it is integr~led into the structure of 
which it forms a part. 
Again, it is significance., not meaning, which is sought for; 
the significance of what is going on between God and man in 
revelation through the processes of inspiration and poetry. 
Farrer concludes The Glass of Vision on precisely this point. 
Poetry and divine inspiration have this in common, 
that both are projected in images which cannot be 
decoded, but must be allowed to signify what they 
signify of the reality beyond them . 
... InspiratiDn does not merely stand at a midway 
point between poetry and metaphysics; it actively 
communicates with both. The subjective process of 
inspiration is essentially poetical, the content 
it communicates is metaphysical. 
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... But what inspiration reveals, it reveals about 
God, so that the thought of the sheer deity of God 
is embedded in the revelation. To think this 
thought out is to enter on a metaphysical enquiry. 
Even if we do not think it out, the thought of sheer 
deity is still the raw material of metaphysics, that 
is to say, it belongs to the natural knowledge of 
God. Without it no supernatur'~ revelation can be 
either received or understood. 
Coleridge, as he sang and snuffled of 1 om-m-mject 1 &nd 
1 sum-m-mject 1 would have approved of this. 33 For God, and 
man made in God's image as a living and creative soul, as 
opposites, the one generated from the other, have a tendency 
to reunion, as 'all polar forces, i.e. opposite, not 
contrary, powers, are necessarily unius generis, 
homogeneous' . 34 
2. A Final Comment 
The influence of Coleridge on the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries is extremely difficult to estimate. In 
1842, F. D. Maurice wrote, 'I rejoice to think that those who 
have most profited by what he has taught them, do not and 
cannot form a school' . 35 In England, a wide diversity of 
people acknowledged their debt to mm; philosophers like 
J. S. Mill, theologians like Julius Hare and F. J. A. Hort, 
or literary men like George MacDonald. In the Church, 
Broadchurchmen and Tractarians felt his attraction. The 
young E. B. Pusey drew extensively, if critically, upon his 
reading of Coleridge for his Lectures on Types and Prophecies 
of the Old Testament (1836), which were much admired by 
Keble, Newman and Isaac Williams, among others. In America, 
Emerson's respect alone would have ensured Coleridge's 
prestige. Yet, by 1884, H. D. Traill was casting doubt on 
- 243 -
the reality of the Coleridge legend. He wrote: 
A few mystics of the type of Maurice, a few eager 
seekers after truth like Sterling, may have gathered, 
or fancied they gathered, distinct dogmatic 
instruction from the Highgate oracles; and no doubt, 
to the extent of his influence over the former of 
these disciples, we may justly credit Coleridge's 
discourses with having exercised a real if only 36 transitory effect upon nineteenth-century thought. 
The legend, nevertheless, persisted and continues to persist, 
irrigating theological and literary discussion. Thus, George 
Watson in his book The Literary Critics (1962) has described 
1a mind passionately in love with free enquiry, concentrated 
and disciplined in its determinati~n to decipher the secret 
of poetic discourse•. 37 
In the twentieth century, investigation is led to seek 
not merely his identifiable influence but the wide diversity 
of thinkers whose work bears an affinity with what Coleridge 
thought. In the fields of phenomenology and philosophy, 
Thomas McFarland has traced valuable similarities in Edmund 
Husserl 1 s Ideas; General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology 
(English translation. 1958), in Jaspers and Heidegger. 38 
In theology, Paul Tillich among others, has spoken of 
religious language with awareness of similar processes in 
poetry and other arts. 39 Nor is Coleridge irrelevant in the 
more recent theological discussion focussing upon the work of 
Don Cupitt, concerning the notion of revelation and in the 
description of Jesus as ironist.4° Finally, poets and 
literary critics have continued to find in Coleridge hints 
and prophecies which seem to be patient of almost limitless 
expansion and suggestiveness. 
But it is Coleridge, the wrecked man seeking the 
assurance of salvation to which the letters and notebooks 
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increasingly point. The vast intellectual effort and the 
tLreLess project of self-reflection are religious tasks 
lasting a· lifetime. To some he remains an enigmatic failure, 
a scavenger in the minds of greater men, and a bad husband 
and father. 'Old Sam was only a poet, you know, never did 
anything practical that was any good to anybody, actually 
not thought of much in the family, a bit of a disgrace in 
fact, taking drugs and not looking after his wife and 
children. Of course STC must have been a wonderful man - in 
•41 
a way -. Somehow, Lord Coleridge has characterized the man 
perfectly. Yet, three weeks before his death, Coleridge 
wrote to his godson.Adam Steinmetz Kennard, summing up, 
perhaps, a lifetime of toil under the sense of sin and 
failure and how these are to be overcome by the paradoxes of 
Christian believing. 
And I thus, on the brink of the grave, solemnly bear 
witness to you, that the Almighty Redeemer, most 
gracious in his promises to them that truly seek Him, 
is faithful to perform what He has promised, & has 
preserved under all my pains and infirmities, the 
inward peace that passeth all understanding, with 
the supporting assurance of a reconciled God, who 
will not withdraw his spirit from me in the conflict, 
& in his own time will deliver me from the Evil One. 
0 my dear Godchild! eminently blessed are they who 
begin early to seek, fear, & love their God, trusting 
wholly in the righteousness & mediation of their 
Lord, Redeemer, Saviour, & everlasting High Priest, 
Jesus Christ. 0! preserve this as a legacy & bequest 
from your unseen Godfather & friend, 42 S. T. Coleridge 
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